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## INTRODUCTION

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The contested yet liberating process of studying men and masculinities is akin to publishing a journal. It is challenging. There are (in)visible barriers that make you either fall into the traps of taken-for-grantedness or lost in the avenues of questions and/or problems. A long process with the awaited “success” which has never been fully ended, as always being dependent on other factors, defines the overall emotional/ professional/ academic journey. However, seeing the “output” throws all of the pain into a sharper relief with new questions in mind.

Today, with our double issue, we are looking back in disquiet, but we are proud to be still dedicated to continue supporting our colleagues to voice their critical evaluations that have the potential to open new avenues of discussions to reveal the intricate ways in which hegemonic power relations are hidden.

The double issue (9<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup>) of *Masculinities: A Journal of Identity and Culture* covering masculinities in relation to different topics as varied as media professionals’ narratives of masculinities, masculinist reasoning in defending democracy, representations of masculinity in photography, performances of black masculinity, gendered identity construction among radical leftist, aging men, masculine identity negotiation and re-positioning of masculinity in Kurdish political movement welcomes readers. The articles, six in English and two in Turkish, cover different representations and constructions of masculinities and offer critical analyses focusing on different geographies including Turkey, Germany, Egypt, France and Greece.

In the current issue, Joel W. Abdelmoez's article opens a discussion on how ideas of masculinities are perceived by English-language media professionals and media audiences in Egypt. The author analyzes the ways in which men are exclusively seen as possessors of power as the head of household and the head of the state both being portrayed as iconized leaders.

Yasmine Taan, in her article entitled "Disrupting Masculinity in Marie al-Khazen's Photographs" analyzes how gender is represented socially and culturally in a number of photographs by an influential artist through complex conventions and significations with a specific focus on representations of masculinity and patriarchy. Taan's analysis is important to reflect different meanings of masculinities as heroic.

Árdís Kristín Ingvarsdóttir's piece, which is based on an ethnographic fieldwork carried out in Greece, shifts the focus towards a multi-dimensional analysis on political movements. The author analyzes Greek radical leftist men who are engaging in a grassroots movement in a precarious environment. The article, entitled "Acts of caring in the shadow of violence: Men's gender construction among radical leftists in Athens", provides a detailed discussion on how different practices and discourses shape the male identity and the other.

Marion Loeffler in her article, "In Defense of Democracy?" analyzes masculinist reasoning, homophobia, and the impossibility of gender democracy in Thomas Mann's *Mario and the Magician*. In her discussion, the author provides the interpretation of the novella from a political science perspective by elaborating on 'masculinist reasoning' advocated by Hans Blüher, who supported pre-fascist male associations in the Weimar Republic. The analysis of *Mario and the Magician* reveals how the alleged defense of democracy promotes a hegemonic project of masculinity.

Kathleen Gyssels in her valuable contribution to this issue compares James Baldwin and Leon Damas on their lens on defining the other. The article touches upon important issues at the intersection of

black diaspora, sexual ambiguity and African-American post-Restoration novel.

In their work, Luigi Wenzl and Birgit Blättel-Mink discuss constructions of masculinities among men over 50 years of age who perform care work outside their biological family in Germany. The article provides insights on care crisis in the country, aging men, and also traditional gender roles. It shifts the focus on the intersection of masculinities, age and care in a case somewhat contrary to the conventional norms of caring and breadwinning.

In one of the articles in Turkish, Meral Gezici Yalçın and Veysi Tanrıverdi make a social psychological analysis of masculinities of university students in Turkey. Based on a qualitative analysis, they offer a perspective that is based on their interviewees' own interpretation of masculinity. The article provides different paradigms of masculinist norms with reference to biological/physical differences, different roles and the inequalities within, sexuality and, male violence.

The following article in Turkish written by Bahar Mermertaş provides an important critical analysis on masculine identity construction in the Kurdish political movement. With a focus on Peace and Democracy Party, she contributes to the literature by addressing the questions of how representative of this party interpret the libertarian discourse vis a vis their close relations with women and also how relations between men and women are constructed during their personal life practices. The inquiry into these important questions also reveals how the patriarchy is positioned in the context of this libertarian discourse from a macro perspective.

In the book review section of this double issue, Deniz Gündoğan evaluates Mel Y. Chen's "Animacies, Biopolitics, Racial Mattering and Queer Effect" and Haktan Ural reviews "Masculinities Under Neoliberalism" by Andrea Cornwall, Frank Karioris and Nancy Lindisfarne.

Finally, it is also important to note that we have a new section in our Journal. *Research in Progress* part welcomes your research that are not totally ended and need further elaboration. In this double issue, we have two works as research in progress whose authors would appreciate your comments and feedbacks.

Last but not least, we would like to thank the authors who sent their work to our journal, the reviewers who kindly reviewed the manuscripts and the readers who spread the word. As the editor in chief of this issue, I am also personally indebted to the members of the Editorial Board who have relentlessly worked. Since the very beginning, despite all negative external circumstances we do believe in solidarity and with the power of being together, I am taking this opportunity to invite you, the researchers of the critical studies on men and masculinities to voice your questions, puzzles, interventions and insights.

Selin Akyüz

On behalf of the Editorial Board of  
*Masculinities: A Journal of Identity and Culture*

## **ARTICLES**

# In Defense of Democracy? Masculinist Reasoning, Homophobia, and the Impossibility of Gender Democracy in Thomas Mann's *Mario and the Magician*<sup>1</sup>

Marion Löffler \*  
University of Vienna

## **Abstract:**

Thomas Mann's *Mario and the Magician* is frequently deployed in political and literary education to teach the lesson of democracy in defense against fascism. Recent analyses focus on the themes of homoeroticism and homosexuality, and raise the question whether a homophobic murder is an appropriate defense of democracy. However, only a few scholars explore the political ideas inscribed in the discourse of the so-called "masculinists" Mann refers to. This article provides an interpretation of the novella from a political science perspective by elaborating on masculinist reasoning advocated by Hans Blüher, who supported pre-fascist male associations in the Weimar Republic. Masculinist reasoning challenges a simplistic notion of the public-private divide and puts (homo-) sexuality center stage in the discussion of the political. The analysis shows that *Mario and the Magician* tells the story of the defeat of Blüher's vision of a homoerotic male association and of the re-erection of a patriarchal society characterized by homophobia and heteronormativity. However, this defeat does not affect antipluralistic, antisemitic, and antifeminist ideologies of 'masculinist reasoning'. Therefore, the alleged defense of democracy promotes a hegemonic project of masculinity, which hinders any vision of social or gender democracy.

**Keywords:** Gender democracy, masculinists, homophobia, Thomas Mann, Hans Blüher, masculinities, homoerotic male association, fascism

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## Demokrasiyi Savunurken? Erkeklikçi Düşünce, Homofobi ve Thomas Mann'ın *Mario and the Magician* Eserinde Toplumsal Cinsiyet Demokrasinin İmkansızlığı

Marion Löffler \*  
University of Vienna

### Özet:

Thomas Mann'ın *Mario ve and the Magician* eseri, faşizme karşı demokrasi savunusu dersini öğretmek için siyasal ve edebi eğitimde sıklıkla kullanılmaktadır. Son analizler homoerotizm ve eşcinsellik temalarına odaklanmakta ve homofobik bir cinayetin uygun bir demokrasi savunusu olup olmadığı sorusunu gündeme getirmektedir. Bununla birlikte sadece birkaç bilim insanı Mann'ın "erkeklikçiler" dediği kişilerin söylemlerinde bulunan politik fikirleri araştırır. Bu makale, Weimar Cumhuriyeti'nde faşizmi önceleyen erkek örgütlerini destekleyen Hans Blüher tarafından savunulan "erkeklikçi düşünce"yi ayrıntılı olarak inceleyerek bu kısa hikayeye siyaset bilimi perspektifinden bir yorum sağlayacaktır. "Erkeklikçi düşünce", kamusal-özel ayırımına yönelik basit kavrayışa meydan okur ve politik tartışmada (eş)cinselliği merkeze koyar. Analizlerimiz *Mario and the Magician*'in, Blüher'in homoerotik erkek örgütü vizyonunun ve homofobi ve heteronormativite ile karakterize edilen patriarkal toplumun yeniden kurgulanmasının bozguna uğrama hikayesini anlattığını gösteriyor. Bununla birlikte bu bozgun, "erkeklikçi düşünce"nin antiplüralist, antisemitik ve antifeminist ideolojilerini etkilemez. Bu nedenle demokrasinin savunulması iddiası, her toplumsal demokrasi ya da toplumsal cinsiyet demokrasisi vizyonunu engelleyen hegemonik bir erkeklik projesini desteklemektedir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Toplumsal cinsiyet demokrasisi, erkeklikçiler, homofobi, Thomas Mann, Hans Blüher, erkeklikler, homoerotik erkek örgüt, faşizm.

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*Mario and the Magician* is Thomas Mann's first political fiction. It presents an allegorical criticism of fascism (Müller-Salget, 1983; Schwarz, 1983; Spelsberg, 1972) and is usually characterized as a "milestone in the author's supposedly exemplary metamorphosis from the apolitical German<sup>1</sup> to the antifascist defender of democratic virtues" (Geulen, 1996, p. 16f.). The novella, first published in 1930 (backdated 1929), was Mann's first publication after he had won the Nobel Prize (Goll, 2000, p. 217). Consequently, the German audience was awaiting a fresh literary statement from the public intellectual. Readers, sensitive to the political message of the story, which takes place in a fictional seaside resort in fascist Italy under Benito Mussolini's rule, recognized Mann's criticism of Italian fascism and his warning of a similar development in Germany following the gains of the National Socialist Party in the elections to the Reichstag in 1930 (Galvan, 2015, p. 139; Müller-Salget, 1983, p. 53; Stockreiter, 1994, p. 330). Others equated the first-person narrator with the author Thomas Mann and suggested an exposure of Mann's private family life, while neglecting any political innuendo (Goll, 2000; Vaget, 1984).<sup>2</sup> Recent interpretations focus on the theme of homosexuality against the backdrop of the flourishing homosexual culture during the Weimar Republic and growing homophobia from the late 1920s to the persecution of homosexuals under Nazi rule (Bridges, 1991; Härle, 2002; Morgan, 2012).<sup>3</sup>

Political readings analyze the novella's depiction of an unpleasant atmosphere, which is described as "childish" nationalism, as Mann's critical stance toward fascism. "From the first moment the air of the place made us uneasy, we felt irritable, on edge" (Mann, 2000, p. 113)<sup>4</sup> and the discomforting atmosphere grows over the course of the story's first part. The second part introduces the magician or rather hypnotist, *Cipolla*, who manipulates and humiliates his audience; he breaks their will by hypnotizing them, and hence seems to be the prototypical fascist leader. In the final sequence, *Mario*, a local waiter, shoots the magician when he awakes from trance, hallucinating to kiss his secret love. Following an early interpretation by Georg Lukács (1964), political



readings detect a tyrannicide by a “working-class hero”, understood as an act of defense of democracy against fascism and totalitarianism.

However, the narration challenges a simple opposition of fascism vs. democracy. The narrative strategy places the reader in a complicit relationship with the (fascist) narrator. “Whoever claims to recognize the structures of seduction, remains entangled in the maze of complicity.” (Geulen, 1996, p. 21) Eva Geulen concludes that resistance is futile within the totalizing narrative, which eliminates any distinction between representation and the represented. *Mario's* shots are an act of resistance because they resist explanation and any explanation would have to reanimate the narrative strategy of totalization (ibid., p. 29). On the other hand, shooting *Cipolla* can hardly be conceived as an act of political, let alone democratic resistance (Baker, 2009).

Alan Bance (1987, p. 386) assumes that the novella deals with the ambivalent positioning of the artist facing the aesthetic politics of fascism, presuming that the problematic relationship between arts and politics had been the core issue of Mann's writing for years. He observes the narrator's secret affinity to *Cipolla*, who figures as fellow-artist, and suggests that *Mario and the Magician* is a “statement of Mann's own struggle with the relationship between literature and political responsibility” (ibid.). This struggle culminates in the very problematic ending: “the liberal humanist [...] finding himself willing to sanction a murder” (Bance, 2002, p. 115) and the intellectual who “is already infected with a moral malaise” (ibid.). This ambivalence creates doubt about the democratic persuasiveness of the story.

Another scholarly strand of discussion focuses on “male fantasies” (Theweleit, 2002) expressed in Mann's obsession with homoeroticism and homosexuality (Bridges, 1991; Elsaghe, 2012; Härle, 2002; Izenberg, 2000; Liebrand, 2012; Morgan, 2012; Webber, 2002; Widdig, 1992), although only a few of these scholars explore the political ideas inscribed in the discourse of *masculinist* homosexuality Mann refers to. In this article, I will elaborate on the political meaning of *masculinist reasoning* from a political science perspective. Masculinist reasoning supports

antipluralistic, antisemitic, and antifeminist ideologies, which form an integral part of pre-fascist political thought of early twentieth century Germany (Bruns, 2001; Kreisky, 1994; Sombart, 1988). It underpins the novella's political argument and thus constitutes an obstacle to the alleged defense of democracy. However, the appreciation of homosexuality as a masculinist ideal could be an important step towards *gender democracy* understood as practices and institutions that challenge the patriarchal gender order. Here, at least the hierarchy between men based on homophobia (Connell, 1995, p. 78) is delegitimized. This article aims at clarifying whether Mann's criticism of fascism makes gender democracy imaginable.

### **Masculinist Reasoning: Male Association and Charisma**

**T**he autonomous bourgeois subject, constituted during the late 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> century, has long remained the unmarked gender, although philosophy and science have implicitly presumed its masculinity. Whenever scientific discourse problematized masculinity, only deviant sexuality (perversion, inversion, or homosexuality) was an issue of concern until, in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, the women's movement challenged the superiority of men, while those characterized as sexually deviant attempted to inscribe themselves into the formation of hegemonic masculinity (Bruns, 2001, p. 88). According to Claudia Bruns, these developments are exemplified by the *masculinists*, a movement which opposed Magnus Hirschfeld's theses of a third sex (male body with a female soul) and, instead, claimed a particularly virile masculinity of the homosexual man. Hans Blüher (1888-1955), psychoanalyst, writer, and chronicler of the *Wandervogel* movement, a precursor of the so-called "conservative revolution" (Breuer, 1993; Brunotte, 2004, p. 70), was a protagonist of masculinist reasoning, who synthesized the theories of Gustav Jaeger (1832-1917), Heinrich Schurtz (1863-1903), and Benedict Friedlaender (1866-1908) (Morgan, 2012, p. 50).

Jaeger was one of the early masculinists who posited the "supervirile" sexuality of the homosexual male (Bruns, 2001, p. 92).

According to him, same-sex desire between men creates the *Männerheld* (men's hero), the etymological counterpart to the *Frauenheld* (womanizer), who is, in Jaeger's view, a mentally inferior man. The ethnologist Schurtz (1902) conceptualized the *Männerbund* (male association or male bond) by arguing that women are subjected to a "family drive" (*Familientrieb*), while men in contrast are motivated by a "sociability drive" (*Geselligkeitstrieb*), which allows them to establish higher forms of public life, such as politics and the state (Kreisky, 1994). Schurtz directed this line of argumentation against Johann Jacob Bachofen's *Mother Right*, first published in 1861, and his followers, who claimed that motherhood was the archaic source of human society (Brunotte, 2004, p. 31). Finally, philosopher and zoologist Friedlaender explained male bonding within an extended notion of sexuality based on *eros* (Bruns, 2001, p. 94). According to Friedlaender, homo- and heterosexual identities do not conflict each other because homoerotic attraction consolidates the homosocial male association between bi-, homo-, and heterosexual men, which is intended to resist the growing public influence of the feminist movement.

Friedlaender and Wilhelm Jansen, the leader of the *Wandervogel* movement greatly admired by Blüher, were members of the homosexual civil-rights movement, *Gemeinschaft der Eigenen*, founded by Adolf Brand (1874-1945). In their journal, *Der Eigene*, they propagated the masculinist notion of homosexual superiority, aiming at a reform of criminal law (Paragraph 175) pertaining to homosexuality (Brunotte, 2004, p. 72f.).<sup>5</sup> Until 1914, Blüher collaborated with this movement. Later, while still advocating the abolition of Paragraph 175, he elaborated his political theses on male association with undisguised antifeminist, antiliberal, and antisemitic impetus.

In a first attempt, Blüher promoted the male association grouped around a leader, the true men's hero (*Männerheld*), who possesses the vigor of same-sex *eros* (Bruns, 2001, p. 98f.). Therefore, only homosexuals or inverts would be able to become political leaders, while the sexual orientation towards women would exclude the heterosexual man, as much as the woman, from the state-building project. In his major

work, Blüher integrates heterosexuality into his concept of homoeroticism by introducing the male creative or aesthetic capacity to create an image of the adored (ibid., p. 101ff.). Although the original image might be the mother, the young man does not adore his mother, but his imagination of her, and later on his imagination of the leader or men's hero. The specific form of masculine spirituality synthesizes female eros (adoration and subordination) and male logos (rationality) into an aesthetic subject, Blüher's vision of the new man. The political leader is an artist who brings the people (*Volk*) into being through his creative imagination. He transforms the metaphorical female masses into a structured (national) male super-subject devoid of the political struggles that characterize liberal democracies. Blüher excludes women and Jews from the political: women lack rationality, while Jews are fixated on rationality (logos) and hence lack the political ability of imagination and male association.

During the war and early in the Weimar Republic, Blüher's theory was very popular and Thomas Mann, among others, embraced his work (Brunotte, 2004, p. 79; Bruns, 2001, p. 108; Kreisky, 2012, p. 129; Webber, 2002; Widdig, 1992). He elaborated on the (homosexual) artist figure and discussed the relationship between politics and aesthetics. In his novels, Mann explored homoeroticism through androgynous figures and dealt with his own homoerotic inclinations (Bridges, 1991, p. 503). Bernd Widdig (1992, p. 52) demonstrates that Blüher's conceptions have fueled Mann's speech *On German Republic* (1922), which marks his alleged conversion to a defender of democracy, but lacks any conventional democratic attitudes. In this speech "he sought to wed homosexual eros to the program of Weimar democracy" (Morgan, 2012, p. 57) and ignored or rather accepted Blüher's antifeminist and antiliberal intensions. Moreover, Mann agreed with Blüher's idea of the *homoerotic eros* as the foundational drive towards the republic, at a time, when Blüher's antisemitism had already been obvious (Brunotte, 2004, p. 74).

Blüher's vision of male association and the men's hero as political leader correspond with Max Weber's notion of charisma (Brunotte,

2004, p. 89ff.; Widdig, 1992, p. 50). In 1918, Weber joined the *German Democratic Party* and delivered various political speeches, which contributed to the discourse of political leadership. In his vision of politics, the rational, unemotional, and distanced professionalism of the modern officer, who runs the state apparatus (Weber, 1980, p. 831), needs a corrective, which is provided by a charismatic political leader. Weber's ideal-type of charismatic domination is rooted in premodern conceptualizations, but was, at the same time, adapted to become the essence of modern politics. Charisma was supposed to provide an emotional basis from which the disenchantment of the world, linked to the process of rationalization in industrial societies, could be countered (Hansen, 2001). The modern political leader is not simply a politician by profession (*Beruf*), but by vocation (*Berufung*) (Weber, 1988, p. 559), a notion taken from Weber's sociology of religion (Fitzi, 2004, p. 269), which indicates a spiritual meaning of charisma. Translated into Blüher's dualism of logos and eros, modern rationality embodied by the bureaucrat is bound to the logos, while the charismatic leader resembles the men's hero whose charisma is likely based on homoerotic attraction. In accordance with the ideology of male association, Weber's vision of the political, too, is that of a homosocial sphere (Bologh, 1990; Brown, 1988), although Weber advocated liberal representative democracy.<sup>6</sup>

### The Disease of Femininity

The masses and their fusion with their charismatic leader constitute the central topos of *Mario and the Magician* through which the functioning of fascist seduction is explored and illuminated (Widdig, 1992, p. 128ff.; Zeller, 2006). The audience of *Cipolla's* show, including the first-person-narrator, is mesmerized, which represents a crucial characteristic of fascism. This is indicated by the frequent use of the adjective "fascinating" (*faszinierend*) which, as Egon Schwarz (1983, p. 216) points out, derives from the Latin word *fasces* – the symbols of power in ancient Rome –, which is the etymological source of the word *fascismo* (fascism).

Some scholars have analyzed the depiction of fascist seduction through the framework of Blüher's theory. Widdig (1992), for instance, adds Freud's conception of the masses to the analysis and discusses the formation of a common body resulting from the re-ordering and re-positioning of the audience during the show and, by applying Weber's concept of charisma, *Cipolla* seems to be the ideal-typical fascist leader. The rearrangement of bodies starts during the prelude to the evening event, when the hotel management places the narrator, who "feels quite isolated and even temporarily déclassé" (Mann, 2000, p. 115), and his family on a table in the dining room and not on the veranda, which is exclusively reserved for the Italian tourists. Later the family must leave the Grand Hotel and the narrator finds himself surrounded by "a middle-class mob" (Mann, 2000, p. 119) at the beach. These events indicate the narrator's loss of social status (Widdig, 1992, p. 129), which is an ingredient of the discomfiting atmosphere and prepares the narrator for becoming a part of the masses. Critics consistently interpreted the narrator's inability to leave as an allusion to the political passivity of the German bourgeoisie facing the rise of National Socialism.

The narrator deploys the metaphor of a disease, which is "acoustically contagious" (Mann, 2000, p. 116), to explain Italian nationalism: "these people [...] were just passing through a certain stage, something rather like an illness" (ibid., p. 120), and finally he confesses that "we had caught the general devil-may-careness of the hour" (ibid., p. 151). The disease motif underpins the depiction of the discomfiting atmosphere and it enables the narrator to present himself as a victim of circumstance who is not responsible for his passivity.

The narrative strategy, which Eva Geulen (1996) reveals as complicity, constitutes a vicious circle: the narrator's complicity with *Cipolla* and the reader's complicity with the narrator. Its totalizing effects rest on the construction of an implicit reader who shares the narrator's assumptions. Actually, the narrator frequently appeals to his reader for understanding and support (Bridges, 1991, p. 507) and, as I argue, their complicity is based on the masculinist eros-logos balance, which provides the homosocial cohesion in Blüher's male association as well as

in the German nation. Consequently, the narration does not merely perform fascist seduction; it also alludes to male bonding between Germans.<sup>7</sup>

Correspondingly, some critics have mentioned that the depiction of the Italian people is rather racist and nationalist from a German point of view, when e.g. the narrator complains about the “African heat” and that “the deeper, more complex needs of the northern soul remain unsatisfied” (Mann, 2000, p. 118). Moreover, the narration of the unpleasant atmosphere is openly misogynous (Liebrand, 2012, p. 363ff.) and hence supports Blüher’s antifeminist stance.

*Mario and the Magician* is a story about masculinity and the problem of homosexuality (Bridges, 1991, p. 508; Morgan, 2012, p. 56), narrated by a respectable bourgeois German, educated and cultured, head of a family with two children and wife, who remains nameless, speechless, and invisible (Bridges, 1991, p. 507). The narrator represents “hegemonic masculinity” (Connell, 1995, p. 76f.) and claims moral authority, which includes a hegemonic perception of femininity within the framework of a patriarchal society. His invisible wife seems to represent the perfect absence of women from the public sphere. In contrast, the people at the beach are loud: “The voices these women have!” (Mann, 2000, p. 119). The “outraged womenfolk” (ibid., p. 121), the women’s voices, and their “hypersensitive prudishness” (ibid., p. 122) represent the nationalist and fascist Italian middle-class and cause the narrator’s discomfort. Edgar Rosenberg (2002, p. 34) comments that “dictatorships are notoriously prudish”. The narrator also complains about “the naïve misuse of power” (Mann, 2000, p. 118) by a Roman *Principessa*, who “[i]n the fullness of her feminine self-confidence” (ibid., p. 116) orders the narrator’s displacement from the Grand Hotel. All these negatively stereotyped female figures surround themselves with representatives of failed masculinity (Elsaghe, 2012, p. 130f.): “the proverbial frock-coated manager” (Mann, 2000, p. 116), who is submissive towards the *Principessa*, the “gentleman in city togs” (ibid., p. 121), who reaffirms the prudishness of his outraged womenfolk, and the ill-bred boy *Fuggièro*, who “was a great coward” (ibid., p. 119).

The national disease turns out to be an infection with femininity, the country being “reduced to a state of hypersensitive prudishness” (Mann, 2000, p. 122). The German original term used to comment on this prudishness is *Rückschlag* (backlash). Klaus Müller-Salget (1983, p. 56) remarks that Mann used to apply the term *Rückschlag* to fascism, which he characterized as a mental backlash (*geistig-seelischer Rückschlag*). Yahya Elsaygh (2012, p. 134) suggests that Mann borrowed the term from Bachofen, who problematized a return to a pre-patriarchal society, which is ruled by the mother-right. Therefore, the novella’s depiction of *Torre di Venere* is one of female domination in a “primitive” archaic sense, which causes a crisis of hegemonic masculinity. This perspective helps to illuminate the narrator’s feeling of discomfort, as his (hegemonic) masculinity depends on a patriarchal society.

A further matriarchal feature causing discomfort is the implied irrationality of this society. Only the physician, “a faithful and honest servant of science” (Mann, 2000, p. 116), seems to represent rational masculinity. Considering the presumed general infection with the national disease, the physician’s immunity is in need of explanation. The narrator mentions his distanced rationality and the annoying fact that the Italians ignore his advice. Accordingly, Geulen (1996, p. 24) comments on the physician, who figures as “the implied principle of sober objectivity”, that “a doctor is obviously what the characters and what the story itself needs”. The fact that he cannot cure the disease clarifies that he does not participate in the nationalist community. Following Blüher’s conceptions, the physician is fixated on the logos, and thus figures as the prototypical Jew, who lacks the erotic sensitivity, which seems to be a basic prerequisite for catching the nationalist illness.<sup>8</sup> In contrast, the narrator is not immune, but succumbs to the irrational force of fascination. He tries to explain, to exculpate, and to justify his transformation from an honorable patriarchal family father and respectable representative of the bourgeois upper class to a member of the masses during *Cipolla’s* performance. The unpleasant atmosphere depicted in the first part of the novella prepares his transformation.



Women's command and the excluded, concealed Jew constitute the narrative components used to illustrate the narrator's discomfort. The physician is the rational logos-centered counterpart to the dominant irrational female eros, which results in a feminized social and political climate with de-masculinizing effects. These effects find an ironical symbol in the name of the city, *Torre di Venere*, i.e. "tower of Venus", and the fact that the name-giving tower, a phallic symbol, "is gone long since, one looks for it in vain" (Mann, 2000, p. 113). Political interpretations of the novella identify the depiction of a fascist society in the first part. Others, like George Bridges (1991, p. 501), cast doubt on this view: "if the unpleasant incidents that create the oppressive atmosphere in *Torre di Venere* are indicative of a fascist, or even pre-fascist, society, then surely that is the kind of society we live in today." In addition, I argue, this society is a patriarchal one. Therefore, only masculinist reasoning can elucidate the narrator's uneasiness: the scene misses the vigor of homoeroticism, while female prudishness indicates homophobia.

### The Liberation of the Patriarchal Society

While the prelude of *Mario and the Magician* is composed of female domination and failed masculinities, its main part, the appearance of the magician *Cipolla*, challenges different masculinities, which can be studied along Raewyn Connell's typology (Löffler, 2014). "From the start the narrator casts the theater as an all male affair." (Geulen, 1996, p. 21) *Cipolla* puts his male audience into a hypnotic trance and tests their virility by exposing their (homo-) sexual desires (Bridges, 1991, p. 504). The performance consists of a contest among men for mastery and submission, in a political and homoerotic sense (Morgan, 2012, p. 59). Bridges (1991) identifies Mann's homoerotic inclinations at the core of the novella. Only once, *Cipolla* picks a female victim, *Signora Angileri*, whose friendship with the actress *Eleanora Duse* indicates a same-sex relationship and thus fits into the homoerotic framework. That *Mario* finally shoots the magician because of a kiss seems to be either a homophobic reaction or the

attempt of a homosexual to conceal his sexual desires from a homophobic society.

Political readings of the novella usually focus on the impossibility of resistance against the sorcerer's spell and thus on *Cipolla's* mysterious authority over his audience, symbolized in his whip, that makes him a charismatic fascist leader. "Freedom exists, and also the will exists; but freedom of the will does not exist, for a will that aims at its own freedom aims at the unknown." (Mann, 2000, p. 139). Freedom of the will is an idealized male trait, essential for the autonomous subject. *Cipolla's* tricks reveal its fictive character and deconstruct the masculine self-esteem of his adversaries. He seems to break their will by forcing them to perform ridiculous gestures. However, *Cipolla* – the word means onion, a fruit without a stone – has no substance. After each trick, he regains strength by consuming alcohol and nicotine and he frequently complains to his amused audience that he is the actual victim, who deserves their pity, although he emerges as the winner from each struggle.

His tricks are humiliating because they are "an utter abandonment of the inmost soul, a public exposure of timid and deluded passion and rapture" (ibid., p. 156), a characterization the narrator exclusively applies on *Mario's* seduction, although almost all previous encounters entail comparable public exposures with sexual overtones. *Cipolla* reveals the machismo of "marginalized masculinity" (Connell, 1995, p. 80) or rather "protest masculinity" (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005, p. 847) represented by a "young cockerel" who's "bumptiousness only served to betray the simplicity of his mind" (Mann, 2000, p. 135). *Cipolla* forces him to stick out his tongue (ibid., p. 129), later he makes him grovel upon the ground (ibid., p. 136). "And yet he seems to want to do it as well. Humiliation and desire go hand in hand." (Morgan, 2012, p. 59). The "lady-killer" (Mann, 2000, p. 130) and "tower of Venus" (ibid., p. 135) are defeated, symbolically castrated and emasculated. In a similar vein, *Cipolla* forces a young military man into a stiff posture, places him between two chairs and sits on him, an image suggestive of sexual domination and submission (Morgan, 2012, p. 59). The magician also

reveals the inferiority of (heterosexual) “complicit masculinity” (Connell, 1995, p. 79), represented by the quiet and bald, *Signor Angioleri*, who “did not look as though he would know how to defend his happiness” (Mann, 2000, p. 148). *Cipolla* seduces his wife and exposes *Angioleri’s* social and sexual impotence.

Even “hegemonic masculinity” personified in a “gentleman from Rome” (ibid., p. 149), who, with “a heroic obstinacy, a fixed resolve to resist” (ibid., p. 150) challenges *Cipolla* to a duel, proves incapable to “save the honour of the human race” (ibid., p. 150) or more precisely of masculinity. The man tries to resist the magician by refusing to dance like a puppet, and finally, when he surrenders and starts to dance, the narrator comments: “we could see his face as he ‘enjoyed’ himself [...] he was having a better time than he had had in the hour of his pride” (ibid., p. 151). Again, humiliation and desire go hand in hand. Humiliation results from his broken will to resist, a negative will without content, while his satisfaction comes from the positive will to dance, although it is *Cipolla’s* will or command. Müller-Salget (1983) and others refer to this scene as illuminating the functioning of fascism. In this line of argumentation, the sexual innuendos become part of *Cipolla’s* sexual-pathological character. Peter Morgan (2012, p. 60), in contrast, suggests that “*Cipolla* plumbs the wellsprings of patriarchal society, namely the deep structure of male rivalry and male bonding”. Although male rivalry and homoerotic bonding condition *Cipolla’s* performance, I argue that he does not repair patriarchy, but rather destroys those masculinities available in a patriarchal society to prepare them for participation in a male association as willing followers of the charismatic men’s hero. Therefore, the subordination of formerly hegemonic masculinity under the magician’s command completes the process of demasculinization of the fascist society.

Finally, *Mario*, the supposedly weakest link in the chain of masculinities, defeats *Cipolla*. *Mario* secretly loves *Silvestra*, whose female name is a masquerade to conceal his homosexuality (Härle, 2002, p. 16ff.). The careful depiction of *Mario’s* fragile and sensitive constitution and the fact that *Cipolla* calls him *Ganymede* support this

assumption (Bridges, 1991, p. 505- 511). In the context of the prudish society described in the first part of the novella, and despite the people being amused by the obscene performance, his homosexual desires make *Mario* an exemplar of “subordinated masculinity” (Connell, 1995, p. 78). His heterosexual weakness is symbolized by the tiny weapon he uses to shoot *Cipolla*, “that small, dull-metal, scarcely pistol-shaped tool with hardly any barrel” (Mann, 2000, p. 157). However, “Mario asserts his masculinity through violence” (Morgan, 2012, p. 61) and though he cannot resist the hypnosis, he rejects the passive victim status and adopts the role of active masculinity, while the rest of the audience, including the narrator, remain passive. Putting into *Blüher’s* framework, *Mario* embodies masculinist virility. *Cipolla* has no identity of his own and hence, by kissing *Mario*, he unleashes *Mario’s* extreme masculinity, which Blüher ascribes to the homosexual, the “full invert”, who is the heroic warrior male (*ibid.*, p. 51).

Only after the shots and a moment of instant silence, the audience starts to act, shouting “for a doctor, for the police. People flung themselves on Mario in a mob, to disarm him” (Mann, 2000, p. 157). These activities restore their previously deconstructed masculinities and the patriarchal gender order. “Ladies hid their faces, shuddering, on the breasts of their escorts” (*ibid.*, p. 157), who regain their socially ascribed male roles of protectors. The narrator takes action, too: “And now – now finally, at last – we took the children and led them to the exit” (*ibid.*, p. 157), clarifying that he was not able to leave earlier because *Cipolla* and his performance mesmerized him. However, the audience owes their awakening from trance and their remasculinization to the deed of a homosexual, who, although the narrator calls the fatal end of liberation, does not become the hero of the day. On the contrary, the mob attacks and disarms him and thereby destroys his heroic masculinity. Even if his homosexuality was concealed or unconscious before his enforced public coming out; after the show, he would be a stigmatized and subordinated man in the patriarchal society he has restored.

The narrator, presented as honorable and responsible family father, undergoes a transformation during the show, which makes it

impossible for him to leave, although his children are tired and fall asleep. His transformation results in a bifocal narration: On the one hand, he is a rational man who is familiar with mesmerism: “he alone in *Cipolla’s* audience is fully initiated into the mysteries of the Magician’s uncanny art” (Bance, 1987, p. 385). Therefore, he can easily comment on the occurrence and report to his implicit reader. On the other hand, he is mesmerized or infected, though not with the national disease, but with homoeroticism. He seems to be the only one who comprehends and experiences the homoerotic tensions when *Cipolla* seduces *Mario* to kiss him: “That was a monstrous moment, grotesque and thrilling, the moment of Mario’s bliss” (Mann, 2000, p. 156). The narrator divides his perception into two conflicting masculine identities: The bourgeois man as unmarked gender, who finds *Cipolla* and his sexualized tricks ugly and disgusting, and the masculinist, who is complicit with *Cipolla* and gives in to his homoerotic inclinations.

The narrator characterizes the fatal ending once as “the horrible end [that] had been preordained and lay in the nature of things” (ibid., p. 113) and another time as “a liberation – for I could not, and I cannot, but find it so!” (ibid., p. 157). The notion of liberation has inspired political interpretations that turn the final homicide into an unequivocal good (Baker, 2009, p. 364): the liberation from fascism. On the other hand, *Mario* lacks the necessary political consciousness to commit a tyrannicide (Müller-Salget, 1983, p. 59). Moreover, the notion of a preordained finale laying in the nature of things may suggest that heterosexuality is natural and homophobia is legitimate. Consequently, “only a certain unacknowledged anti-homosexual bias can explain the fact that critics have not questioned the rightness of the conclusion to the story” (Bridges, 1991, p. 503). Bridges concludes that *Mario’s* deed is a symbolic act, the outcome of the psychological drama a homosexual experiences within the binding restrictions of bourgeois morality (ibid., p. 514). However, it is still unclear to whom or what the words of liberation apply (ibid., p. 509). In my above interpretation, the liberation applies to the patriarchal society and its corresponding masculinities. At the same time, *Cipolla’s* attempt to establish a male association fails. This

view poses the question whether this liberation would clear the way for democracy.

### Conclusions: A Defense of Democracy?

When the first reviews of *Mario and the Magician* were published, Thomas Mann rejected a political interpretation and claimed art and ethics constituting the core topics of the novella (Baker, 2009, p. 353; Bridges, 1991, p. 510; Müller-Salget, 1983, p. 52). In the years that followed, he became increasingly willing to see politics at work in the story and finally, while in US exile, he called it an initial political action (*Kampfhandlung*) against Nazism. However, the diversity of interpretations demonstrates that the story has several layers: the relationship between arts and politics, the aesthetics of fascism, irrationality at work in fascist propaganda, homosexuality and bourgeois morality, among others. Each of these layers is likely to support an interrogation of fascism. Alan Bance (2002, p. 117) concludes that there are public morals to be drawn from *Mario and the Magician*, a view supported by the fact that the novella is frequently deployed in political and literary education (Andreoli & Bär, 2011). Bridges, in contrast, who prefers an autobiographical reading, claims that the story “never really leaves the realm of the mainly private” (Bridges, 1991, p. 510). I argue, however, that these comments rest upon a simplistic notion of the public-private divide: Civic education on the public side and sexuality on the private. Masculinist reasoning and Blüher’s discourse on male association challenge this dualistic distinction and put (homo-) sexuality and homoeroticism center stage in the discussion of the political.

There is no doubt that Mann opposed National Socialism. In October 1930, immediately after the enormous gains of the National Socialist Party in the general elections, he gave a speech with the subheading “an appeal to reason” (*Deutsche Ansprache: Ein Appell an die Vernunft*). He called on his fellow-Germans to support the Social Democrats, who seemed to be the last bastion against fascism (Zeller,

2006, p. 109). Even Blüher, at least retrospectively, criticized Hitler, albeit only after the execution of the openly homosexual SA-leader Ernst Röhm and the subsequent replacement of Paragraph 175 of the criminal law with a more punitive one in 1934, which made homosexuality a capital offence (Morgan, 2012, p. 52). These politics of the National Socialists reaffirmed heterosexual masculinity and forced homosexual men to either repress their sexuality or distance themselves from the political male associations (ibid., p. 53). In a way, *Mario and the Magician* tells the story of this masculinist defeat.

The narrator applies masculinist reasoning to convince his implicit reader of the discomfiting atmosphere in *Torre di Venere* by pointing to a return of homophobia caused by the society's backlash into an archaic state of the mother-right. A constitution of masculinity able to balance homosexual eros and male logos must fail in the feminized and emasculating environment. Feminine irrationality, exemplified in hysterical hypersensitive prudishness, prevails, while the only masculine identity available is pure rationality, fixated on the logos, and, like the Jew in Blüher's concept of male association, is expelled from the national community. *Cipolla's* performance turns out to be a parody of male bonding and association. The alleged "men's hero" is a "charlatan" (Mann, 2000, p. 127), bodily "deformed" who faces his audience with "an arrogant grimace" (ibid., p. 128). He has no charisma of homoerotic attraction; instead, he applies a whip to enforce his command. General applause and laughter acknowledge the public humiliations of his chosen victims. If *Cipolla* represents the prototypical fascist leader, then the fascist version of male association is a perversion of Blüher's ideal. Accordingly, in his speech of 1930, Mann explained the National Socialists' success with reference to irrationality and cultural barbarism, which engender a grotesque form of politics (*Politik im Groteskstil*) (Müller-Salget, 1983, p. 54).

As argued above, *Mario and the Magician* makes clear that the masculinist strategy has failed, because fascists all over Europe have returned to homophobia and heteronormativity. The masculinist narrator experiences this patriarchal turn as a backlash into the rule of

archaic mother-right. *Mario*, the last masculinist, draws the right conclusion and shoots *Cipolla*, the faked men's hero. With this deed, he cannot restore the masculinist vision of male association; the patriarchal society is the only available alternative. However, patriarchal society does not guarantee democratic plurality, individual freedom, and equality. On the contrary, it reinstalls male supremacy over women on the one hand and the "specific gender relations of dominance and subordination between groups of men" (Connell, 1995, p. 78) on the other. It reaffirms the gendered public-private divide and the political as a homosocial sphere. Consequently, the homoerotic male association's retreat from the political acknowledges homophobia and the subordination of homosexual men. In addition, the common ground of male association ideology and modern patriarchal society remain unchallenged. The novella does not problematize Blüher's extreme antifeminism and antisemitism. On the contrary, it legitimates his ideology by concealing his support of pre-fascist male associations. Therefore, the ending of *Mario and the Magician* suggests that these features do not inflict liberal democracy. Moreover, the liberating ending promises a novel hegemonic project, which would terminate the crisis of masculinity, experienced in the Weimar Republic.

It is likely that Mann modeled hegemonic masculinity along liberal ideals of emotionally detached male rationality and social autonomy. Accordingly, the novella discusses some crucial issues of liberal democracy: Autonomous freedom of will vs. interdependency, civil courage vs. passivity, rationality vs. irrationality, and individual responsibility vs. collective hysteria and incitement of the masses. However, the choice seems to be either fascism including homophobia, antifeminism, and antisemitism or democracy including homophobia, antifeminism, and antisemitism. Consequently, the liberation at the end of the novella clears the way for liberal democracy. At the same time, it hinders any vision of social or gender democracy.



**Notes:**

1. "Apolitical German" refers to Mann's *Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen* (Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man), first published in 1918, when he rejected a democratization of Germany after the First World War. However, already in 1922 in the speech *Von Deutscher Republik* (On German Republic) he advocated democracy (Fechner, 1990, p. 106ff.).
2. This interpretation does not come as a surprise as the story's backdrop is a real vacation of the Mann family. Mann claimed that most of the story is true, except the lethal ending, which was an idea of his elder daughter Erika (Geulen, 1996, p. 28).
3. This line of criticism started after the publication of Mann's diaries in 1975, which disclosed his homosexual desires and thus enriched the interpretation of his work in terms of the problematic self with the issue of homosexuality (Izenberg, 2000, p. 99).
4. I have taken all English quotations from the standard translation by H. T. Lowe-Porter.
5. After frequent attacks by the Nazis, Brand quit his homosexual activism in 1933.
6. Like Mann in his speech *On German Republic*, also Weber does not mention women's suffrage granted in the Weimar Constitution. This is surprising because his wife, Marianne Weber, was a leading figure of the women's movement (Kreisky, 2012; Widdig, 1992).
7. An Italian translation was published only after the War in 1945. In a letter, dated February 1930, to his Italian friend, Lavinia Mazzuccheti, Mann confessed that the story was "impossible" for Italian readers (Galvan, 2015, p. 139).
8. Alexander Raviv (2007) points to the discrepancy between Thomas Mann's antisemitic portrayals of Jewish figures in his novels and rather philosemitic views and feelings he expressed in his non-fictional writings.

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# Acts of caring in the shadow of violence: Reconstruction of moral masculinities among Greek leftist volunteers

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## Abstract:

Recently Greece has been stuck in a state of economic and humanitarian crisis. Amid a volatile environment, some men among the Greek radical left negotiated forms of masculinity in which glorified memories of heroes, political performance on the streets, and solidarity of caring emerged. While they locally resisted European economic policies, and increasing xenophobia, they also reconstructed a moral masculinity in a hyper-masculine environment.

This paper is based on ethnographic fieldwork carried out in Athens, Greece in 2012 and 2014-2015. The analysing is based on participation in general assemblies, demonstrations, spending time in hangouts and volunteering at refugee oriented sites. 36 informal and 15 in-depth interviews with radical left Greeks were conducted.

In occupied refugee spaces, many Greek radical left men embedded the role of the caring and protecting with the *Solidary with refugees'* grassroots movement, while they coped with their own vulnerability in a precarious environment. This was done through a shared every-day space with the refugees; through the discourse of respected autonomy and humanity; and emphasised class struggle. Thus, a hegemony of anti-capitalistic moral masculinity was emerged. However, with the practice of protective patrols thought more suitable for valiant men; discourse of the

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cowardice of members of the xenophobic Golden Dawn party; and calling for recognition of young heroic Greek leftist male suffering, certain traits of hyper-masculinity was nurtured. Thus, supporting gender segregation practices, as the cooking and cleaning was mainly done by the women and the migrant men. It is worth noting that most local women would uphold this segregated practice while some men and women resisted. We therefore argue that in the space 'in-between' hegemonic and hyper-masculinities, the morality is negotiated.

**Keywords:** Moral masculinities, hyper-masculinities, solidarity and resistance.

## Şiddetin Gölgesinde Yardımsever Eylemler: Atina'daki Radikal Solcular Arasında Erkeklerin Toplumsal Cinsiyet İnşası

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### Özet:

Yunanistan son zamanlarda ekonomik ve insani bir krize saplanmış durumda. Dengesiz bir atmosferin ortasında Yunan radikal solundaki bazı erkekler, övülen kahramanlık anılarının, sokaklardaki siyasi performansın ve yardım dayanışmasının ortaya çıktığı erkeklik biçimlerini müzakere ettiler. Avrupa'nın ekonomi politikalarına ve yabancı düşmanlığını arttırmasına yerel olarak direnirken, aynı zamanda hiper-erkeksi bir ortamda ahlaki bir erkekliği yeniden inşa ettiler.

Bu yazı, 2012 ve 2014-2015 yıllarında Yunanistan'ın Atina şehrinde gerçekleştirilen etnografik saha çalışmasına dayanmaktadır. Analiz, genel kurul toplantılarına, gösterilere, mekanlarda geçirilen zamana ve mülteci odaklı alanlardaki gönüllü etkinliklere dayanmaktadır. Radikal sol Yunanlılarla 36 resmi olmayan görüşme ve 15 derinlemesine görüşme yapılmıştır.

İşgal altındaki mülteci mekânlarında pek çok Yunan radikal solcu güvencesiz bir ortamda kendi savunmasızlığıyla başa çıkarken, *Mültecilerle Dayanışma* halk hareketiyle birlikte yardım ve koruma rolüne de girdi. Bu, mültecilerle paylaşılan gündelik mekanlar aracılığıyla, hatırı sayılır özerklik ve insanlık söylemi aracılığıyla ve sınıf mücadelesi vurgusuyla yapıldı. Böylece anti-kapitalist ahlaki erkekliğin egemenliği ortaya çıktı. Öte yandan cesur erkekler için daha uygun olduğu düşünülen koruyucu

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devriyeler uygulaması; yabancı düşmanı Altın Şafak partisi üyelerinin alçaklık söylemi; ve genç kahraman Yunan solcu erkek çilekeşliğinin tanınması için yapılan çağrı ile birlikte hiper-erkekleğin belirli özellikleri de geliştirildi. Böylece yemek yapmanın ve temizliğin çoğunlukla kadınlar ve göçmen erkekler tarafından yapılması gibi cinsiyet ayrımcılığı uygulamaları da desteklenmiş oldu. Bazı erkekler ve kadınlar direnirken, bu ayırıcı uygulamayı çoğu yerel kadının desteklediğini de belirtmek gerekir. Sonuç olarak biz, hegemonik ve hiper-erkeklikler arasındaki boşlukta ahlakın müzakere edildiğini savunuyoruz.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Ahlaki erkeklikler, hiper-erkeklikler, dayanışma ve direniş.

In February 2015 the center of Athens became a place of jubilation as Athenians rallied to celebrate their resistance to the austerity measures imposed on their country since 2010 by the so-called "troika" (the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund). This moment of hope occurred just after Syriza: The Coalition of the Radical Left, a party founded in 2004, won the parliamentary election for the first time in Greece. At that time, the Syntagma Square, situated in front of the Greek Parliament, was full of people of all ages and dressed in all kinds of colorful warm clothes. All metro stations were open instead of being barred off and filled with teargas, which had been a tactic often used by the police to control demonstrations in the past. In the past, national hymns had often been broadcasted over the square by governmental forces before organized protests, so as to invoke nationalism but during this jubilation, international songs were played, such as *Sodade*, sung by the immigrant female singer Cesária Évora. Moreover, posters celebrating multiculturalism were paraded. One of the posters read: "We are all human," representing a common rhetoric of shared temporal vulnerability and the inclusive space of solidarity.

Two weeks later, Muhammed, a Pakistani man committed suicide in the Amygdaleza detention center for asylum seekers located near the police academy in the town Acharnes, a short distance from Athens. After being tortured repeatedly by members of the academy, he hanged himself from the bars of his bed, becoming the most recent victim of the detainment policy. Members of *Solidarity with Refugees* (a new initiative among activists in Athens, based in Exarhia) staged a protest, demanding the immediate closure of the detention centers and the release of the detainees being held in inhumane conditions. The reaction of the usually aggressive police confused the protesters; just weeks after Syriza formed a government with Anel: The independent Greeks, a small conservative party, the police had been forbidden to use excessive force,<sup>1</sup> and on this occasion only temporarily restrained two female protesters and one male. "They don't know what to do" said Yiannis, one of the leading Greek male protesters, "This is so strange. I have never seen them [the

police] act like this before. And it is like the anarchists don't know what to do!" The activists had become accustomed to reshaping their performances in reaction to persistent violent encounters with the police – therefore, the absence of action on the part of the police came as a surprise. These events marked the beginning of a period during which there was a sudden absence of state violence. Still, as the summer of 2015 brought close to a million refugees to Greek shores, male activists saw the need for protection work and, consequently, a reorientation of their masculinity.

This article, based on ethnography, explores how the European border-zone affects masculine formation among Greek activists in the context of their own struggles against neoliberal projects, the recent increase of refugees and women's participation in the grassroots activism. We will highlight the effect of the presence of refugees, and use the term hybrid masculinities (Demetriou, 2001) to propose an exploration of moral masculinities on the margins of Europe. In Demerious' theory, "hybrid masculinities" refers to practices from diverse masculinities that unite to form a hybrid bloc constituting hegemonic masculinity in a particular setting. In this way, the article will contribute to the recent field of transnational masculinities which focuses on how gender relations are formed within and across borders in context to regional, national and global positionalities, economies and flow of images (Hearn, Blagojevic and Harrison, 2013). We will demonstrate how our participants' masculinity was informed by male symbolism embedded in the historical resistance to the destructive forces of capitalism, while at the same time they sought security with others in similar vulnerable positions. During the summer of 2015, some of our participants travelled to Lesbos to assist the newly arrived refugees. The social anthropologists, professor Evthymios Papataxiarchis (2016) framed members of this initiative as solidararians. In line with the discourse of our participants, we will be using this term to identify them. The values the solidararians embraced revolve around anti-austerity protests, resistance to neoliberal projects and participation in collectively occupied spaces with an emphasis on inclusive practices

(Rozakou, 2016). Contrary to global humanitarianism, they perceived humanism (gr. *anthropia*) as less corrupt, with horizontal decisions made through assemblies. However, the vulnerability of refugees caused the solidarians to reconstruct masculine dignity through a discourse of what it means to be human, while embedding the role of protector. Hybrid masculinities emerged from an ambiguous navigation of differences, defined by the naturalization of motherhood and the weaker resistance of women, migrants and queer people towards capitalistic practices of consumption. Therefore, we will demonstrate, in the case of leftist male volunteers in Athens, how hegemonic gendered identity was reconstructed as moral masculinities on the semi-periphery of Europe.

### **Precarious masculinities in temporal disposition**

**T**he concept of hegemonic masculinities, most notably used by Raewyn Connell in the 1980s, describes how an ideal 'real' man is created within patriarchal societies, keeping the gender hierarchy in balance, elevating the social status of men conforming to the image, and subordinating women and other men (2005, p. 75). Scholars have criticised Connell's concept for being too comprehensive, singular and static to apply to discourses, practices and images of diverse men in their daily existence (Beasley, 2008; Hearn, 2004). Men's negotiations with changing gender relations and various intersectionalities tend to lead to a complex formation of differences and commonalities (Melström, 2015), therefore the focus should be on the process and practices that influence men's gender identities (Hearn, 2015; Fedele, 2016). Concepts such as hybrid masculinities (Demetriou, 2001), and emergent masculinities (Inhorn, 2012) have been suggested in order to capture the complexity of moulding hegemonic masculinities in the everyday life of men as they struggle with new political landscapes. The difference between hybridity and emergence is that, as Marcia Inhorn (2012) explains, despite harsh realities, there are emerging patterns among men that point towards more gender equality, while Demetrakis Demetriou (2001) believes men belonging to the hegemonic bloc adopt bits and pieces of the newly

visible political identities, such as embracing fashion that spurs from gay culture (p. 350). In this way, privileged men maintain power through a dialogue with marginalized groups who are gaining social recognition, while simultaneously appearing more egalitarian. As such, many men may be continually searching for a way to be perceived as good humans without losing their security inside local hegemonic structures (Bridges, 2014; Jóhannsdóttir & Gíslason, 2017). We believe that the hybrid masculinity is also formed among men outside the elite and even in opposition to other hegemonic masculinities as a form of resistance as men's struggles must always be analysed in global and local context.

Following this line of thought, Marina Blagojević (2013) highlights how scholarly work tend to refer to men in the Balkans within patriarchal stereotypes of barbarism without consideration of the effect of neoliberal governmentality on local gender regimes (see also Lindisfarne & Neale, 2016). Thus, the men are commonly viewed as unable to be victims, despite their fragile economic positions and emotional losses. To demonstrate this point, Blagojević shows that the countries in the semi-periphery are in a continuous state of de-development, and people in these countries are constantly pressured to "catch up" in regard to the image of good finances, material possessions, new technology, responsible government, and gender equality. This, she believes, affects the formation of hegemonic masculinities, as men are afraid of acquiring the status of 'surplus humans'. This surplus represents humans who are disposable labourers according to neoliberal policies, or people of such low means that they are not counted as consumers. They are therefore in danger of being treated as non-human in regards to rights and responsibility (Grosfoguel, 2016). In contrast, managers of global markets and labour are considered civilized modern men.

This effect of de-development on masculinities has been demonstrated in several Greek studies. Aliko Angelidou and Dimitra Kofti's (2014) research on Greek male business managers, for example, indicated that when the Greek economy was apparently booming, Greek males tended to identify themselves as the bearers of neoliberal

civilization to former Soviet countries. In a similar context, the Greek media emphasized that the nation had finally taken its place among the major nations during the 2004 Olympic Games held in Athens (Dalakoglou, 2013), and entering the EU was perceived as a step towards morally civilizing the Greek economy (Gkintidis, 2016). However, when the economic crisis hit in 2008, it affected the global, regional and local image of the Greek man as a successful provider, and is believed to have contributed to the rising rate of male suicides (Antonakakis & Collins, 2014). This is also emphasized in Judith Butler's and Athina Athanasiou's (2013) discussions of dispossession in Greece during the economic crisis, as many Greeks felt de-humanized, or that they were being treated "like animals". However, there are several ways people reconstruct their identities to resist these social forces.

In her history of the Greek left since the First World War, Neni Panourgíá (2009) sheds significant light on the ways in which the identities among the Greek left were formed in resistance to the Greek conservatives that were supported by Britain and the United States of America. She argues that this created an ambiguous relationship between Greek leftists and the dominant Western governmentality, while nourishing an underground working-class culture. This is reflected in Blagojević's (2013) work, as she notes that the topography of the Balkans creates a discourse of 'us', as people within the semi-periphery and 'them,' meaning other Western people. Though Greek national identities have long been formed by distancing themselves from their colonial oppressors, the Ottomans (Hatziprokopiou & Evergeti, 2014), we believe, as Heath Capot (2014) has demonstrated, that with the recent increase of migrants from the south, be they refugees, immigrants or irregular migrants, a new level of complexity has been added to the discourse of 'others,' meaning migrants in relation to 'us' as Greeks and 'them' as Europeans.

The concept of hospitality in relation to migrants has been critically examined by various scholars (Tsimouris, 2014; Voutira, 2016) in Greece. It has been shown that among men, the honour is accrued by the host if the stranger integrates successfully (Cheliotis, 2014;

Papataxiarchis, 1991). This paternalistic treatment can further be seen in EU refugee procedures, and its moral and economic ambiguity is well-documented by Capot (2014) in Greece. However, Katerina Rozakou (2016) has shown that movements of solidarity with refugees in Greece seek to build a bridge of shared humanity. Within these movements, a benevolent attitude is fiercely resisted with a moral code of respecting the stranger's position, wishes, and autonomy. Nonetheless, there is a subtle encouragement towards refugees adapting to the local norms (Rozakou, 2012). Our results concur with Rozakou's, though we focus on the gender performances and power hierarchy forming within these solidarity movements.

While the hegemonic masculinities among the police and the neo-Nazi political party Golden Dawn were based on xenophobia, misogyny and nationalism (Tsimouris, 2015), we will demonstrate that the forms of masculinity among the solidarians is impacted by their own disposition made tangible by violent encounters with the police and Golden Dawn members, and further by the recent arrivals of refugees and other migrants, who are themselves dependent on the ambiguous moral economy within European states. Thus, there is a reconstruction of moral masculinities,<sup>2</sup> which are infused with values such as respecting the human right to a dignified life, resistance to consumerism and neoliberal hierarchies, and lastly, solidarity embedded with the notion of protecting those in a weaker position. As such, there are emerging patterns that tend towards respecting the political struggles of women, queer people, and migrants, but hegemonic masculine power is re-negotiated through the heightened value of spontaneous protests and performances of men on the streets. Stuck in the midst of global neoliberal projects in the semi-periphery, solidaritarian men have thus negotiated moral masculinity in a hybrid manner that responds to their social and political context.

## Methodology and methods

This article is based on ethnographic methodology that relies mainly on long-term observations of the participants, in order to understand the participants' worldviews, while at the same time remaining aware of the historical context, in order to gain a holistic perspective (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). The main fieldwork was conducted from June 2014 to September 2015<sup>3</sup> in Athens, where the first author, Árdís, participated in leftist political struggles, spoke out publicly for human rights and volunteered at refugee-orientated sites 3-5 times a week. This methodology should be considered engaged ethnography (Low & Merry, 2010) as it takes a stance alongside marginalized voices. During this fieldwork numerous photos and videos were taken to gain a holistic perspective of bodily performances (Pink, 2009), alongside meticulous field notes and reflective diaries (Davis, 2008). Árdís was open with the participants about the topic of her research and obtained the necessary consent in adherence with professional ethical guidelines. Interlocutors who were involved in solidarity practices with refugees were identified and approached through networks among the leftists. 15 in-depth interviews were conducted with people, in English and Greek, and a further 36 individuals were interviewed during participant observations, between the ages of 20 and 60. Overall our participants were equally men and women, mostly cisgender but not all. The methods of Kathy Charmaz's (2006) guide to Grounded Theory were used to analyse the written material in order to spot new themes emerging during the research, such as the discourse around being human. As such, Charmaz's emphasis on process and reflexivity was well-suited to this study. Reflecting on the researcher's power, a counter-method of assigning pseudonyms was used, as interlocutors were asked to choose their own secret names based on their childhood role models. To minimise exposure and ensure their safety, we will *only* describe our participants briefly as they are cited in the article.

Special attention was paid to a grassroots movement given the pseudonym Kentro, whose members participated in launching the



initiative of *Solidarity with Refugees*. Their headquarters are in Exarhia, a district in the centre of Athens generally referred to as the anarchist area, which is embedded with radical leftist fractions and reconciliations (Kallianos, 2013). Some locals have created a haven for migrants of various ethnicities at Kentro headquarters, and offer social activities, such as free language lessons, a community kitchen and coffee/tea/beer hangouts. The movement is community-based, holds regular meetings, and does not accept donations from either state or international organizations, though there are tensions around the political meanings of spontaneous and anti-structural sociality in the movement (Rosakou, 2008). Kentro serves as an umbrella for other grassroots movements, and Kentro members participate in organizing various meetings and activities that focus on human rights in Greece. This space includes locals, migrants of Asian, Arabic and African descent, as well as Europeans. Some of our participants lived in Exarhia, while others came to seek social communities there. Their leftist political affiliations tended to be fluid, and their involvement with refugees of varied temporality, but all were passionate about horizontal practices. As such, their political identities evolved around anti-authoritarianism with high scepticism of governmental structures and leading politicians.

The article will first describe the symbolic space of Exarhia, and then explore how the masculine effect of heroism is both elevated and resisted. We will then discuss the ways in which the participants negotiated their own vulnerability and that of others, and lastly, we will show that the participation of women, queers and migrants was marked by motherhood and weaker resistance towards consumption. Within the discussion we will draw this together as to show how the hybrid hierarchy were formed through moral masculinities.

### **Exarhia: a historical space of resistance**

**P**anourgiá's (2009) historical ethnography shows that many of the leftist sufferings within families in Greece have been silenced. Still, she reflects that some memories are nourished and continue

to influence men across generations. One of these legends is of the student uprising in 1973 against the Junta dictatorship. The students had sought refuge within the Polytechnic University (positioned inside Exarhia), but the Junta sent in army tanks to break down the gates, resulting in many casualties. This contributed to a public revolt that ultimately led to the Junta's downfall in 1974. *Politechneio* is therefore a historical symbol of resistance, and a contemporary gathering point before protests. It is a landmark that has a special significance for locals, though the area is full of intricate and contested places of meaning<sup>4</sup>. Exarhia is also linked to resistance as the site of protests in 2008, when thousands of youths alongside their teachers and parents, protested every day for a month in front of the parliament against police brutality, government corruption, and desolate future prospects (Astrinaki, 2009). The protest was ignited after a police officer shoot a youth, Alexandros Grigopolous, inside Exarhia. The area, moreover, has an ambiguous reputation in regards to drugs, as there is a tendency to discredit the leftists as criminals in the right wing media and political discourses, to justify the use of state violence against them (Dalakoglou, 2013).

Before Syriza rose to power, few of the city's internal borders were, therefore, as keenly observed as Exarchia, where the presence of armed policemen was continuous, and even more so during protests. Strategically, the (predominantly male) police were assigned to the area to protect the offices of political parties in the neighbourhood. Furthermore, during the fall of 2012 the police launched its operation 'Xenios Zeus', with the publicly stated aim of reducing criminality on the streets and detaining 'illegal' migrants (Voutira, 2016). However, in practice, this operation involved massive sweeps of non-white people, and was identified as racial profiling by Human Rights Watch in Greece (2013). As part of this operation, the police would launch sudden attacks on the district with tear gas and clubs, enclosing the area with large police buses used to detain and forcefully remove people, migrants and protesting locals alike.

Exarchia was, therefore, in a continuous shadow of violence, while most locals both resisted and made an effort to reconstruct the area as

autonomous and safe. As such, in this social space of protests, the masculine role held a greater social prestige than the feminine, as we will demonstrate below, drawing on fieldnotes and interviews.

**“Alexis, you live, you are our guide”: the unifying young male martyrs**

The effect of male heroism on male youth or marginalized men is well-documented within Greece (Herzfeld, 1988; Kornetis, 2010; Papailias, 2003). Similarly, heroic tales of resistance were dominant among our informants. Or, as Gabriel, an interlocutor who is in his twenties, said: “It’s somehow complicated, because they [leftist men] have stereotypes, I think, in the present from the past.” Gabriel was from a rural village but came to Athens to study and was residing with his aunt in Exharhia. He was tall, thin, with wavy dark hair and was considered quite beautiful among the local population. In many places in Greece the image of the young, tall, unspoiled, beautiful man is most appreciated (Loizos, 1994). Among the leftists in Athens, this takes the form of the exaltation of male youths whose future has been suspended, particularly if they have met violent deaths at the hands of the police or the Golden Dawn.

Most notable was previously mentioned Alexandros Grigoropoulos, who was celebrating his friend’s birthday in the district when he was shot, at the age of 15, by a police officer in December 2008. During our fieldwork, it was common to see banners idealizing Alexandros at demonstrations, with slogans such as: “Alexis you live, you are our guide” (gr. *Αλεξη ζεις, εσύ μας οδηγεις*). Bruce, an interlocutor in his forties, was amongst those men who often carried banners in demonstrations. He was muscular, tall, with gray hair and beard stubs. He had some inheritance that he could live off and had recently bought a house in Exarhia where he was living with his girlfriend at the time. During one demonstration, Bruce, elaborated that Alexandros was not called Alexis while living, but after his death the nickname was used as to bring his commonality closer, making him a hero who comes from one of

us, and could have easily been you or your child. Or as Freddie, a musician in his thirties, recalls:

And for me, it was like a personal, shocking, experience, it could have happened to me, or the other one beside me. It was a place that I was walking by every day. I was there three hours before the shooting.

Thus, 'Alexis' became a unifying symbol after years of apathy and political factions on the left. Moreover, Alexandros's death marked an increase in spontaneous actions against state violence or enforcements (Brekke, Dalakoglou & Vradis, 2014). Even though Alexandros did not go to Exarchia with the intent to protest, his death has been reconstructed as a sacrifice, and elevated to heroism among some leftists.

Alexandros's friend, Nikos Romanos, also became a hero after he was arrested in 2013 for attacking a bank, claiming it as an act of resistance to capitalism. After his arrest, and that of his collaborators, photographs of them severely beaten, taken on a mobile phone, were widely circulated in leftist social media circles as evidence of police brutality. In November 2014, Nikos went on a hunger strike to demand the right to attend university exams outside the prison. Coinciding with the six-year anniversary of the death of Alexandros, major protests took place to show support for Nikos. Protesters repeatedly shouted an old leftist slogan, "The passion for freedom is stronger than all the cells" (gr. *το πάθος για τη λευτεριά είναι δυνατότερο απ' όλα τα κελιά*), celebrating his resistance and indicating that the life of a young man should be one of mobility and of autonomy from neoliberal forces. The Romanos protest also occurred at the same time as young Syrian males had organized a sit-in for refugees in front of the Greek parliament (Ingvars & Gíslason, 2018). These protests would often merge, particularly as the Greek protesters would walk past the Syrians and rephrase their slogans to indicate that the borders were the Syrians' prisons, and they too should have freedom of movement.

Often this resistance towards state violence and treatment of refugees would be combined in a martyr, as in the case of the rapper, Pavlos Fyssas, who is remembered for his public performances in

support of migrant rights. He was stabbed to death in 2013 by members of Golden Dawn while the police stood idly by. The solidararians viewed his murder as a show of cowardice by Golden Dawn members, whose strategy involved targeting an individual and attacking in larger numbers. One of our informants was Freddie. He was in his thirties, a musician of medium height, with dark curly hair and a beard. He found the anarchist movements in Greece to be stuck in its own dogma, and had left to study abroad with his girlfriend. Still, he returned regularly to contribute to struggle. His views of the Golden Dawn members were recurrent in the interviews:

Who would have imagined that this, these sub-humans [Golden Dawn] would form a political party that would enter the parliament? ... This started out as a terrorist group, they were wearing swastikas, they were beating up fellow pupils and foreigners, always attacking in groups like twenty against one.

In contrast, the young heroes of the leftists were perceived as brave because of their vulnerability, owing to the higher numbers of opponents or the state monopoly on legal violence. Thus, the use of protective violence was morally justified, and fascists, Nazis, and police officers were marked as non-human, alongside neoliberals. As such, male heroes were exalted through memorial walks and tokens raised in their names, through references to their deaths in public speeches and writings directed towards resistance, and through billboards, and banners displayed during protests. What was absent (or less visible) in these exaltations of heroism were women. Moreover, when the death of a migrant was the occasion for a resistance march, there was also less Greek leftist attendance. Women and migrant men were in this way included but less exalted.

*"The political supermarket": navigating hegemonic masculinities*

Participation in protests gave our participants social credibility as young men, in order to prove their hunger for justice. Or, as Trotsky, an

informant in his thirties, thin, medium height, dark hair, unemployed and living with friends, explained while sitting in an anarchist's bar organizing protests: "Energy is life". By this he meant that though he had no prospects for a decent job, it did not matter as he could use his energy and time to fight for the social reorganization of state practices and oppose European austerity measures. Thus, it is not just what men did but how they performed their normative gender role (Butler, 1990), and how it was valued as a resistance to other men (Herzfeld, 1985).

Within the interviews it was discernible that solidarians would situate themselves against a certain style that was popular in Kolonaki, area to the west of Exarhia and was associated with neoliberal politicians and businessmen, and Gazi, a gentrified party area to the south of the city centre, connected to the consumer youth:

...in the nineties everyone wanted to become a yuppie. ... I would say that brands like Levi's and Benetton back then, Timberland and all this hot friends' period in late '80s. ... Then everyone decided that they wanted to buy brands and it became a status symbol wearing Timberlands. .. But in politics back then, everybody wore a suit and tie and Chinese shoes. (Bruce)

I used to hate men of that style more than the girls [of that style]. (Yannis)

The appearance of Golden Dawn members was identified through a militaristic appearance, or as Freddie would say: "Neo Nazis with Swastikas, they were looking like, bold, with military outfits in Anoraks." And as such, there were a lot of resentments among activists towards Golden Dawn members for colluding with the police by dressing up like anarchists in demonstration with the purpose to ignite violent confrontations. This was identified in Youtube videos.

At the same time, the anarchist performance and appearance was impacted by the militarization of the space, as black clothes became common in the struggle with the police. The clothes were used to veil their faces, so that shielded by their numbers, they could not be identified by state apparatuses (Astrinaki, 2009). One of the more

extreme anarchist groups was even called 'Black Block' (Kornetis, 2010). As such, the clothing was used to identify a commitment and, therefore, created a position of difference among the radical leftist, or as Freddie remarks:

They confine themselves to a sect, a squad, and also a lot of outfit and style. If you weren't wearing black clothes and shoes, black red... "You are not a real anarchist, you are not wearing black, you are not doing this and you are not going there. You are not as much anarchist as we are."... They were, you know, hooded and like: "Are you ready for...". They were ready for like battle and me and my friends were a bit like more ok, we follow up but we were never into vandalizing without a reason.

Black clothing could therefore be a visible indicator of how far into violent struggles the person was willing to go and her alliance with extremism, which is in line with Christensen's (2011) analysis of hyper-masculinities among Danish leftists. She identified hyper-masculine formation through men bragging and celebrating the use of violence. Our interlocutors would, however, distance themselves from violence, as seen in quote above. That said, a certain look of the male anarchist was believed to be appealing to women, or as Freddie phrased it: "A lot of girls would be attracted to the long hair and the beard, and the black, and the physiography of the anarchist". This would be confirmed in the interviews with women as they would discuss finding men committed to the cause most attractive. However, it was not simply about wearing black, but a particular kind, as this piece of field-note shows:

Gabriel takes off his scarf and black leather jacket before sitting down. Jason comments on the jacket, that he has not seen it before. Gabriel says he just bought it yesterday in the *Kilo* [second hand store]. He remarks on how it is in good quality even if it is used and tells us he got it for only 10 Euros. He smiles broadly. The jacket gets shown around and Jason, Hussain and Mary admire it.

So used black clothes held special value. However, this embedded underground tendency towards wearing black was also resisted, for example, by people showing up in demonstrations in pink, and disagreeing when gays were shamed for wearing feminine fashionable clothes. Many of our interlocutors would recall how they were teased for being feminine or sissies, because of the kinds of drinks they ordered, the jobs they held, the music they played, the places they liked to hang out, and the people they associated with. Most said that they considered this kind of teasing sexist and counter to inclusive practices. This shows that there were ambiguous morals among the men when it came to the hyper performance of the masculine hegemony. This is clear in Gabriel's negotiation of a complex blend of masculinities:

They easily put a label on someone, if he doesn't participate in political parties or groups. Or they say: This is like other Greek people who only care about money, eating and having fun. It is not that exactly. Some people don't participate [in protests] because they don't consume, I say, from that political supermarket! ... I can't understand, for example, how an anarchist can wear an army jacket or suit. How can this suit your ideas? Or how can you be like a macho ... like a member of Golden Dawn on steroids. ... I think it is sexist again, what it is to be a man, to be tough ... all of this.

Gabriel's choice of words, such as "consume" and "supermarket" demonstrates that he follows the hegemony against consumerism though he distances himself from the hyper masculine performance, despite buying and wearing the black leather jacket. Moreover, he recognizes the paradox of gendered oppression among the leftists, and is trying to make space for an alternative masculine practice without losing respect among his peers.

The examples discussed in this section suggest that commitment, bravery, sacrifice, public street performances are highly valued among the activists. However, our interlocutors would mitigate such practices, as they don't want to be viewed as oppressive themselves. Therefore, the



men's sense of vulnerability, their own and others', needs to be considered contextually, as we will show in the next section.

**“It is a human right not to use money”: a masculine negotiation of vulnerability**

Our interlocutor Kal-el, in his sixties, was in many ways representative of the older generation among the solidarians, a community in which he was greatly respected due to his care for others and for fighting the Junta in the 1970's. He was soft spoken, displayed an appreciation for women's struggle for equality, and had some health issues to deal with. He divorced in his later years and moved closer to his ailing mother to assist her, as he was greatly concerned about her well-being. Austerity measures have severely impacted the welfare state in Greece, and thus family support has become crucial (Karamessini, 2012). Our discussions highlighted the economic and emotional aspects of the family that were deeply in his mind, revealing his vulnerability in dealing with his situation.

Kal-el's account reflects a recurrent theme among our participants: emotions following the loss of a loved one, coupled with the men's concern that they would be unable to take care of their family members, such as parents or current/prospective partners or children. These worries were impacted by the high unemployment rate, the precariousness of the labour market, and patronage within Greek universities, which negatively affected men's prospects of gaining entry to higher levels of education. Thus, men would renegotiate the value of what it meant to be a good human being in today's Greece. For example, Bruce, who had some inheritance but little prospect of a permanent job, stated: “It is a human right not to use money. I mean people die out of money, out of stress, out of pressure, out of debts.” Bruce's repugnance for capitalism was also embedded in his own loss, as he believed his father's death was indirectly caused by capitalism:

My father's death came out of some kind of economic collapse. So, we all, in our family subconsciously, think it

was ... business killed him. He was such a nice guy, soft spoken, light, honest, da da da, what was he doing in shipping business! I mean they are all like gangsters. So finally, they ended up ripping him off, and two, three years after that he died. So subconsciously we had in mind that business is the killing thing that kills you.

Besides blaming capitalism for his father's death, Bruce characterizes men within the shipping business as gangsters or as inhuman, due to their harshness towards his father. In a similar way, Freddie explained that in his youth he felt threatened because of increased attacks on his leftist friends and school mates in the neighbourhood of Kypseli, located to the north of Exarhia, by Golden Dawn members, whom he characterizes as sub-human. At that time, he had recently lost his mother, was rebelling against his father and sought out the anarchist district to find people with common interests:

I remember the first time I went to the old square in 1995. ... There were punks and people listening to rock music and it was an open square. ... they were drinking beers, it was like, I think I will never forget that moment, really. ... And some friends of mine who were a bit of, you know, long hair, were like: "Come on man, why do you still hang around in your neighborhood now with all the fascists. This is the place to be!"

In this way, our interlocutors would describe loss and vulnerability while distancing themselves from nationalistic and/or neoliberal men, indicting how they would both relocate and renegotiate their masculinities. Partly this was done to find a sense of safety. This further shows that the status of 'surplus humans', that is, the non-manager or non-consumer (Blagojević, 2013) was negotiated by embedding the discourse of human rights, which was the dominant discourse used to fight for the rights of the refugees.

*“A human problem”: impact of others’ vulnerability*

Most Athenians seemed to realize the harsh realities faced by refugees, during the Syrians’ sit-in protest in Syntagma Square in December 2014 (Ingvars & Gíslason, 2018). However, the solidarians had been aware of the struggles of refugees for some years. While both groups were in precarious positions, there was bound to be some hierarchy due to citizenship rights, local networks and knowledge of the place. To give some examples, volunteer teachers at Kentro were recommended to have a list of students’ numbers in their phones to advise them to keep safe if confrontation broke out in the neighbourhood. And through mobile networking, solidarians (more commonly males) were also on constant alert to react to distress calls within the city. Moreover, motorcycle groups would arrive quickly at places where there was conflict. As such, the vulnerability of others gave some men a positive role to embody, including an element of benevolence. This is well described in Bruce’s words about how he came to help with immigrants’ and refugees’ struggles, during an occupation and a hunger strike of primarily North African workers in Athens in 2011:

We stayed for 45 days with them, tried to play the role of the friendly guy who would ask them about their family and their country, their life, their hobbies, the music that they like. ... To be kind to someone by being interested in more than their ethnicity and immigrant status. This is a guy who is interested in what kind of music I like. Or how I like to party, what girlfriends I had. ... The human side. And I think it helped a lot. ... So, I was really kind of feeling like I did something important.

However, some men did not perform this benevolent role without reflecting on the morality of hierarchical differences in status. Our participant Yiannis was in his thirties, tall, muscular, with short black hair, and living with his pregnant wife in Exarhia. His education was in vocational training and he had some part time work. He explained that

he refused to define his working alongside refugees in terms of a paternalistic impulse:

I have discussed this issue [of assisting migrants] with other people, and some of them told me that 'I feel strong when I help someone who has problems, and I become the person who solves their problems'. And I had to decline this way of thinking. It is their way of thinking, not mine. [Later he then goes onto say] ... It concerns all the people ... above ethnicities, nationalities. ... I think first we are human and we are in the same class.

In this way, there was a tendency to see humanity as a common class struggle and, despite good intentions, to gloss over hierarchical positions. Furthermore, as Jack, another musician, who was in his twenties, self-identified as queer, was single, short, with black hair, quick movements and seeking a scholarship to study abroad, said, the aspect of humanity was commonly considered to be above gender:

I don't really think that we have to separate a man from the women, because it's all about being a human. So, the question should be what it takes to be a good human to one another.

This reflects an inclusive discourse pattern, and shows how volunteerism, in the sense of sharing the burden of your fellow humans' fragility, has a growing social value among leftist men in Athens (Rozakou, 2016). In this way, the ethnic and gender distinctions tended to collapse into the idea of shared humanity. Still the gendered elements of the word human were recognizable. For example, when Gabriel was describing traditional gender roles he said: "Man needs to be tough, man needs to be rude, man needs to be **not kind** [his emphasis]"; and later, when he was discussing emotional attachment and responsibility of the male solidarians when it came to romantic relationships, he said: "So as a human being nobody can be perfect." Thus, a hard man was viewed as traditionally restrictive and in the opposite of the vulnerable female or someone in need of care. However, being human was to acknowledge

one's own fragility even as a man. In this way the men could re-negotiate their masculine role.

Embedding the caring role with horizontal dialogues, thus, points towards new emerging masculinities (Inhorn, 2012), but, alongside the protest performance, the gender relations tended to reproduce local hegemonic masculinities, as we will demonstrate further in the last section.

### **“Neither a slave nor a lady”: a gendered and ethnic politics of difference**

**A**s we have shown, in the everyday life of solidarians, participating in protest and embedding the role of protector or guide provided the social affirmation for men. Even so, the solidarian women negotiated their own power among the men. To show how gender relations impacted the men's negotiation of gender, we will draw forth some examples of women's roles, starting with the following piece of field note from a protest in November 2014:

Demetra showed up and noticed that again she was the only gray haired one. By this she meant she was the oldest woman showing up. We talked a little about this and recollected that an older active teacher sometimes shows up, and in 2012 an old lawyer sometimes showed up. Demetra told me she likes Exarhia a lot, for she feels there is more activity going on and she likes to be active, though her husband is more conservative, and that is why they do not live there. When their sons were younger they moved out of Exarhia as she did not feel safe there with them ... Her husband thinks she is too old to be acting like this, but it does not seem to stop her. ...she likes to meet all kinds of people while he mingles with close friends and family.

Interestingly, women over approximately fifty seem to be claiming space within political meetings and everyday actions among the solidarians in Greece, alongside younger women. However, their power was located

within their femininity, place and time. For example, the instigation of spontaneous protests usually came about in a bar, late in the evenings, when men were in the majority. This caused aggravation as older women, who seldom occupied the bar in later hours, would try to encourage the men to participate in longstanding community projects, which were mainly their responsibility. Men would rarely comply with such encouragements though generally great respect was shown to older women. During the summer of 2015, when the number of refugees increased dramatically, many activities had to be organized, and more emphasis was put on horizontal assemblies. Even so, our field notes showed that in meetings men would verbally dominate the space, as they usually spoke first, for a longer time, and were rarely interrupted. Older women would have some dialectic space, but were often interrupted. Last to speak were usually young women.

Younger women, therefore, often had to rely on the sexual appeal to gain power. This attitude can be discerned in Bruce's description of a proverb:

We have this saying in Greece.... The first one is: The housewife is a slave and a lady, both. She is a slave when needed and a lady when she is needed. .... And the anarchy version of it is: Neither a slave nor a lady, just a woman. ... She has to be a bit like a kind of sexy and slutty and all of that, but still at the same time be presentable.

To explain further, the notion of slavery is traced to resistance among communists in Greece towards liberal feminism, as previously it was thought demeaning for women to work and a justification for consumerism (Avdela & Psarra, 2005). Leftist men were expected to find someone they would ideologically 'click' with in regard to resisting consumerism but many of our male solidarians would try to negotiate this rule, and 'bring in' other girls. As such, there was pressure on women to be sexually appealing and many would rely on some consumer products, such as red lipstick, tight clothes or hair products to be considered appealing.

Another marker of femininity was the naturalization of motherhood, through which mothers were respected, but grandmothers even more. Therefore, cleaning and child care was mainly done by women and sometimes by male migrants, but rarely by local men in semi-public spaces. Motherhood would also prevent women from participating in the same manner as men, and this social construction would often cause women to resist men's involvement in activities that were considered feminine, such as playing with refugee children. As such, younger men often felt pushed towards participating in the violent confrontations, as Christos, a participant in his twenties, a drama school student, short, slightly overweight, with short brown hair, living with relatives in Kypseli, remarks:

They want their men to be brave and tough and fight in political struggles and they [mothers] stay and take care of the children and help others in the neighbourhood. ... Why, they think that women, when the riot begins, must go back? Why go back? If a woman wants to throw a rock, throw a stone, hit a cop, hit! She can do that if she wants.

This indicates that the younger generation was struggling with gender expectations, as young men would often convey their desire to embed the caring role, and young women would participate in the violent protests. Middle-aged women who were not yet grandmothers, however, would often be bereft of power, or as one female teacher would say, "You don't have a voice if nobody wants to fuck you". Thus, though the solidararian space was opening new venues for women to participate in society, they were still subjected to ideas of motherhood and sexuality. This would often prove problematic.

Among the solidararians, people profiting excessively from others were ostracized, but those harassing women or transgender people, were less likely to be ostracized. For example, a local male migrant was ostracized for benefiting financially from refugees, but accusations of sexual harassment were met with mitigation by a majority of the initiative in favour of the men accused, an older local Greek and a migrant. Citing other incidents, a lesbian group therefore decided to

depart from the movement, accusing members of Kentro of supporting rape culture and misogynistic attitudes towards women and transgender people. This indicates that the support for women's rights and queer rights was more in discourse than in the daily practice.

Another example of ostracism among the larger community of anarchists was through the ideology of musical performances as pop music was connected to gay culture and thought to promote consumerism:

Punk rock was very much connected with being anarchist in Athens. So if you didn't play that kind of music and if you had played in some non-club where you had 2 euros' entrance, you were considered as a commercial band. If you had done that so you were commercialized, you are not a believer, you are not like us, out! ... if you are playing something like electro or music that was obviously gay music, they were saying that. (Freddie).

In recent decades gay culture has been increasingly absorbed by the neoliberal masculine hegemony and used to promote consumerism (Demitriou, 2001; Brigdes, 2013). As with feminism, this seems to cause marginalization of a certain kind of queers among activists in Athens. Moreover, some of our migrant interlocutors would convey frustration, as their entrepreneurship was frowned upon among the Greek activists, with the suspicion that they were profiting from the need of others. Thus, both queer and male migrants were describing difficulties of showing the 'right kind of masculinity' exalted by the locals (Kimmel, 2012).

In short, we believe there is a tendency among the solidararians to connect consumerism with feminine practices, and as such, subjecting people who do not adamantly resist consumption with a feminine weakness. Alongside the sexism, this puts women, queers and migrants in a precarious position and may have influenced the women to be protective of the motherhood role, which continued gender segregations and prevented the men's effort to embed feminine practices.



## Discussion

In a transnational world where borders and boundaries are being intensely renegotiated, it is imperative to analyse how such changes affect gender identities and practices in their local context (Ratele, 2015). Thus, the impact of the increase in refugees in the western hemisphere of the world has caught the attention of scholars of men and masculinities. Recently, Ann-Dorte Christensen (2011) demonstrated how hyper-masculinity was formed among leftist men in Copenhagen, owing to confrontation with the police and xenophobic groups attacking refugees and other migrants. As we have shown in the case of the solidarians in Athens, however, the process has occurred in a hybrid manner, in the context of their own economic and physical vulnerability.

We have drawn forth how the nurtured stories of resistance affected men's contemporary identity formation and performances of protesting in the streets. Moreover, how young martyrs became resistance heroes, unifying images of dignity, autonomy and vulnerability. Thus, our interlocutors could relocate and renegotiate their masculinities through being brave and morally good humans, instead of accepting the assigned 'surplus human' status (Blagojević, 2013). Furthermore, as they were impacted by refugees and other migrant's struggles through the discourse of human rights, the male solidarians entwined that discourse with the role of a fellow human being who was fighting the global construction of inequalities and immobility. They portrayed having ambiguous morals on subjecting others they perceived in a weaker position, and they tried to negotiate the benevolent power of a protector. This can, in the absence of violent encounters, transcend the usual pathos of Greek leftist masculinity. Still, due to the local struggles, the performance of protests prevailed as a hegemonic masculine value and the hybrid masculinities (Demetriou, 2001) were formed.

The dominant theme among the solidarians is resistance to capitalism, be it in the form of consumerism or neoliberal projects. Thus, neoliberal men are perceived as immoral while Greek traditional

masculinities as misogynistic, xenophobic and hard. Rising from a resistance culture, the hegemonic elements of the solidararian masculinities were evident in the social value of courageous performances, and the symbolism of an underground culture embodied through the wearing of black clothes. Though Greek scholars have shown how spontaneous resistance was brought forth from the home to the streets (Brekke, Dalakoglou & Vradis, 2014; Kallianos, 2013), there are few indications that this created a space for men to perform feminine activities in public. Moreover, even if women are making niches by bringing feminine acts to the protest (Vaiou, 2014) and can more easily perform 'resistance masculinity', they are still restrained by sexism, markers of motherhood and, along with queers, by what is seen to be weaker resistance towards consumerism. Lastly, migrants are selectively treated in a sheltered manner unless they were believed embedding capitalistic tendencies.

The solidarians, therefore, reconstructed their resistance identity towards a moral masculinity, which amplifies men who are brave but inclusive and creates a bond of mutually respected vulnerability across ethnicities, sexualities and gender. It is an indication of emergent masculinities (Inhorn, 2014) as it shows a discursive pattern and some practices towards an egalitarian world. However, young men's effort to perform feminine activities is somewhat resisted by women in the solidarity, their own effort not to lose respect among peers, and lastly by continuous austerity measures that inhibits them to find security and promotes protests. Therefore, moral masculinities were contextually negotiated by men stuck in global neoliberal projects of austerity in a hybrid manner.

<sup>1</sup> Since the economic crisis hit Greece in late 2008, there have been both left and right-wing governments. The right-wing governments, headed by New Democracy, have been documented to support xenophobia and violent enforcement of the police (Dalakoglou, 2013). Many leftists hoped for a different practice with Syriza coming to power but the ban on the police using weaponry against protestors remained active only for several months.

<sup>2</sup> The term “moral masculinities” was formed in discussions with Christina Palivos, to whom we owe a debt of gratitude.

<sup>3</sup> This fieldwork builds on preliminary fieldwork conducted over eight months in 2012 and additional perspectives gathered through contact with key interlocutors and visits to Athens following the latest events. We thank Dr. Alik Angelidou for her supervision during the fieldwork. Our most sincere thanks to all our participants.

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# Grandfathers For Rent – If Aging Men Care<sup>1</sup>

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## Abstract:

Men over 50 years of age who perform care work outside the biological family, e.g. in “grandfathers for rent” programs, are rare, as are research projects dealing with this phenomenon. Recently, however, grandfathers for rent have attracted the attention of politics and media as a *potential* solution to overcome societal challenges, such as the care crisis, and the effects of demographic changes. What motivates aging men to become a grandfather for rent and how is the care practice experienced? With our study we strived to answer these and other questions, all the while retaining a focus on the social implications of this phenomenon. The theoretical framework for the study is found in the intersection of (hegemonic) masculinity, care and age which relies on grandfather studies, the debate on caring masculinities, on the care crisis, and the social-political concept of *active aging*. In keeping with the *win-win* credo of the discourse, senior citizens are thus encouraged to modify their lifestyle and activities in order to provide social benefits for others as well as for themselves, supposedly enriching their own aging process.

The empirical study was conducted in a German federal state. In terms of the motivations of grandfathers for rent, it becomes apparent that they are aware of the current care crisis. A second motive, however, is a feeling of missed opportunities during their previous life course as career-

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focused breadwinners. Grandfatherhood for rent is perceived as a *second chance* of active participation in childcare. Although their care practice is similar to that of biological grandparenthood, the interviewees do not relinquish individual claims on their available time. Furthermore, and somewhat contrary to the promise of active aging, it becomes apparent that the care work is far from effortless – and can make you both *young* and *old* at the same time. Patterns of traditional division of labor among gender groups are persistent within their care practice, as can be seen in grandfathers preferably taking on typically *male* care activities - often outdoor. Nevertheless, the care work provided by grandfathers for rent does help articulate emotionality and affection and therefore gives hints to reconciliation of masculinity and care.

**Keywords:** Rent a grandfather, active aging, care crisis, hegemonic masculinity, caring masculinities

## Kiralık büyükbabalar-Yaşlanan erkekler bakıcı olursa

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### Özet:

Biyolojik aileleri dışında bakım işi yapan 50 yaşın üzerindeki erkekler, örneğin “kiralık büyükbabalar” programları, aynı bu konuyla ilgili araştırma projeleri gibi, enderdir. Ancak yakın zamanda, kiralık büyükbabalar, bakım krizi ve demografik değişikliklerin etkisi gibi toplumsal problemlerin üstesinden gelmek için *potansiyel* bir çözüm olarak, politikanın ve medyanın dikkatini çekti. Yaşlanan erkekleri “kiralık büyükbaba” olmaya iten nedir ve bu bakım pratiği nasıl deneyimlenir? Çalışmamızda, bu konunun toplumsal implikasyonlarına odaklanarak, bu ve benzeri sorulara cevap aradık. Bu çalışmanın teorik çerçevesi, (hegemonik) erkeklik, bakım ve büyükbabalık çalışmalarına konu olan yaş unsuru ile yaşlanan erkekler üzerine yürütülen tartışmaların, bakım krizinin ve sosyo-politik bir kavram olan *aktif yaşlanmanın* kesişimi ile oluşmuştur. Söyleme yerleşik olan “kaybedenin olmadığı” inancıyla uyumlu olarak, yaşça büyük vatandaşlar, kendileri ve diğerlerine sosyal fayda sağlamak için, bilhassa kendi yaşlanma süreçlerini zenginleştirmek adına, hayat tarzlarını ve aktivitelerini değiştirmeleri için cesaretlendirilmektedir.

Ampirik çalışma bir Almanya federal eyaletinde gerçekleştirilmiştir. Kiralık büyükbabaların motivasyonunda görünür olan, mevcut bakım krizinin farkında olmalarıdır. İkinci bir motivasyon ise, kendi geçmişlerinde, kariyer odaklı geçim

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sağlayıcılar olarak, bazı fırsatları kaçırmış oldukları hissidir. Kiralık büyükbabalık, çocuk bakımına aktif katılım için *ikinci bir şans* olarak görülmektedir. Bakım pratikleri biyolojik büyükbabalık ile benzer olduğu halde, görüşmeciler müsait zamanları konusunda bireysel haklarından feragat etmemektedir. Dahası, görülüyor ki, bakım işi, aktif yaşlanmanın vaatlerine ters düşecek şekilde, zahmetsiz olmaktan uzaktır ve kişiyi aynı anda hem *genç* hem de *yaşlı* yapabilir. Büyükbabaların çoğunlukla dışarıda yürütülen, tipik olarak *erkek* bakım aktivitelerini tercih etmeleri de gösterir ki toplumsal cinsiyete dayalı geleneksel işbölümü kalıpları bakım pratiğinde de süreklilik göstermektedir. Yine de, büyükbabalar tarafından üstlenilen bakım işi, duygusallığın ve şefkatin ifade edilmesine yardımcıdır ve bu nedenle de erkeklik ve bakımın uzlaşması üzerine ipuçları sağlamaktadır.

**Anahtar kelimeler:** Kiralık büyükbaba, aktif yaşlanma, bakım krizi, hegemonik erkeklik, bakıcı erkeklikler

## Introduction

“Grandfather for rent” is a relatively recent social phenomenon made prominent in Germany primarily through a television series in the 1980s (“Der Leihopa”), which may have been inspired by a real institution: the “Grandmother and Grandfather Care Service Bremen” (Oma-Opa-Hilfsdienst Bremen), that was founded in 1983 and exists to this day (Klein, 2014, p. 20). Back then, grandparents for rent services were a curiosity in care, but today numerous organizations are offering their assistance with finding grandfathers and grandmothers for rent, or with becoming a grandfather or grandmother for rent yourself, indicating a growing demand of families for assistance in reconciling work and family (IfD Allensbach, 2012, p. 37). In Germany, such programs include volunteer initiatives (Klein 2014, p. 20), publicly funded child care institutions as well as market driven organizations<sup>1</sup> (Riedel, 2007) with a clear dominance of women taking the role of a grandmother for rent as our results show. A finding that came as no surprise if we take a look at the feminine connotation of non-professional (Beckmann, 2016, p. 33) as well as (semi-)professional fields of care provision in Germany (Funder, 2017, p. 455).

Overlooking the already existing body of research we know that we know little. Neither German nor international agencies provide data on the distribution and characteristics of these old male caregivers as well as insights on the social practice of providing care (Lattner and Schneewind 2014; Klein 2014).

We define grandfathers for rent as a social practice by which men over 50 years of age care for children they have no kin relationship to (Lattner and Schneewind, 2014, p. 14). Their participation enters them into an asymmetrical subject-subject-(service) relationship (Mädorin, 2010, p. 88) between an older *care giver* and a younger *care taker*.

In our project that was located in the German federal state of Hesse, we were interested in the quantitative dimension of grandfathers

for rent, their motivation, their care practices and whether and how they *modernize* (hegemonic) masculinity (Meuser, 2010, p. 325): Do they adhere to the image of the loving (Lattner and Schneewind, 2014, p. 9) but nevertheless *distant* grandfather (Tarrant 2012), or do they challenge this depiction that has been perpetuated – also by academics (Mann 2007, p. 286) – for a long time?

Grandfathers for rent are conceptually located within the debates of the interrelations between (hegemonic) masculinity, care and age as it is discussed within grandfather studies and the concept of caring masculinities.<sup>2</sup> We further argue that these intersections can be better understood if the care relations are contextualized within a political paradigm shift regarding age policies as well as the feminist diagnosis of a care crisis.

We will start off by discussing the current research on grandfathers for rent, introduce our theoretical approach, give a short overview on our quantitative findings, present the results of the interviews and discuss them in the subsequent conclusion.

## **1. Theoretical framework to study grandfathers for rent**

### **1.1 Current research on grandfathers for rent - untapped water**

German research discusses the phenomenon of grandfathers for rent in connection with processes of modernization of the family and demographic change (Höpflinger, Hummel and Hugentobler, 2006). Grandfathers for rent are considered to be assets within these macro tendencies (Possinger, 2014). But despite the assumption that they might be of growing significance (Höpflinger et al., 2006, p. 105) these studies are devoid of any insights into the experiences of these old care givers. There is only one other study available for the German case: a “feasibility study” (Lattner and Schneewind, 2014) that explored potential grandfathers for rent. The study does not provide any gender sensitive insight, nor significant statistical data. One might argue that

they share some similarities with so called “foster grandfathers” in the United States whose care tasks are centered on help regarding institutionalized education and vocation schemes. The state-funded volunteering program “Foster Grandparents” is a socio-political program to incentivize volunteering of older people in general and of older people from lower social strata (Tan et al., 2016, p. 88). Predominantly, studies investigating this phenomenon look at socio-demographic characteristics, participation duration and frequency, matters of social cohesion as well as issues of physical and psychological health development of the participants (Rook and Sorkin, 2003; Tan et al., 2016).

Summarizing, we lack quantitative data on grandfathers for rent as well as insights into why men participate in such programs and how they experience the care relationship. To further investigate these issues we developed a complex theoretical framework.

## 1.2 Reclaiming or transgressing hegemonic masculinity?

International research on grandfathers for rent can be related to the more general discourse on grandparenthood (Höpflinger et al., 2006; May, Mason and Clarke, 2012; Marhánková, 2015), the Anglophone grandfather studies (Mann 2007, Tarrant 2012, Mann, Tarrant and Leeson, 2016) and the current debates gravitating around caring masculinities (Elliot, 2016; for an overview: Hunter, Riggs and Augustinos, 2017; Ruby and Scholz, 2018).

Grandparent studies raise questions of grandparental care practices in general, whereas grandfather studies provide insights into the interrelations between masculinity, age(ing), and care. The latter criticizes grandparenthood research claiming that grandfathers are often merely made into *decals* of grandmothers. Many studies never actually give a voice to grandfathers and make assumptions about them based on the insights on grandmothers (Tarrant, 2012, p. 184). This nurtured the depiction of grandfathers as being more *distant* and less *engaged* than grandmothers, with their caring style being formal and authoritarian

(Mann, 2007). Grandfather studies take up this gender bias, acknowledging the gender specifics and the contributions of grandfathers to care work (Tarrant, 2012).

Theoretically, grandfather studies center around the notion of *hegemonic masculinity* (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005). It introduced a historical and dynamic system of subordination between different forms of masculinity, who complicit, diverge or contest the “hegemonic” cultural notion of what it means to be a man in and through a specific set of social practices, and the subordination of women and femininity. With a critical impetus, they argue that age(ing) (Hearn and Sandberg, 2009), care practices (Elliot, 2016) and the interrelation of masculinity, care and age(ing) are not investigated systematically (Mann et al., 2016).

What remains ambiguous in grandfather studies, however, is whether and how grandfathers connect to hegemonic masculinity. Men who are retired and provide care might be considered diverging from hegemonic masculine identities. They are no longer the breadwinner and the head of the household which entails the exclusion from activities within the reproductive sphere (Ruby and Scholz, 2018). As they retire they become disconnected from their work environment and re-enter their homes (Tarrant, 2013). This “transition to retirement ...generates a gap between the idea and the reality of hegemonic masculinity” (Mann et al., 2016, p. 4). Furthermore, cultural assumptions and expectations portray care and masculinity as contentious (Jackson, 2016, p. 105). Retired grandfathers are confronted with the challenge to renegotiate their relation to *traditional* masculinity (Mann, 2007). And they do so in various ways, as grandfather studies suggest. They are able to diverge from traditional male roles, thus expressing an alternative mode of masculinity in their relationship to their grandchildren that is based on a desire to be more affectionate (Waldrop et al., 1999). It is argued that grandfatherhood could even counter hegemonic masculinity, as grandfathers can be reflexive and draw consequences for the enactment of their current role by using their fatherhood, which they experienced as impartial and distant, as a non-desirable negative counter horizon



(Sorensen and Cooper, 2010). Others understand grandfatherhood as a way to *soften* and *reconnect* to hegemonic masculinity. It provides men with “(hegemonic) capital” by demonstrating “to be fit and active; to be needed and significant family figures” (Mann et al., 2016, p. 597) while adhering to a more nurturing grandfather image (ibid, 2016).

Despite these ambiguities, grandfather studies until now lack an alternative conceptualization of masculinity. Thus it might be interesting to take a closer look at the notion of the term *caring masculinities* which arose in the field of “involved fatherhood” (Hunter et al., 2017), oscillating between science and politics (Gärtner et al. 2007; Ruby and Scholz, 2018). Recently, Elliot introduced a stronger theorization of the concept. She argues that *caring masculinities* “embraces values of care such as positive emotion, interdependence, and relationality” (Elliot, 2016, p. 240). According to her, being a man and caring are not mutually exclusive. Elliot differs *caring for* (*doing care*) and *caring about* (being affectionate and emotional). She argues that by doing care men might also learn to care about and that caring masculinities can be seen as a “gender equality intervention” (ibid., 2016, p. 243).

This positive, rather enthusiastic claim that does not subsume the occurrence of more nurturing enactments of male caregiving under a hegemonic roof, bears its own problems as the interrelations between hegemonic masculinity and caring masculinities are complex: There is considerable doubt that hegemonic expectations are losing importance in men’s lives as practices of caring masculinities expand. Researchers claim that aspects of caring masculinities are incorporated into hegemonic norms and expectations; some even argue that caring masculinities become hegemonic itself (Hunter et al., 2017).

Those insights leave us with the clear cue regarding analysis and interpretation of our data: Affectionate articulations by grandfathers for rent can be considered hegemonic, but do not have to. So, it might be helpful to consider the “feminine other” as well, whose disregard is a central pillar of hegemonic masculinity, and therefore take a closer look

at shifting or reestablished gender differences in care work (Hunter et al. 2017, p. 7).

### 1.3 Care crises and renegotiation of age

Despite the important insights provided by the debates mentioned above, they do not reflect upon the societal implications regarding age(ing) and care practices, systematically. Grandfather studies operate with a distinction between “young” and “old” men, the latter being retired, predominantly. Caring masculinities studies are devoid of any reflections upon age(ing). Grandfather studies widely ignore that elders nowadays are confronted with politically, scientifically and medically driven expectations of active aging (van Dyk, 2015). Studies gravitating around the concept of caring masculinities on the other hand miss out to investigate that age(ing) might intersect with masculinity and care. Moreover, both strands of thinking do not consider that the societal conditions of care are crisis-prone. We therefore argue that grandfathers for rent can be contextualized by two interrelating macro-phenomena: the *care crisis* (Fraser, 2016) and the welfare state concept of *active aging* (Walker, 2002)<sup>ii</sup>.

Increasing employment rates of women as well as changing gender roles and family concepts imply that reproductive work and the care tasks associated with them can no longer be comprehensively provided by (employed) women alone. One strategy for German middle-class families to overcome this care crisis is the delegation of reproductive tasks, such as shifting care work to migrant workers and women from lower social strata (Hochschild, 2003; Anderson, 2007). Thus, women participating in the labor market externalize reproductive activities, causing an entanglement of various dimensions of social inequality (Apitzsch and Schmidbaur, 2010). Family policy and legislation addresses the care crisis as well (Blome, 2017, p. 206). The German government, for example, has greatly improved both public childcare structures and legal entitlements to care, including support for bringing formerly privatized, self-employed childcare workers into

public child care structures (Winker, 2015, p. 33). In addition, age policy aims at strengthening the role of “regular” grandparents in child care (BMFSFJ, 2012, p. 130; for Great Britain: May et al., 2012, p. 153). Grandparents for rent are considered to tackle the problems of reconciling employment and family (Deutscher Bundestag, 2012).

The acknowledgment of grandfathers for rent as a strategy to address a crisis-prone social reproduction is accompanied with changes in welfare-state politics aimed at activating untapped potentials, such as those of senior citizens, in order to close “care supply gaps” (Auth, 2009, p. 311) within families and which, as the German government continues to argue, will be an intergenerational “win-win situation” (Deutscher Bundestag 2012, p. 14): Senior citizens can engage in active, useful and meaningful practices that provide them with social and health benefits. Parents, in turn, receive assistance in their efforts to manage both career and family (ibid.). Such a political rhetoric can be considered as part of a general *renegotiating of age* (van Dyk, 2015). In the wake of a neoliberal-conservative turn, a structural reduction in public services coincides with the sociocultural formation of *entrepreneurial subjects* (Bröckling, 2007) who “should want to” (van Dyk, 2015, p. 104) actively apply themselves towards the public good – for their own benefit and that of others. Considering the catastrophist demographic discourse, aging individuals are becoming of interest – especially when it comes to “young-old” (ibid.). Volunteering and the individualization of health responsibilities (Schroeter, 2009, p. 166) – regardless of one’s ability to succeed there (cf. Estes, Biggs, Phillipson, 2003, p. 197) – are cornerstones of this renegotiation, as the underlying expectations are considered to be a moral necessity for an active “social” being (van Dyk, 2015, p. 99). Carried by a “societal consensus” (van Dyk and Lessenich, 2009, p. 36), this age policy presents itself as a win-win situation as both young and old people, which will profit because it is considered to strengthen the overall quality of life, communal solidarity and participation opportunities (Walker, 2002).

The discursive renegotiations of age bear gender specific implications for becoming and being a grandfather for rent. The “regime of voluntary self-control” (Bröckling, 2013, p. 214) of the activating welfare state (van Dyk, 2015, p. 104) in times of care crisis can be understood as a catalyst for transforming and reproducing habitualized gender practice and identity construction in later life (Auth, 2009, p. 304). By providing care for others in the name of the common good grandfathers for rent might demonstrate that they are still needed and fit; they can show their importance and ability even though they might be considered “old iron”. They can show that they are (old) men you can count on in times of crises.

## 2. The social practice of grandfather for rent

### 2.1 Grandparents for rent – a feminized social field

The statistical basis for the analysis was provided by the volunteer organizations which mediate supply and demand of care-provision by grandparents for rent with respect to the number of participants, age and gender, retirement status. We also included data provided by the Federal Statistical Office which is concerned with public childcare services which neither included the retirement status nor the marital status (HSL, 2015).

Of the 1,370 male and female grandparents for rent (50 years or older) identified in the German federal state of Hesse 5.9% (N=81) are *male* care givers. This percentage changes when we look in detail at specific fields of care provision: in public child daycare it is 3.3% (N=37 of a total of 1,134; HSL, 2015). For volunteering grandparents that percentage climbs all the way to 18.6% (N=44). Within the group of all grandfathers for rent 45.7% are part of public child daycare while 54.3% work as volunteers. 65.3% (N=49). All the males participating in grandparents for rent programs are 60 years or older. Inside the field of volunteering grandfathers for rent we can state that 86% are retired (N=43). 87, 8% of the volunteering care givers are married or live in a

partnership. 2.4% of these men are either divorced (N=1) or single (N=1). 7.3% of them are widowed.

The social phenomenon of grandparents for rent therefore shows a clear gender bias. This makes it even more interesting to investigate why men participate in such a *feminized* field. The goals of our problem-centered interviews (Witzel, 2000) were to investigate individual paths of becoming a grandfather for rent, the motivation and practice of care relations.

## 2.2 Socio-demographic characteristics of the interviewees and qualitative approach

A total of 16 interviews were conducted, three of which were with grandmothers for rent. Three of the male interviewees were publicly funded, with the rest being volunteers. Another three of the interviewees were males within public child daycare. Ten males are volunteer grandfathers. Regarding the subsequent presentation of our results, we will focus on the latter group. Almost all interviewed grandfathers for rent live with a partner or a spouse (9 out of 10), four of them being married. Five interviewees got divorced and re-partnered. All of the male interviewees are retired. The sample also contains men with at least one kin-related grandchild (6 out of 10). Their average age is 75.1 (ranging from 63 to 80). Five grandfathers for rent have an academic degree. Considering the median household income of 3.300€ per month (based on those interviewees who provided such information; N= 7) they are part of the middle class (see for Germany: Niehues, 2017).

The data have been analyzed according to the *qualitative content analysis* (Mayring, 2015) which allowed us to summarize a large body of empirical data by inductively and deductively condensing recurring topics into categories across several cases.

## 2.3 Motives for becoming a grandfather for rent

### *Having time/giving time*

One motive is derived from families' need for support which can be called *having time, giving time*. This need is twofold: on the one hand, due to occupational obligations parents are under time constraints, and on the other, there is a lack of family members, relatives, or friends that could or would support them with child care. Having time, however, is one of the hallmark potentials of retirement, which can be used to help others:

The parents just don't have any time, but time is something we grandparents have in spades. That was just something where we, where I thought, you know, I might as well give some of my time both to the parents and the grandchildren.  
(Mr. Weiß<sup>3</sup>, lines 31-34)

#### *One's own experience of lacking support*

Motivation seems not merely centered around the needs of other families, but also cognizant of the "helplessness" experienced during one's own family history. The participants appear very well aware of what it means to be able to count on a network of family assistance:

And another thing was that we had been in that situation ourselves ... His parents are in South America, both in [part of the country]. When things got tough, my parents came, but that was always really difficult for them ... I just stayed at home, that was normal back then. ... [B]ut when I wasn't available, that's when my parents came. And that kind, that sort of situation, here in [town in Hesse] it was about 22 families that were the same! Well, I suppose we managed to squeeze in some time that way. (Mrs. Perez, lines 11-19).

#### *Sense of regret*

The third central motive is a type of regret affecting primarily men who led a gendered, career-focused life (Russel 1986, see also Sorensen and Cooper, 2010). A majority of the retired men in our sample led such a

career-focused life pre-retirement. So, they were mostly “absent” as a father.

And now with little [name of grandchild] here, I really wish I had done that back then with our own ... But it wasn't possible ... [W]hen I think back to my working days, it is just this impossible thing. Couldn't do both together at 100%. (Mr. Perez, lines 323-328)

By providing care for the grandchildren for rent they experience a child's development joyfully which they missed as fathers with their “own” kids (and also grandkids):

You know one of the kids there, it is so exciting, I really find it incredibly exciting, and I'm also really thankful for it. That I can witness this one more time. Because I didn't experience all that with my own son and my grandson. (Mr. Wagner, lines 314-317)

And by being (mostly) absent they even got the impression that they have done something wrong regarding the education of their own children:

The daughter always comes and wants to change the tire with me, see. Now she finally wants to do it alone for a change. She's 33 and has never changed a tire. That in itself is a sign that I did something wrong there. (Mr. Gabriel, lines 756-758)

Our interpretation of the reflexive use of one's own fatherhood as “inadequate” implies a kind of debt that is now being repaid. Being a grandfather for rent provides an opportunity to make up for missed opportunities during (grand-) fatherhood.

*Providing care now to receive care in the future*

Two of the interviewed grandmothers – but none of the grandfathers – explained their participation partly with a *prospect* of future help from the care families, be that simply help with groceries, or emergency assistance such as transport to the hospital or not being alone at a critical life event.

They [the family of the child] would be there if I have to be at the hospital. They live down the road five minutes from here. That is one reason why I decided to help them. ... If something happens, they would take care. We would have not to call an ambulance. (Mrs. Perez, lines 385-393)

The assumption of reciprocity reflects a specific female experience of age(ing). Women tend to get older and correspondingly are more likely to be widowed or live alone (Backes, 2005).

#### 2.4 The practice of grandfathers for rent

*The role of spouses*

As men prepare to take their commitments as grandfathers for rent, their spouses play an important role: Often it is those spouses who pointed their partners to the programs in the first place, e.g. through newspaper articles or their own experiences.

But it also works the other way round as the case of Mr. Müller indicates. As his wife transitioned into retirement she got a “pension shock” and he felt responsible or obligated (as a husband) to help her find a meaningful activity as an early retiree.

It was important for me that she had a task. For me personally it wouldn't really have been the right thing. I wouldn't have needed to take care of those two girls. And I was occupied anyway. But I wanted to support her. (Mr. Müller, lines 643-645).



In the majority of the cases wives/female partners are the ones who maintain and stabilize the relationship between the grandparents for rent and the parents of the children they care for.

Yes, well, with [father of the children] I did, he's a very quiet one, but when I have some trouble or problems with my health, then I call [mother of the children] and she helps me out. (Interviewer: And this goes the other way as well?) Yes, [name of the mother] as well, and especially with [name of grandchild1], when she has trouble there. (Mrs. Holland, lines 752-763)

The grandfathers are generally more reserved, and hold back:

Yeah, I don't really want to. I prefer dealing with the kids, see, rather than sitting down and talking about politics for hours. (Mr. Gabriel, lines 360-361)

### *Doing, being an ordinary family*

Establishing a trusted and respectful relationship with the parents of the child(ren) cared for is of great importance to all interviewed grandfathers for rent. As our findings indicate these arrangements are considered to be “family-like” as things happening within these relations are things that are considered to be “normal” affairs of “normal” families. This is reflected in the response of our grandfathers for rent, who (largely) do not separate their own family from the *other* family:

Well, we also see the parents now and then, at concerts and such, or they invite us over, on Christmas or for some coffee or for a birthday. Yes, that is, it is kind of like a part of your own family. Yes, I wouldn't, I don't really see a difference there. (Mr. Kramer, lines 222-225)

At the same time, this “doing family” is corresponding with “caring about”: Grandfathers for rent report that they feel a strong affection for

the child(ren). As it seems, there is no qualitative difference between biological and social grandchildren:

And it is just such a joy, when the kids make those sparkling eyes and you see that everything is accepted somehow, and yeah, that was the same with my own grandkids. (Mr. Kramer, lines 69-71)

Regarding quantity and frequency of care arrangements there is nevertheless a strong orientation towards time sovereignty. As the care arrangements are usually regulated by appointments, though spontaneous “*calls*” (Mr. Gabriel, line 32) are not categorically excluded. One *fringe case* is Mr. Müller:

Yes, my wife always tells me the dates. And it does happen sometimes that I then say: 'Gee, so many in a row, think of what Ms. [name of the project organizer] told us, that this isn't supposed to just be a substitute for child care' ... The grandfathers and grandmothers in families don't do that either, do they, being together with the kids so much during the week, right? And that's how we do it with our own children and grandchildren, of course, and so we do it ... do it also with the family of [name of the grandchild in care]. (Mr. Müller, lines 831-837)

With regard to questions of educational aspects of the care relations it becomes apparent that some of the grandfathers for rent do not consider their primary task to educate the children, unless the parents explicitly ask that “the children should also be encouraged a little” (Mr. Müller, lines 1217-1218). But even without such an explicit desire of *not interfere* can transition to *interfere*. It is always clear, however, that the last word about the children lies with the parents:

But when it is about [name of the grandchild], I say: 'Listen, you gotta think about this again, okay?' But when they decide he's not

playing soccer anymore tomorrow, I can't undo that decision. (Mr. Wagner, lines 362-364)

*Making you old and keeping you young*

Overlooking the intersection of masculinity, age and care confronts us with a complex picture. At first, the care relation itself is experienced in a two-fold way as it keeps the grandfathers for rent *young* and makes them *old* at the same time. The latter is addressed by Mr. Perez on the occasion of picking up the child from kindergarten:

[H]e has his ... kick bike ... and he's off at a speed I can't keep up with ... I really have to make every effort ... you never know when the next car is coming. And that was the case, a car came, some Turkish guy with loud Turkish music, this young man he drives and he's blind to the world, he's just sitting there, speeding, and a kid is there, and then ... I ran like crazy ... I said to myself, man, I'm so old, I can't do this anymore ... I don't want to blame myself, I told myself, I should have paid more attention, if something happens to the kid. (Mr. Perez, lines 670-687).

As the quote indicates “doing care” corresponds with “doing age”, in this case “doing old”: It is constituted by not being physically capable of “protecting” the child from physical harm, because of the disparities between the physical capacities of a “young” and “fast” body and an old “slow” one, that might no longer be able to guarantee the physical safety of the child.

Interestingly, it can be observed that experiences of “feeling old” in and through care practice seem to come up especially with those grandfathers who have the least biographical experience with small children. The (age related) strains of care which might occur are related to a lack of care experience. Mrs. Perez articulates this connection when she talks of her husband's “fear” that the boy might run away from him,

which, in her view, is rooted in his absence as a father due to occupational obligations.

My husband is always afraid that he'll run away from him. He doesn't do that at all, he's not one to run away. No kid runs away. I mean, I've raised kids... He was always at work. He never really experienced all that. (Mrs. Perez, lines 251-253)

Nevertheless, health and medical issues cannot simply be ignored. Mr. Perez, for example, has “problems with the cervical spine ... and the asthma, that's also quite something.” (Mrs. Perez, lines 474-476)

On the other hand, the care practice is reputed to be a veritable “fountain of youth”.

Yes, when we do bicycle tours ... then sometimes we go off into rough terrain, cross-country, right? We always liked doing that, right, up a steep hill or across a flat ... and I can't do it like that anymore with my wife. But the kids, they give you ideas ... So you can see that the bike helped me stay young ... (Mr. Gabriel, lines 143-156)

*Staying young* goes hand in hand with specific learning processes. Some children, for example, introduce their grandfathers for rent to a current technology, or question their entrenched views and perceptions. But even things as simple as just bugger around can become sources for that *fountain of youth*.

#### *Masculinity, care and age*

Examining relationship between masculinity and care in old age, it should first be noted that a majority of interviewees feel love and affection while caring for the children.

There's nothing more fun for me than driving in my car with [name of grandchild], because the first thing, when he

sits down and buckles up, he says: 'You got something to eat?' Then he says: 'I just got one more question'. Then he says: 'Where does God actually live, anyway?' (Mr. Wagner, lines 79-83)

It also becomes clear that *fatherly practices* can have a reflexive character. Mr. Wagner gives an example:

He's got his own view, and his own will, with a kid it will always be, like: 'Here, eat your pudding, eat your meat, eat'. But [name of grandchild], he eats and he says: 'I'm not hungry anymore'. But there's just ONE more piece of meat left. Twenty years ago, I'd have just made him eat it. ... Then he also goes: 'Can I have some pudding?', he says. 'This is hard for me, [name of grandchild], see? Because I thought you were full.' 'Well,' he says, 'maybe I'll wait ten minutes, then'. So you compromise, see? No, but he wouldn't have gotten a pudding ... but I'm not making him eat. Back then, I would have made him. (Mr. Wagner, lines 520-528)

Others report that the care practice of grandfathers for rent is seen as something *unusual*. It "was impossible for them ... that a man could do that too" (Mr. Michel, lines 268-269). And it also had something *suspicious*, as Mr. Peter notes:

But in part I'm also not aware of how I'm seen there, I mean, when I pick up [name of grandchild] from kindergarten, whether they realize that I'm just an adopted grandfather and not the one related to him. (Mr. Peter, lines 763-765)

Overall, the care tasks can be described as having a masculine connotation (Horsfall and Dempsey, 2015): accounts by the grandfathers usually contain instrumental (transport services), educative, or leisure-focused care tasks. The latter are usually centered on the children's

hobbies (e.g. soccer) or the hobbies of the grandfathers, such as cycling or swimming. These activities generally take place out of the home and frequently without their spouses/partners.

During in-house care, the “co-presence” of grandmother and grandfather reveals a practice that puts the latter into a “helper or assistant position” (Horsfall and Dempsey, 2015, p. 1080). Mrs. Perez explains this in a story about their “typical daily routine”:

Then [mother and child] arrive, the little one disappears into the back of the sewing room right away, and there's the Lego blocks and a trampoline and he's busy with for a while ... then we eat ... he doesn't eat when we eat. Most of the time he eats later ... and during lunch you have to read to him and my husband does that. ... I eat or do the dishes or I'm in the kitchen. (Mrs. Perez, lines 545-567)

This gendered labor pattern is supported by the grandfathers' spouses/partners. Mrs. Holland talks about it with a certain emphasis:

And it is always my husband at the playground with the kids. That would really bug me! I'm not a playground grandma. My husband does all that. Everything with strength, and stuff. I'm there for the soft things, yes. (Mrs. Holland, lines 476-479)

### 3. Conclusion

**B**y shedding light onto a phenomenon – grandfathers for rent – that has been inadequately studied since its emergence, we have won a complex picture. As expected, men are outnumbered by women in this field quantitatively. With that statistical insight at hand we felt even more curious about the practical side of becoming and being a grandfather for rent.

As our research findings indicate we are confronted with both selfish and altruistic motives: helping parents, knowing about one's own helplessness, giving time to others or expecting to receive future help. The latter introducing a difference between grandmothers for rent and their male counterparts. Becoming a grandfather for rent often involves the partner, who has access to or experience with this field. The reported practices reveal a broad, and at times ambivalent, spectrum of experiences, impressions and emotions. You maintain contact to the children's parents (especially true for grandmothers), yet you can find yourself caught between meddling in and keeping out of the parent's own educative efforts. Free time is willingly sacrificed, yet time sovereignty is largely preserved. Grandfathers articulate love and affection for the children they care for. What they do is largely considered to be what "normal" families would do. The practices of care bear gender specific implications. To be a grandfather for rent can help keep you young, but it also reveals physical limitations.

A theoretical look reveals a kind of *self-responsibilization* in connection with the care crisis, concretized in the assumption that the time potentials made available through retirement can (and should) become meaningful to others, as well as to yourself - without losing sight of ones' own time sovereignty. Grandfathers for rent (as well as grandmothers) are well aware of the changing conditions of care work and its consequences. They react to the reproduction crisis by making themselves a compensatory element of social infrastructure, hoping to at least partially close the gap in childcare demand.

Despite the often repeated credo that being active for others implies not aging yourself, being active as a grandfather for rent can very much result in effort and strain (van Dyk 2015, p. 105). Providing care makes you both *old* and *young* at the same time. In the case of the latter and especially in regard to out-house activities, grandfathers for rent can demonstrate physical strength and agility in and through sportive and bodily care activities, and by doing so they can demonstrate that they are (still) a *man*.. Or in other words: They are capable of reconnecting to

hegemonic masculinity, as the feeling and display of physical ability can provide them with hegemonic capital.

The question, whether grandfathers for rent transform or transgress (hegemonic) masculinity cannot be answered clearly. They express affection and love for the child they care for. One might argue, by caring for, they care about (Elliot, 2016). Concurrently, they revert to activities with male connotations. Many of the male interviewees justify their participation with a *sense of regret*. The resulting commitment of being a grandfather for rent touches upon a *modernization of masculinity* (Meuser, 2010). Reflecting their own role as fathers, displays of masculinity can be articulated in *softer* forms: a former strict, harsh and authoritarian father yields to an *empathetic* grandfather being present for the child, which is not to say that authoritarian implications disappear altogether. It can be argued that, while confronted with the societal task of renegotiating age and filling the gap of care supply in times of crisis, they adhere to a more nurturing image in the sense of caring masculinities. They are provided with a chance to reconcile masculinity with care and affection and counter to some extent the notion of hegemonic masculinity (Sorenson and Cooper 2010). At the same time, the care practice reproduces traditional gender roles.

#### 4. Discussion

Our data contribute to the insight that more nurturing, more “caring” articulations of masculinity bear hegemonic implications, yielding the impression of a contradictory modernization of masculinity (Meuser, 2010) that is interrelated with a changing normative environment regarding age(ing) and with the challenges of the care crisis. We might nevertheless consider that caring masculinities even if they are partially or fully integrated into hegemonic expectations still provide a transformation potential, if we agree to the theoretical concessions, the hegemonic masculinity framework and its gender political implications provide (critical Howson, 2016)<sup>4</sup>.



If caring masculinities (as a concept and practice) enter the “serious games of competition” (Bourdieu, 1997, p. 203) within the dominant gender order, it may not automatically reestablish dominance and hierarchy at the very end. It may set, a “positive hegemony” (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005) which is open to equality, and may have democratizing effects on gender relations which are not subsumed under renewed relations of subordination. Yet, thinking into this direction has to take into account that the construction of the masculine identities and social practices are interconnected and embedded into changing sociocultural and sociopolitical environments. As our research contributes to the ambiguous findings of grandfather studies it might be fruitful to investigate a more diverse set of social divisions (e.g. spatiality, class, (dis)ability, ethnicity, sexual orientation: Hearn and Sandberg, 2009) that intersect with hegemonic masculinity. This might help to better understand the ambiguous, at times contradictory, experiences of older men who provide care and their relation to power. Further on, national variations of hegemonic masculinity as a concept and diverging traditions of theorizing men and masculinities ought to be taken into consideration more systematically – besides the aforementioned proposals. Hearn et al. (2012: 47) reviewing the use of hegemonic masculinity in research on men and boys in Sweden present other approaches of how this can be accomplished.

It is up to future research to investigate whether or not the current generation of grandfathers for rent is a transmission belt for change within the gender order in the long run. It might also be interesting to take a closer look at future generations of grandfathers for rent, who are over their lifespan somewhat stronger socialized by cultural expectations of the “involved father”.

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<sup>1</sup> We also included private enterprises. Relevant data were taken from an online platform brokering care workers, which contained 4 men and 140 women aged 50 or older. Though each of the four grandfathers was contacted, none were available for an interview. For that reason we expensed with this particular mode of grandfatherhood for rent.

<sup>2</sup> The project also considered the precariousness of work and life (Marchart, 2010). We assumed that working as a remunerated grandfather for rent could emerge from precarious work or life situation. Neither our statistical data nor the interviewees themselves support such a thesis, though.

<sup>3</sup> Names of the interviewees are anonymized.

<sup>4</sup> Howson (2016) argues that efforts to remove hegemonic masculinity and its restorative system in and through hegemonic processes that rely on “de-gendering strategies” and “alliance politics” are incapable to tackle the issues of closure, which he presumes to be a crucial task to develop a progressive movement. Hegemony has to be understood not as a monolithic, homogenizing singular force, as Connell has conceptualized it. It should rather be considered as a complex system of knowledge in the Gramscian sense, which allows for a *radical pluralization strategy* that aims not at *de-* but *regendering*. It recognizes the *relationality of gender* with respect to other societal domains (e.g. work, law, media) which contribute to the production of gender knowledge in their own right, which have to be considered, systematically. For further insights: Howson, 2016.

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# Performing Masculinity during Mandate Lebanon in Marie al-Khazen's photographs

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## **Abstract:**

Marie al-Khazen (1899-1983) is an amateur photographer who took most of her photographs in the 1920s and 1930s in and around Zgharta, a village in the North of Lebanon. In this paper, I will analyze how gender — a category used to express differences between male and female individuals depending on a combination of naturally endowed and chosen attributes, abilities, appearances, and expressive codes — is represented socially and culturally in a number of her photographs through complex conventions and significations. How and in what way men inhabit al-Khazen's photographs is the focus of this paper. These photographs were produced during a period that is often characterized as predominantly patriarchal. In most of the photographs selected for this paper, I will argue that, al-Khazen reflects this predominantly patriarchal ideology and will show how most of al-Khazen's photographs prescribe to meanings of masculinity as heroic.

While analyzing the photographs, I consider the following question: How do representations of masculinity differ from representations of femininity in al-Khazen's photographs? Her position being behind the camera puts her in control of the image provided to us today. In other words, she is not a neutral mediator, but, rather, manifests control through her choice of the subject matter, the moments that she wanted to be salient in her life, the light and shadow, the objects in the foreground

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and background setting, the subjects' positions within the space of the photograph and the ways in which these subjects perform their social relations to each other within a group. How do al-Khazen's photographic decisions shape our understanding of gender relations in her photographs?

I will examine the ways photographs disseminate ideas and meanings by generating discursive notions on gender. Gender is explored as a category used to express differences between male and female individuals depending on a combination of naturally endowed and chosen attributes and appearances. The paper offers a scrutinized study of the photographs and the different ways manhood or *rujuliyya*, particularly in the rural areas in Lebanon, was culturally represented through an amplified masculinity. From having a moustache, smoking a cigarette, sporting *tarabish* to holding rifles, a plethora of props and accoutrement appeared in the photos to denote signs of virility.

**Keywords:** post-colonial, gender, photography, middle east, Arab masculinity

## Marie al-Khazen'in Fotoğraflarını Bozan Erkeklik

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### Özet:

Marie al-Khazen (1899-1983), fotoğraflarının çoğunu 1920'li ve 30'lu yıllarda Kuzey Lübnan'ın bir kasabası olan Zgharta civarında çekmiş amatör bir fotoğrafçıdır. Bu çalışmada, toplumsal cinsiyetin al-Khazen'in fotoğraflarında çeşitli kompleks imgeler ve kurallar aracılığıyla sosyal ve kültürel olarak nasıl temsil edildiğini inceleyeceğim. al-Khazen'in fotoğraflarında erkeklerin nasıl ve ne şekillerde yer ettiğini göstermek çalışmanın temel odağını oluşturmaktadır. Bu fotoğraflar, ağırlıklı olarak ataerkil olan bir dönem boyunca üretilmiştir. Bu çalışma için seçilen fotoğrafların çoğunda, al-Khazen'in çoğunlukla ataerkil ideolojiyi yansıttığını tartışacak ve fotoğrafların çoğunun erkekliğin anlamını kahramanlıkla tanımladığını göstereceğim.

Fotoğrafları incelerken temel olarak şu soruyu göz önünde bulundurdum: "al-Khazen'in fotoğraflarında erkekliğin temsili kadınlığın temsilinden nasıl farklılaşıyor?" al-Khazen'in kamera ardındaki varlığı bugün bizlere ulaşan imgelerin kontrolünü ona veriyor. Başka bir deyişle, Khazen fotoğraflarında tarafsız bir aracı değil; aksine fotoğraftaki özneleri, kendi hayatında görünür olmasını istediği anları, ışığı ve gölgeleri, ön ve arka plandaki objeleri, öznenin fotoğraftaki konumunu ve bu öznelerin gruplar içinde birbirleri ile olan ilişkilerinin nasıl yansıtıldığını seçerek fotoğrafın ardındaki kontrolünü gözler önüne seriyor. Al-Khazen'in fotoğrafik kararları bizim onun fotoğraflarındaki

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toplumsal cinsiyet algımızı nasıl şekillendiriyor? Bu bağlamda, fotoğrafların toplumsal cinsiyete dair söylemsel kavramlar üretmek, düşünceleri ve anlamları yaydığı yolları inceleyeceğim. Toplumsal cinsiyet, erkek ve kadınlar arasındaki farklılıkları ifade etmek adına kullanılan; hem doğal olarak verilen hem de seçilen tutum ve görünümlere bağlı olarak değişen bir kategori olarak ele alınmıştır. Bu makale, Al-Khazen'nin fotoğraflarının ve erkekliğin (*rujuliyya*) özellikle Lübnan'ın kırsal kesimindeki güçlendirilmiş tezahürleriyle sunulan kültürel temsillerinin ayrıntılı bir örneğini sunmaktadır. Fotoğraflarda erkek cinselliğini simgelemek adına, bıyık bırakmaktan, sigara içmeye, tüfek kullanmaktan ve *tarabish* yapmaya kadar pek çok ayrıntı yer almaktadır.

**Anahtar kelimeler:** postkolonyal, toplumsal cinsiyet, fotoğrafçılık, Orta Doğu, Arap erkekliği

## Introduction

In this paper, I analyze how gender — a category used to express differences between male and female individuals depending on a combination of naturally endowed and chosen attributes, abilities, appearances, and expressive codes — is represented socially and culturally in a number of her photographs through complex conventions and significations. These photographs were produced during a period in which understandings of what it meant to be masculine or “a man” were deeply informed by a normative expression of patriarchal values. In most of the photographs selected for this paper, I argue that, al-Khazen reflects society’s strongly patriarchal ideology and I show how most of al-Khazen’s photographs portray masculinity as heroic. While analyzing the photographs, I consider the following question: How do representations of masculinity differ from representations of femininity in al-Khazen’s photographs? Her position being behind the camera puts her in control of the image provided to us today. In other words, she is not a neutral mediator, but, rather, manifests control through her choice of the subject matter, the moments that she wanted to be salient in her life, the light and shadow, the objects in the foreground and background setting, the subjects’ positions within the space of the photograph and the ways in which these subjects perform their social relations to each other within a group. How then might al-Khazen’s photographic decisions shape our understanding of gender relations during mandate Lebanon? Here I examine how masculinity is constructed in al-Khazen’s photographs in the ways they disseminate ideas and meanings by generating discursive notions on gender. Gender is explored as a category used to express differences between male and female individuals depending on a combination of naturally endowed and chosen attributes and appearances. The paper offers an analysis of the different ways manhood or *rujuliyya*, particularly in the rural areas in Lebanon, was culturally constructed through an amplified masculinity. From having a moustache, smoking a cigarette, and sporting a *tarbouche*,

to holding rifles, a plethora of props and accoutrements appeared in the photos to denote signs of virility.

Scholarship on photography that incorporates the study of masculinity in the Middle East is a rapidly expanding field. When I first began to explore gendered readings of al-Khazen's photographs, I sought to combine theoretical work in gender studies with theories of representation.<sup>1</sup> Studies of masculinity were primarily devoted to western men in art history, photography, anthropology and cultural studies.<sup>2</sup> As I did not want to simply resort to western models in exploring masculinity, I turned to writings about imagined masculinities in the Middle East.<sup>3</sup> It is by combining readings and research from these sources that I examine the photographs in which al-Khazen portrayed the masculine figure as the central figure, in line with the predominant patriarchal ideology which places particular male figures as central to the social hierarchy.

Marianne Hirsch has posed the question of power deployed and contested within a family's visual dynamics, in the context of photographic practices within families (1997). To contextualize al-Khazen's photographs, I first look into family photographs of the same period in which it is a recurring photographic convention to place men in central positions in portrait photographs. A recurring tradition in most family photographs show the patriarch of the family placed at the top of a triangular composition to emphasize his role as the head of the family. Following the convention of placing men in the highest point of the photograph that dates back to early practices of photography in the Ottoman Empire, the photographer is often in charge of organizing the subjects in hierarchical order determined by the subject's age, gender and social rank.<sup>4</sup> I then show how this convention appears in Marie al-Khazen's photographs of her brother and nephews as well as other men within the al-Khazen's family circle. The way boys are depicted as engaged and mobile with highlighted strength, intelligence and confidence is explored in the next part of this paper that discussed the photographic construction of masculinity of young boys. I then share examples of photographs in which a group of men are performing their

masculinity while exhibiting power by holding arms and rifles and posing heroically in the photos. I demonstrate how one of these photos was intercepted by al-Khazen's shadow as an attempt to infiltrate the masculine space by the woman photographer.

### Staging Patriarchs in Photographs

The beginning of the twentieth century in the Middle East and North Africa was an era of *embourgeoisement* and especially the solidification of the bourgeois family (Sheehi, 2016, p. 103). Photography was a valuable tool for shaping and sustaining an image of family solidarity (Hirsch, 1997, p. 9). In plate no. 1, dated 1898, Salim Mansur Abu Izzeddin and his wife Lutfiyah are holding hands; the primacy of the patriarch is indicated by his position in the photo with his *tarbouche* vertically stretching his length in order to appear large and tall, occupying as much space in the photograph as possible while looking down at the viewer/ photographer. Another example, plate no. 2, most probably from the same period, portrays two women sitting below two men in a living room setting, the upper rank seems to reinforce the superiority of the two men standing or laying in an upward position confidently waiting for the photographer to capture this moment. Plate no. 3 depicts a family celebrating their youngest child's baptism in Palestine in 1928. This photograph appears to have been taken at the studio where the same convention of placing men at the top or highest point in the photograph was widely followed.

According to Michael Lesy (1980) in his analysis of social relationships in photography,

[w]hen the camera is raised to the eye of a friend, a lover, or a parent, it becomes the symbol of a judgment, attention and insight even more intense and scrutinizing than that which ordinarily characterizes such intimate relationships. Its presence transforms the people it beholds into actors, standing in sets, posing with symbolic props, the whole

scene, a private allegory of love, defined by the edge of an imaginary proscenium stage (p. xv).

This insight provides us with useful resources for the analysis of family portraiture. Family portraits often represent family pride and loyalty, prosperity and orderly succession. Each of the family members relates to the other members by his/her position, pose and body gesture. The father or patriarch is facing the camera occupying a central position in the photograph with the rest of the family members sitting below him as if under his authority and protection. Often the younger male members who will later come after him are equally emphasized in the photograph by being positioned in the middle of the photograph as in plate no. 5. Traditionally, fathers, husbands and brothers stood for authority. Human relations were largely determined by one's relative rank or status within the household as well as by gender hierarchies (Joseph, 1993, p. 473).

All men in plates no. 1-2-3-4 are sporting moustaches. Each moustache is trimmed in a different way. In a book on Arab masculinity, Hassan Daoud, a contemporary Lebanese novelist, focuses on the moustache as an essential component of masculinity (2006, p. 274). He explores the various meanings of the moustache in relation to virility. He refers to the moustache, sarcastically, as the "wings of manhood," to express its importance in the representation of manhood or *rujuliyya* in turn-of-the-century Mount Lebanon villages in particular (p. 274). According to Daoud, the moustache's shape, length, direction and thickness are meant to represent a man's level of honor and authority. For example, when stretched from ear to ear and pointed upward or downward, "[t]he moustache determines a man's personality, social rank and age," claims Daoud (p. 274). The most striking moustaches in the photographs are that of the men in plates 1 and 2. What distinguishes their moustaches from the others is how firmly the hair at the ends would maintain its upward twirl. The moustache seems as if it was coated with a sticky substance that holds it in place. The custom of twisting moustaches, according to Daoud, dates back to the days when Lebanon was under Ottoman rule. It carried connotations and associations of the Turkish authority's attitude, symbolizing the



harshness and stubbornness of the oppressor. In pictorial representations, the moustache pointing downward, as in a number of Naji al-Ali's famous caricatures, can be understood as a symbol of a people's defeat; when it goes upward it signifies courage, victory and pride.<sup>5</sup> "A moustache for a man is like forearm muscles, a man raises and tenses his moustache to exhibit his strength" explains Daoud (p. 278). Another accouterment that enhances masculinity is the *tarbouche*, worn by the man in the first photograph. For men in general during this period, the headdress asserted their authority over the rest of the family and their estate while inscribing them as the educated, cultivated, knowledgeable member of the family.

Again, this time in a rural setting, the central figure in plate no. 4 is the male figure situated at the highest point in the photograph. In plate no. 4, taken by al-Khazen in around 1920s and 1930s Zgharta, the man holding an *arak* bottle in one hand and his headgear in the other has the confidence of the patriarch.<sup>6</sup> He has removed his *tarbouche* in a gesture of greeting directed at the photographer. His moustache and his *tarbouche* are traditional signs of virility while his western attire reflects his social status. His position, higher than the other men in the photograph, metaphorically implies his higher position in society. The same applies to a younger boy, shaykh Salim, Marie al-Khazen's nephew, in plate no. 5, another of the woman photographer's captured moments, yet this one seems like a carefully staged scene. Shaykh (plural: shuyukh) is an honorific title in the Arabic language. The title is commonly used to designate the front man of a tribe or feudal family who inherited this title from his father. Most of the al-Khazen men who appear in Marie al-Khazen's photographs are Maronite shuyukh, or leading family members, who controlled areas that ranged from one village to entire districts under the Ottoman era.<sup>7</sup> A shaykh's main task was to collect the taxes from the sharecroppers or peasants in their areas as well as keeping the peace locally (Khater, 2001, p. 23). From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, they played an important role in the political life of Mount Lebanon. They were often the mediators between the Ottoman rulers and their districts or villages (Gilsenan, 1996, p. 92). In this frame,

most of the objects, the furniture as well as the two girls in the image revolve around the central male figure. The three children appear as if they were instructed, for the sake of the photograph, to lean their head on their hand in forming a triangular shape around the young male figure, positioning his head at the top. Men, in general, pose in certain formulaic ways that reflect and affirm patriarchy. Following this convention, al-Khazen asserts this ideology while nurturing patriarchy in her nephew at an early stage of his upbringing through her photograph.

“I’m from an environment that honors and celebrates procreative masculinity... The father in our culture is called “Abu” followed by the name of his eldest son, and the eldest son is named after his grandfather,” contends Rashid al-Daif in his *Dear Mr. Kawabata* (Al-Daif, 1999, p. 60). These naming customs are not the case for young girls whose mothers are not named after them; rather mothers and grandmothers carry the names of their eldest sons, too. For example, shaykh Salim’s mother, following this tradition, is called Umm Salim that is the “mother of Salim.” In her ethnographic study of Lebanese family relations, Suad Joseph makes a strong argument for the centrality of kinship or brother/sister relationships in defining gender roles (1993). Joseph suggests that Arab brothers and sisters are caught up in a relationship of love and nurturance on the one hand and power and violence on the other, in a manner that reproduces Arab patriarchy (p. 471). Patriarchy also finds its expression in family photographs through the women’s public display of affection such as in plate no. 10 where Umm Salim is proudly holding her son with fulfillment and admiration. Women’s roles in society, as seen in photographs of this period, are even more exaggerated in relation to male figures — husbands, sons, and brothers. Motherhood, especially of male children, is congratulated and praised, and this can also be seen in the confident look of the woman proudly holding her son who is sporting a baby’s dress traditionally worn by both infant boys and girls during their baptism ceremony. She is looking confidently into the viewfinder as if she consciously wants to be depicted in the photograph, proud of her relationship to her husband and her three sons.

## Young Boys Becoming Men in Photographs

A significant number of Marie al-Khazen's photographs capture young boys. In her photographs we see the following: a boy on a donkey (plate no. 6), a boy riding a car (plate no. 7) a boy playing with his toys (plate no. 13), a baby boy held by his mother (plate no. 10), a boy in the center flanked by two girls (plate no. 5), a naked boy sitting on a table in the al-Khazen salon (plate no. 8), and a father raising his son above his shoulders (plate no. 9). What is common to all these photographs is the centrality of the young male figure within their frame.

How do we explain the little shaykh posing proudly naked in the center of a table placed in the middle of the house's living room in 1920s Zgharta (plate 9)? If it were a girl, would Marie al-Khazen have taken the photograph in the same way? Would she have stripped the little girl of her clothes and placed her in the middle of a tall table to take her picture? Would a girl be sitting as comfortably as the little boy is while sharing her nudity with us? Al-Khazen took many photographs of her nephews. However, although she had both nephews and nieces, she did not take any photographs portraying her nieces in the center of the photograph, or proudly sitting in the center of a table. To give birth to a girl was not an event to be celebrated in this time and place as it is expressed in Najla's letter addressed to Linda, at around the same time that Marie al-Khazen was taking her photographs.<sup>8</sup> Towards the end of her letter, Najla reveals her preference in wanting to have a boy child. Despite her admitting that this attitude is "backward," as she puts it in the letter, "like peasants," she admits to not being able to transcend her preference for boys.

In centralizing the male child's subjectivity, al-Khazen reflects a range of gendered relations which were widespread in the rest of the Ottoman Empire and beyond at the time. In the al-Khazen's house, men were away a great deal of time; they were busy gathering taxes and solving village disputes. It was not unusual for women to celebrate a

young boy's physical masculinity and to spoil him by acceding to his demands. As long as the boy was alone with his mother and aunts, he could play at being the uncontested master of the house (Kandiyoti, 1994, p. 206). The different attitudes of the mother and the father towards their son are seen in the above photographs, particularly in their expression of affection. In plate no. 9, the father holds his son as high as he can, symbolically expressing his pride; in contrast, the mother, in plate no. 10, holds her son lovingly and protectively as close to her body as she can. Patriarchy finds its expression in how the father positions his son, his successor, in a manner that reproduces Arab patriarchy, at the highest point in the frame of the photograph to highlight his importance and metaphorically imply his elevated position in society.

A further reading of this image might suggest that it is a woman's construction of the young boy's masculinity, allowing us to gain insight into the subject's experience as a boy becoming a man, as set by the context and the family's behavior around him. The boy's identity is being constructed from his childhood experiences, as seen in the way he is positioned and portrayed within the space of the photograph—in his pose and pride in his nakedness. Thus, this photograph is not only about a child, but suggests the young boy's experience of his future "male-ness" through his attitude of sitting naked and proud before the photographer's gaze. Al-Khazen's photograph inscribes Arab masculinity, as understood during the Ottoman era, into the image of the young al-Khazen boy.

All of this is contrasted with plate no. 16 which depicts gender properties differently. In this photograph, al-Khazen portrays particular masculine expectations for the young upper class boy. These would include chivalry and compassion as vital ingredients of the upper class's paternalistic logic. The young boy sits in front of a piano, as a sign of the cultivated and 'civilized' environment, yet, from all the toys that surround him, he holds a rifle. The rifle as an essential accouterment projects the young Zghartawi's expectations to become a courageous fighter. In rural areas in the North of Lebanon in particular, masculine

culture is wrapped up in blood feuds and vengeance. Attributes of masculinity, or the meaning of “being a man” is linked to being an *abaday* or a strongly built man in Arabic.<sup>9</sup>The value of vengeance is emphasized as a means of protecting a man’s masculinity. Embracing masculinity in rural areas in particular, is much more important than “being a man,” according to al-Daif (1998, p. 39). Masculine men are short tempered, aggressive and violent. The slightest disrespect or provocation may result in what appear to be disproportionate consequences. In plate no. 13, the little boy, surrounded by toys, is given a rifle to hold as a prop for the photograph in order to symbolize what he will grow up to fulfill.

### The Pursuit of Heroic Masculinity

Two contrasting personalities construct the masculine figure in the plates no. 14 and 15. In plate no. 14, shaykh Khazen, he photographer’s brother, is disguised as the devil, a symbol for what is bad and undesirable. He stands in a frontal position facing the camera; two pointed horns are projected from his head, his face is covered with white fake facial hair and in his hand he holds a long hammer. Traditionally the devil stands for evil, but in this photograph the figure does not convey the frightening meanings of the devil. It seems as if the subject and the photographer are amusing themselves in constructing different personalities through the production of images. In plate no. 15, the same shaykh Khazen al-Khazen appears disguised as a priest. The priest is expected to provide sound counsel and moral guidance to his co-religionists and faith community. The al-Khazen household was situated in a predominately Maronite environment and thus often visited by priests to give its residents their benediction. However, the priest in this photo could not refrain from laughing, drawing attention to the fact that the subject was not indeed a priest but rather acting out the role. In the first example here, the masculine figure represents evil and in the second, goodness. Both photographs capture shaykh Khazen acting in an inappropriate manner that is not in accordance with the traditional masculine social and cultural

expectations of a shaykh. Regardless of the purpose of this activity, what is interesting to us is that Marie al-Khazen and her brother were amusing themselves experimenting with a camera by producing images in which masculinity is depicted in ways other than those which emphasize men's power and virility. They were producing a masculinity that went beyond the conventional man-as-bread-winner and head of family (plates no. 1-2-3). Putting conventions aside and exploring new a representation of masculinity, al-Khazen, instead of portraying shaykh Khazen as the patriarch—as the protector of the house, the *batal* or the *abaday*—alternatively portrays him as a devil in one photograph and as a priest in the other.

Another kind of masculinity is exemplified in al-Khazen's photographs in other cases; it is not only as a marker of gender tension but also of social rank. If we compare the pose and the dress worn by bourgeois men and peasant warriors this becomes clear. In plate no. 16, a young man who is a peasant and protector of the house poses holding a rifle, wearing his war munitions and a traditional *serwal*. In plate no. 17, a man sporting a European three-piece-suit, along with a bowler hat, typical attire of the 1920s Parisian, stands in a three quarter position next to a young boy also wearing a European style coat. Both pictures seem to be taken in front of the al-Khazen house. Plate no. 16 represents a traditional man. The sense of his masculinity is intensified by exaggerating his image as a fighter, a hunter or the protector of the house. Men were frequently photographed with pistols, rifles and swords during this period of instability and upheavals. These were used as props to assert *rujuliyya*, or manhood as physical strength, in the photographs. According to John Ibson, men resisted new notions of modernity as urbanization projects because these notions would restrain their masculinity as they experienced it (2002, p. 66). However, Engin Cizgen observes that the Sultanate, looking to European royalty, started wearing imported styles of attire in order to project an image of themselves as modern as well as distinct from the lower class. She contends, “[f]or the first time in the six hundred year history of the Empire the traditional costume of the Sultanate underwent a change. In place of the caftan and

the shalvar, the Sultan, looking to the models of European royalty, began to wear striped trousers and jackets with epaulets. The turban was replaced by the red fez" (1987, p. 14). This change among the Ottoman authorities' attire was also seen in the different countries under the Ottoman Empire as early as the end of the nineteenth century. The change of attire is not only an expression of class differences but also an affirmation of the urbanized subject or *tamaddun*. This change of costume later, during the first decades of the twentieth century, occurred in a period of rapid change in the region in which the population underwent a massive expansion with the growth of transport and communications, public services like schooling and health care, new entertainment venues like cinemas and parks, and the publishing of newspapers and magazines (Thompson, 2000, p. 174). Zeina Arida, the managing director of the Arab Image Foundation, observed that the subjects in most of the first two decades of the twentieth century photographs in the archive of the foundation, rather than being portrayed next to religious sites dressed up in Bedouin clothes, aspired to be depicted next to railways and cars.<sup>10</sup> She further explains, "Where Europeans nostalgically fastened on a vanishing world of tradition, Arab photographers were determined to show their present while tracing the lines of the future, as if they were willing modernity into being by the force of their gaze" (Shatz, 2003).

The urban looking man in plate no. 17 displays confidence and pride in sporting Western attire. He seems to accept a diminished sense of power in the modernizing society of the 1920s, whereas in plate no. 16, the man resists notions of modernity that come at the expense of being divested of his masculinity as strong and physically powerful. As the cities and machines of a modernizing Lebanon became even more significant in society and culture, men in some photographs seem more interested in escaping it, whereas other men appear to aspire to look modern.

How did men affirm their masculinity as *batal* and *abaday* in al-Khazen's photographs?<sup>11</sup> It is what Douglas Holt et al. in "Man of Action Heroes: The Pursuit of Heroic Masculinity in Everyday Consumption,"

terms the ideology of heroic masculinity that is when male figures construct themselves in dramatic fashion as man-of-action heroes. This exaggerated heroic masculinity is exemplified in the plates no. 11 and 12. From this perspective, it is with this mythologized *batal*, and *abaday* along with other historically masculine icons like Antar that masculinity is idealized in al-Khazen's male group photographs (Frangieh, 2005).<sup>12</sup> Rather than highlighting virtues of the bread-winners and head of families such as in photos discussed earlier – of domesticated cosmopolitan bourgeois family, that articulated their masculinity in their dress pose and position towards their female counterparts (plates no. 1-2-3 – here it is the adventurous hunters posing as heroic risk takers who are displaying their physical prowess and various acts of bravery as signs of their masculinity).

Similarly, plate no. 11 captures a large group of men, possibly heading off to a hunting trip or a battle, and most of them are armed with rifles and swords. They are posing in ways suggestive of a shared manhood. The second young man standing on the right holds a cigarette in his hand. The older one is lying ostentatiously on his rifle, on his right, sticking a cigarette in his mouth. Smoking was conventionally associated exclusively with men, and rifles were visible tokens for male subjects in countless photographs of the beginning of the twentieth century (Ibson, 2002, p. 68). A number of them hold both a rifle and a pistol. Their rifles and pistols are pointed upward as if they are ready to pull the trigger as a sign to start the battle. They all look into the viewfinder as if they are warning the photographer or the viewer not to get closer to the scene. They are posing in pride exhibiting their victory of a successful hunting trip or as if they won a battle. However, plate no. 12, reveals a more theatrical scene for which it seems that the photographer had previously planned a dramatic scenario. Imitating hunting trips in studio photographs was quite common at the turn of the century (Ibson, p. 69). In the middle of what looks like a dry, sandy, deserted area surrounded by mountains, a group of eight men with a donkey and a camel, most of them dressed in *serwals*, are acting out a fight.<sup>13</sup> The *batal*, the highest one in the center of the group, is holding a gun sideways, looking down



at the man below him. The latter, the man holding the rifle, points his rifle at the former in a position to shoot, his back turned to the spectator. Another man is holding a stick as if he is about to smash it on the floor. The four other men are looking straight into the camera as if they were given orders to do so. On the left, extended towards the open legs of the man holding the rifle in action, al-Khazen's shadow extends to reach out to the group. The eight men, the donkey and the camel's eyes are all dazzled by the sun while waiting for al-Khazen's finger to push the button of her Eastman camera box. They are all caught in a moment of stillness, before being released by the photographer. The men who appear in this photograph not only have been directed to strike theatrical poses but they have been also directed to make symbolic gestures whose meanings are to be deciphered as widening gender roles. At times, they make gestures of their own free will; at other times the photographer directs their actions. Her decisions about the theme of the scene, the distance, point of view and angles slice the world apart.

### Intercepting the Masculine Space

The people pictured seem to have been well rehearsed, know their parts, and enjoy them. Each one of them has been given a task in order to participate in the construction of this predominantly masculine space framed by the photographer. The subjects of the photograph were likely given orders to act out their masculinity. Masculinity, in this case, is understood as a display of power, rivalry and heroism. Combats, conflicts and fights were challenging occasions for men in which they might display their physical power in front of the camera. For the sake of the photograph, al-Khazen has carefully designed the setting, instructed her models, the al-Khazen *shuraka*, to act as if they were having a fight.<sup>14</sup> All accoutrements revealing virility are present in the photograph: the moustache, the *tarbouche*, the *serwal*, guns and rifles. The men in the photograph find being photographed as heroes reflective of their own aspirations. They seem to do the job by executing al-Khazen's orders as to how to enact their battle very enthusiastically.

Physical strength is the quality underscored in the portrayal of rural masculinity in al-Khazen's photograph, yet what strikes us most is her shadow extended in the space of the frame as if to join the heroic moment celebrating the battle's victory. Al-Khazen's decision to place her shadow and insist on her presence within a predominantly masculine space is not a random or innocent choice. This notion that conventional family photographs can make space for resistance or revisions of social roles and positions offers an interesting avenue for looking into al-Khazen's visible intention to insert her shadow in this photograph. Drawing once again from Hirsch's work, "family photographs operate between the junction of public myth and personal unconscious" (1997, p. 14). This interpretation places al-Khazen in an open dialogue with masculinity. Rather than just being at the end of the triangular space behind the camera, she steps into her photo through her shadow to impose herself as an interlocutor. We can read her insertion of herself into the photograph as an opportunity to voice her discontent about the patriarchal order and to attempt to prick the normative space by extending her shadow within this frame as an intruder as if taking part in the act and sharing the bravery and other male privileged virtues that are, for al-Khazen, not necessarily, exclusive to male subjects.

## Conclusion

To conclude, looking at photographs in which young and older men are positioned at the center of the frame, displaying their strength, nudity, pointed moustaches, *tarbouches* and other props that exaggerate their social status to rising above the humanity in exhibiting courage, determination and confidence makes us realize not only how constructed masculinity is but also that there seems to be little difference between posing and being. Convention, with all its trappings, is just another kind of performance. Yet the *punctum* in the photographs is al-Khazen's shadow in plate no. 12 when she places her shadow in between the hunter's legs, to attest to something beyond the binary. She seems to provide an alternative account in reading masculinity and

femininity in her photograph. The shadow can be read as a female subject's aspiration to take part in masculine acts while blurring the line between what men and women are expected to act within the normative social structure. As an interlocutor, she voices her aspiration to take part in this gender performance by resisting normative femininity and reconstructing it differently. She expresses her interest in sharing the attributes that are associated, in most if not all of the photos discussed in this paper, exclusively with men. She conveys her will to take part in ventures that appear to be restricted to men in the photographs and does this through a mixture of representing and challenging binaristic and conventional gender roles.



Plate no. 1 (photo Selim Abu Izzeddin from Faysal Abu Izzeddin collection)



Plate 2 (photo anonymous from Aimée Kettaneh collection)



Plate 3 (photo Garabed Krikorian from Mamdouh Bisharat collection)



Plate 4 (photo Marie El-Khazen from Mohsen Yammine collection)



Plate 5 (photo Marie El-Khazen from Mohsen Yammine collection)



Plate 6 (photo Marie El-Khazen from Mohsen Yammine collection)



Plate 7 (photo Marie El-Khazen from Mohsen Yammine collection)



Plate 8 (photo Marie El-Khazen from Mohsen Yammine collection)



Plate 9 (photo Marie El-Khazen from Mohsen Yammine collection)





Plate 10 (photo Marie El-Khazen from Mohsen Yammine collection)



Plate 11 (photo Marie El-Khazen from Mohsen Yammine collection)



Plate 12 (photo Marie El-Khazen from Mohsen Yammine collection)



Plate 13 (photo Marie El-Khazen from Mohsen Yammine collection)



Plate 14 (photo Marie El-Khazen from Mohsen Yammine collection)



Plate 15 (photo Marie El-Khazen from Mohsen Yammine collection)



Plate 16 (photo Marie El-Khazen from Mohsen Yammine collection)



Plate 17 (photo Marie El-Khazen from Mohsen Yammine collection)

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<sup>1</sup> For theoretical references in gender studies see Rita Felski (1995), Griselda Pollock (1999) 229-246, and (1988), Andrea Cornwall et al. (1994), Antoinette Burton (2005), Toni Ballantyne et al (2005).

For theoretical references on representation see John Berger (1973), Victor Burgin (Ed.), (1982), and John Tagg, (1988).

<sup>2</sup> For literature on western models of masculinity see Carol Duncan (1982), John Ibson (2002), Andrea Cornwall et al. (1994) and Douglas B. Holt et al. (2004).

<sup>3</sup> For literature on masculinity in the Middle East and North Africa, see Deniz Kandiyoti (1994), Micheal Gilsenan (1996), Sherifa Zuhur (1998), Rashid al-Daif (1998 and 1999), Hasan Daoud (2006), May Ghousseub (2006), Samira Aghacy (2009), and Wilson C. Jacob (2011).

<sup>4</sup> The research on Ottoman Empire photography includes Engin Cizgen (1987), Michelle L. Woodward (2003), Wendy Shaw (2009), Stephen Sheehi (2016) and Ali Behdad (2016).

<sup>5</sup> Naji al-Ali is a Palestinian cartoonist.

<sup>6</sup> *Arak* is a local alcoholic drink based on absinthe.

<sup>7</sup> For more on the Maronite shuyukh, see Akram F. Khater (2001) and more on the al-Khazen shuyukh in Van Leeuwen, R. (1994).

<sup>8</sup> Both Linda and Najla must be close friends of the Torbey family (Marie's family from her mother's side) and the al-Khazen family.

<sup>9</sup> For more on the masculine figure in Lebanese rural societies see Michael Gilsenan (1996).

<sup>10</sup> The Arab Image Foundation is a non-profit organization established in Beirut in 1997. Its mission is to collect, preserve and study photographs from the Middle East, North Africa and the Arab diaspora.

<sup>11</sup> The Arabic term *batal* can be used as a courtesy title for the leader.

<sup>12</sup> Antarah ibn Shaddad, a 6th-century pre-Islamic Arab warrior and poet, known for his heroic deeds and bravery.

<sup>13</sup> *Serwals* are traditional baggy trousers usually worn by peasants.

<sup>14</sup> The term *shuraka* in Arabic means the sharecroppers.

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## **“Kavanozu Açan” Erkeklerle “Kafasını Kullanabilen” Kadınlar: Erkek Üniversite Öğrencilerinin Erkeklik Müzakereleri**

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### **Özet:**

Biz bu araştırmada erkekliği anlamak için sosyal psikolojik ve sosyolojik yaklaşımları bir araya getiren kuramsal bir çerçeve çizmeye çalıştık. Erkeklik olgusunu çözümlmek için söylemsel psikoloji, sosyal kimlik kuramı, kendini-kategorileme kuramı ve hegemonik erkeklik yaklaşımını sentezlemeyi hedefledik. Bu kuramsal çerçeveye dayanarak erkeklerle üç odak grup görüşmesi gerçekleştirdik. Toplam 18 lisans öğrencisi çalışmamıza katıldı. Odak grup görüşmelerinin tamamını deşifre ettikten sonra tematik analiz ve söylem analizi tekniklerini kullanarak veriyi analiz ettik. Alanyazında daha önce bulgular ve tartışılan erkeklik temalarının katılımcılarımız tarafından farklı söylemlerle ortaya konulduğunu gözlemledik. Erkekliğe yaklaşmak için oluşturduğumuz bütüncü teorik çerçeve, elde ettiğimiz görgül bulguları betimlememizi sağladı, diğer bir anlatımla, erkeklerin erkekliği anlamlandırma ve bunu çeşitli söylemsel stratejilerle ortaya koyma pratiklerini anlamlandırmamıza yol açtı.

**Anahtar kelimeler:** Erkeklik(ler), erkek kimliği, kimlik müzakereleri, söylemler, tematik analiz

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## “Jar Oppening” Men and Women Who “Can Use Their Brains”: Male University Stutents Masculinity Negotiations

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### **Abstract:**

In this research we established a theoretical framework that brings together social psychological and sociological approaches to understand masculinity. We aimed to synthesize discursive psychology, social identity theory, self-categorization theory and hegemonic masculinity approach to analyze the masculinity phenomenon. Based on this theoretical framework, we conducted three focus group interviews with men. A total of 18 undergraduate students participated in the research. After transcribing the entire focus group interviews, we analyzed the data using thematic analysis and discourse analysis techniques. We observed that the topics of masculinity as found and discussed previously in the literature were put forward by our participants in their different discourses. The complementary theoretical framework we have put together to approach masculinity allowed us to describe the empirical findings we have obtained. In other words, we made sense of men's interpretation of masculinity and their practice of putting it into various discursive strategies.

**Keywords:** Masculinities, masculine identity, identity negotiation, discourses, thematic analysis

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**E**rkek doğmakla erkek olmak aynı şey midir? Erkek olmakla, erkeklik ve erkek-egemenlik arasında nasıl bir ilişki vardır? Erkeklik, erkeğin doğasında bulunan özellikler midir, kurulan bir kimlik midir, kazanılan bir pozisyon mudur yoksa erkeği de kadın kadar ezen bir ideoloji midir? Buna benzer soruların yanıtları alanyazındaki diğer kaynaklarda aranabilir (örn., Atay, 2004; Carrigan, Connell ve Lee, 1985; Connell, 1995, 2014; Kandiyoti, 1997; Kimmel, 1987; 1996). Erkeklik sosyolojisi (örn., Connell ve Messerschmidt, 2005) erkekliği anlamak için önemli kuramsal açılımlar sunar, ancak psikolojinin bu alana katkısı oldukça sınırlıdır. Bunun nedenlerinden biri, psikolojide uzun yıllar kadınlarla erkeklerin bilişlerinde ve davranışlarında ne tür farklar olduğuyla ilgilenilmiş olmasıdır. Biyolojik, evrimci, psikoanalitik, davranışçı veya bilişsel bakış açılarıyla toplumsal cinsiyet farklılıklarına dair çeşitli açıklamalar yapılır. 1936'ya kadar cinsiyetler arası zekâ farklılıkları konusunda yapılan çalışmalar psikoloji alanına damgasını vurur, 1980'lere kadar ise cinsiyete özgü kişilik özellikleri [*traits*] yaklaşımı benimsenir (Helgeson, 2012). Sonraki yıllarda cinsiyet ayrı bir sosyal kategori olarak ele alınmaya başlanır, ancak, cinsiyet farklılıklarını test etmek için katılımcıların cinsiyetlerini sormanın ötesine pek geçilemez. Bu anlamda, Deaux ve Major'un (1987) ileri sürdüğü sosyal psikoloji modeli, bağlamın önemini vurgulamasıyla diğerlerinden ayrılır. Ancak, bu modeli temel alan araştırmalara pek rastlanmaz. Psikolojide, özellikle de sosyal psikolojide toplumsal cinsiyet çoğunlukla sosyal roller kuramı (Eagly ve Wood, 2011) çerçevesinde ele alınır.

Erkekliği doğrudan ele alan psikoloji kuramları sınırlı olsa da sosyal psikoloji alanında ortaya konmuş kuramların erkekliği anlamaya katkıda bulunabileceği ileri sürülebilir. Bu nedenle biz bu çalışmada, bir yandan sosyal psikoloji kuramlarını, bir yandan da erkeklik sosyolojisi alanında ileri sürülmüş hegemonik erkeklik kavramsallaştırmasını sentezlemeye çalıştık. Bunun için, sosyal kimlik kuramı (Tajfel ve Turner,

1986), kendini-kategorileme kuramı (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, ve Wetherell, 1987), söylemsel psikoloji (örn., Potter ve Wetherell, 1987) ve hegemonik erkeklik (Connell, 1995; Connell ve Messerschmidt, 2005) bakış açısını bir araya getirdik. Önerdiğimiz bu kuramsal çerçeve şu şekilde özetlenebilir:

Erkeklik olgusuna birey-içi süreçler, gruplararası süreçler ve kültürel süreçler birlikte tesir eder<sup>1</sup>. Biyo-psikolojik (birey-içi) süreçleri olan erkeklik, belirli cinsiyet grupları içinde anlamlandırıldığı gibi belirli sosyal gruplara (örneğin sınıflara, etnik gruplara, mekânlara, sektörlere, kurumlara) özgü olarak da anlamlandırılır. Dolayısıyla, erkeklik kesişimsel [*intersectional*] bir belirlenime açıktır. Bir kez bir kategorinin üyesi olarak kendini sınıflama, iç-grupla benzerliğin ve dış-grupla farklılığın abartılmasına dayanan bilişsel bir süreçtir (meta-tezat ilkesi için bkz. Turner vd., 1987). Kadınlık ve erkeklik birbirinin karşıtı olarak değerlendirilerek, bu iki kategorinin toplumsal ve psikolojik farklılıkları abartılır (Atay, 2004). Bir sosyal kategorinin üyesi olarak bireyin kendini sınıflamasına dayanan sosyal kimlik, kategorinin gerektirdiği şekilde (kalıpyargıyla uyumlu olacak şekilde) davranmayı beraberinde getirir; hatta bireyin duyguları ve düşünceleri iç-grup kalıpyargısından etkilenir. Diğer bir anlatımla, bir erkeğin nasıl düşünmesi, hissetmesi ve davranması gerektiği sosyal kimliğin, başka bir ifadeyle, erkekliğin normatif baskısı altındadır.

Erkekliğin sosyal olarak inşası, taklit etme, model alma, pekiştirme, doğallaştırma<sup>2</sup> gibi psikolojik mekanizmalar yoluyla gerçekleşir. Diğer bir ifadeyle, erkeklik (veya kadınlık) sosyalleşme süreçleri yoluyla (örn., Onur ve Koyuncu, 2004; Kandiyoti, 1997) belirli bir kültüre özgü olarak edinilir/kurulur. Selek'e (2008, s. 9) göre, "Çocuk oyunları, okul takımları, spor oluşumları, arkadaş grupları, aile ortamı, iş alanları, askerlik hizmeti" gibi cinsiyetlendirme mekanizmaları, farklı sosyalizasyonların yarattığı eşitsizliklerin ortaya çıkmasına yol açar. Erkekliğin (ve kadınlığın) kültürel yapıtlar olarak edinim süreci farklıdır (Atay, 2004). Erkekler, sünnet, askerlik gibi kültüre özgü zorlu ritüelleri ve ödevleri geçerek erkekliği başarmak durumundadır (Atay, 2004; Kandiyoti, 1997; Selek, 2008). Örneğin Kandiyoti (1997), Tunus'ta erkek

çocukların kadınlar hamamından sürgün edilerek erkekler hamamına (dünyasına) adım atmasıyla erkeklığe ani ve kesin bir giriş yaptığını belirtir. Benzer bir şekilde, kadınlar (anne ve ablalar) dünyasında şımartılan bir erkek çocuğun erkekler (baba ve abiler) dünyasında ezilmesine dair Ege köyünde tanık olduğu bir olayı da paylaşır yazar.

Öte yandan, bireyin etkilendiği kültür tekil, yekpare ve sabit değildir; kültür de insanlar tarafından kurulur, değişir, dönüşür. Ulus-devleti temel alarak söyleyecek olursak, bir ülkede muktedir [*dominant*] kültür(ler) olabileceği gibi, farklı sosyal gruplar tarafından anlamları farklı şekillerde kurulan madun [*subordinate*] kültürler de olabilir. Çoklu kültürler eş zamanlı tezahür edebilir; hatta bunlar içinde bazıları birbirine tezat bir biçimde kurulabilir. Bunun yanında, erkeklığı (benzer şekilde kadınlığı da) kuran birey pasif bir alıcı değildir hem kültürel normlardan etkilenir hem de bu normları etkiler ve değiştirir. Dolayısıyla, tarihsel olarak değişen erkekliklerden söz edilebileceği gibi, belirli tarihsel dönemlerde egemen olan (hegemonik erkeklik) veya bastırılan çoklu erkekliklerden de söz edilebilir. Deniz Kandiyoti, erkeklikleri belirli tarihsel ve kültürel bağlamlara yerleştirmeyi amaçladığını belirtir. Çünkü “[e]ğer belirli toplumsal bağlamlara dayalı özgül erkeklikler varsa, bu noktada hem süreklilik gösteren hem değişen örüntülerin çözümlenmesi bizzat bu bağlamların somut sorgulanmasında aranmalıdır.” (Kandiyoti, 1997, s. 185). Nitekim eski ve yeni erkeklik anlayışlarının bir karşılaştırmasını yapan yazar, Osmanlı erkeklığı ile Cumhuriyet’in erkeklik idealleri arasındaki farklılıkları betimler. Bazen farklı erkeklik anlayışları bir arada gözlenebilir. Örneğin, “çok karıllığı hiç bilmeyen kuşaklar” ile “kadınlar hamamını hala anımsayan erkekler” aynı zamanda yaşıyor olabilir (Kandiyoti, 1997).

Bunun yanı sıra, biyolojik ve kültürel süreçlerin etkileşimi belirli bağlamlarda belirli cinsiyetlere atfedilen davranışları ortaya çıkarır. Diğer bir ifadeyle, bağlam farklı erkekliklerin ortaya konmasında rol oynar. Çünkü bağlam, bireyin yaptığı sosyal karşılaştırmaları etkiler ve bu karşılaştırmalara bağlı olarak erkeklığın içeriği de değişir. Karşılaştırmaların kim tarafından ([cis – ed.n.] kadın, erkek veya trans), kimlere karşı (referans kişisi veya grubu) ve ne amaçla yapıldığına (öz-

değerini korumak, belirsizlikten kaçınmak gibi) ve bunların hangi söylemsel stratejilerle (meşrulaştırmak, savunmak, itiraz etmek gibi) ortaya konduğuna bağlı olarak erkekliğin farklı içerikleri ortaya çıkabilir. Erkekliğin bağlama özgü bir biçimde beliren bu içeriği de onun eyleme dökülme biçimini (davranışı) etkiler. Dolayısıyla soruyu “kişi için sabit, değişmez, genel geçer bir erkeklikten söz edilebilir mi?” yerine “bağlama özgü olarak değişse de birey için zaman içinde tutarlılık gösteren bir erkeklik anlayışının gelişmesi mümkün müdür?” şeklinde sorduğumuzda, cevaplanması daha olasıdır. Tıpkı toplumda yaygın olarak kabul gören normatif bir erkeklik tezahüründen (egemen sosyal temsil, kalıpyargı veya hegemonik erkeklik kavramlarıyla ele alınabilir) söz etmenin mümkün olması gibi.

Bağlam, aynı zamanda erkeğin ve kadının pozisyon alışlarını (konumlanma) içerir/etkiler. Pozisyon alma (Wetherell, 1998; Potter ve Wetherell, 1987), erkek-kadın, erkek-erkek arasındaki ikili ilişkilerde olduğu gibi erkekler-kadınlar veya [cis – ed.n.] erkekler-translar gibi gruplar arasında da gözlenir. Diğer bir anlatımla, pozisyon alma, kişiler arası ve gruplar arası düzeylerde ortaya çıkabilir<sup>3</sup>. Wetherell’in (1998) pozisyon alma ile ilgili söylediklerini erkeklik bağlamına uyarlayacak olursak, şunlar söylenebilir: Bireyin pozisyon alması, bir taraftan ideolojik belirlenimler (örneğin erkek-egemenlik veya erkeklik ideolojisi), bir taraftan da kişisel anlamlandırmalar yoluyla mümkün olur. Erkeklerin söylemlerinde stratejik olarak başvurduğu özne pozisyonu, hegemonik normları yansıtır (Wetherell ve Edley, 1999). Hegemonik erkekliğin birçok anlamı olabilir ve erkekler başkalarıyla etkileşimlerinde bu çoklu anlamlardan bazılarını öne çıkarır. Rağbet edilen bir şey olduğunda erkekler hegemonik erkekliği benimseyebilir, ancak başka bazı zamanlarda da hegemonik erkekliği reddedebilir. Dolayısıyla erkeklik, belirli bir erkek türü (bir grup erkeğin karakter yapısı) değil, erkeklerin söylemsel pratikler aracılığıyla pozisyon alma yoludur. Söylemsel psikolojinin eleştirilerini kendi bakış açısına dâhil eden Connell ve Messerschmidt (2005), söylemsel olmayan pratikler (ücretli emek, ev içi emeği, çocuk bakımı, şiddet, cinsellik gibi) içinde de

cinsiyet ilişkilerinin kurulduğunu bize hatırlatır ve cinsiyetler arası hiyerarşiyi besleyen sosyo-yapısal gerçekliği bir kez daha vurgular.

Yukarıda özetlenen kuramsal çerçeve dâhilinde, biyolojik ve psikolojik süreçleri inkâr etmeden, ancak erkekliği biyolojize veya psikolojize etmeden, kültür ile davranış arasındaki sosyal psikolojik belirlenimleri ortaya çıkarmak amacıyla bu çalışma gerçekleştirildi. Bu araştırmada biz, erkeklerin erkeklikten ne anladığını, erkekliği nasıl ortaya koyduğunu, erkeklik içeriklerini nasıl müzakere ettiğini [*negotiate*], erkekliği tanımlarken, anlatırken ne tür söylemlere başvurduğunu betimlemek istedik. Kısacası, bu çalışma, erkeklerin erkekliği nasıl anladığını anlamak için gerçekleştirildi. Araştırma bulgularına geçmeden önce erkeklik sosyolojisi alanına ve erkeklik çalışmalarına kısaca bakmak ve erkekliğin Türkiye hallerine değinmek yararlı olacaktır.

### Erkeklik Çalışmaları

**E**rkeklik çalışmalarının başlangıcı ancak otuz yıl kadar geriye götürülebilir<sup>4</sup> (Connell, 2014; Edley, 2017). Erkeklik çalışmaları, Edley'nin (2017) ifadesiyle, kadın çalışmalarının kıskırtmasıyla ortaya çıkar. Kadın çalışmaları ise sistem-karşıtı hareketlerin toplumsal bir güç olduğu 68 Hareketiyle birlikte yeni bir ivme kazanır<sup>5</sup>. İkinci dalga feminizm olarak adlandırılan bu dönemde erkeklik çalışmalarının ilk dalga eserlerine rastlanır (Akça ve Tönel, 2011; Bozok, 2009). Erkeklik çalışmalarının kısa tarihi<sup>6</sup> içinde profeminist yaklaşıma sahip önemli çalışmalar ortaya konulur. Connell'in (1998, 1995, 2014) küresel toplumsal cinsiyet düzeni [*global gender order*] olarak adlandırdığı cinsiyet rejimleri yaklaşımı, bunlardan biridir ve erkekliği anlamada önemli bir kuramsal çerçeve sunar. Avustralya'da lise öğrencileriyle sosyal eşitsizlik üzerine yapılan projeler sonunda hegemonik erkeklik kavramı ileri sürülür (Kessler, Ashenden, Connell ve Dowsett, 1982). 1980'li yılların başında gerçekleştirilen bu alan araştırmaları, okullarda, iş yerlerinde ve köylerde var olan yerel cinsiyet hiyerarşilerinin ve yerel erkeklik kültürünün görgül olarak ortaya

konmasını sağlar. Daha sonra bu görgül bulgular, Carrigan ve meslektaşları (1985) tarafından *Yeni Bir Erkeklik Sosyolojisine Doğru* [*Toward a New Sociology of Masculinity*] adlı makalede sentezlenir. Çoklu erkeklik ve güç ilişkileri modeli olarak ortaya çıkan erkeklik sosyolojisi, erkek cinsiyet rolü yaklaşımını eleştirerek toplumsal cinsiyete dair sosyoloji kuramlarını bütünleştirir<sup>7</sup>. Connell ve Messerschmidt'e (2005) göre, yapılan bu çalışmalar, bir yandan cinsiyet-rol kuramında olmayan çoklu erkekliklerin ve erkeğin toplumsal cinsiyet kurulumunun karmaşıklığına ilişkin etnografik gerçekliği gösterir, bir yandan da Gramsci'nin hegemonya kavramının geçerliliğine dair kanıt sunar. Hegemonik erkeklik kavramı, erkeklik çalışmaları, erkek egemenlikle ilgili feminist açıklamalar ve toplumsal cinsiyetle ilgili sosyolojik modeller arasında bağlantı kurar (Connell ve Messerschmidt, 2005).

Hegemonik erkeklik, diğer erkekliklerden özellikle de boyun eğici erkekliklerden farklıdır; ancak erkeklerin çoğunluğu tarafından kabul gören erkeklik değildir; azınlık bir grup erkek tarafından icra edilir, fakat normatiftir; erkek olmanın güncel olarak cisimleşmesidir, tüm erkeklerin buna göre pozisyon almasını gerektirir ve erkeklerin küresel ölçekte kadınları baskılanmasını meşrulaştırır. Hegemonya şiddetle değil, kültür, kurumlar ve ikna yoluyla sağlanır. Ancak sabit bir erkeklik yoktur; cinsiyet ilişkileri tarihsel olduğu için cinsiyet hiyerarşileri de değişebilir. Hegemonik erkeklikler belirli durumlarda ortaya çıkar ve tarihsel değişime açıktır. Eski erkeklik biçimlerinin yerini yeni erkeklik biçimleri alabilir. Farklı erkeklikler arasındaki sınırlar belirsiz veya binişik olabilir. Erkeklik, toplumsal cinsiyet ilişkileri yapısına göre örgütlenmiş bir konfigürasyon olarak tanımlanır. Hegemonik erkeklik kavramsallaştırması, sosyo-yapısal faktörleri gözettiği gibi, öznenin pratiklerini de gözetir. Cinsiyetler ilişkiseldir, erkeklik gerçek veya hayali [*real or imagined*] bir biçimde ve kadınlıkla zıtlık(lar) üzerinden kurulur ve erkekliğin kurulumunda kadınlar merkezdedir. Erkekliğin kurulumu, erkeğin hem kendi cinsi hem karşı cins üzerinde tahakküm kurmasıyla sonuçlanır.

Çoklu erkeklikler farklı kültürel bağlamlarda çalışılmıştır. Örneğin, Valdes ve Olavarria (1998; akt. Connell ve Messerschmidt, 2005) Şili'de



tekil bir erkeklik olmadığını, sınıf ve kuşaklara göre değişen erkeklikler olduğunu anlatır. Japonya'daki çoklu erkeklikler, çocuk yetiştirme pratiklerindeki değişim üzerinden ortaya konulur (Ishii-Kuntz, 2003). Gutmann (1996), kamusal erkeklik kimliği olarak görülen maçoizmin Meksikalı erkeklerin yaşamındaki karmaşıklığı maskeleydiğini ifade eder. Türkiye'de yapılan araştırmalar da çoklu erkeklik hallerine işaret eder (bkz. Kandiyoti 1997). Askerlik üzerinden erkekliğin nasıl inşa edildiği (Altınay, 2013; Selek, 2008), erkeklik rol ve tutumlarını (Onaran, Bükler ve Bir, 1998) veya erkekliğin bedensel ve toplumsal aşamalarını (Barutçu, 2013) ortaya koyan çalışmalar, Türkçe alanyazında göze çarpar. Özbay (2013), askerlik, beden, yaş, mekân, sınıf, din ve mezhep, siyaset, spor gibi alanlar üzerinden erkekliğin farklı hallerinin ele alınabileceğini ifade eder.

Bolak-Boratav, Okman-Fişek ve Eslen-Ziya (2017) tarafından kaleme alınan *Erkekliğin Türkiye Halleri* isimli kitap, erkeklik çalışmalarına psikoloji alanından yapılmış önemli bir katkıdır. Kitapta Türkiye'nin kırsal ve kentsel alanlarında yaşayan 18 yaş ve üstündeki evli erkeklerle gerçekleştirilen nitel ve nicel çalışmaların bulgularına yer verilir. Araştırmada erkek katılımcıların babalarıyla, anneleriyle, eşleriyle, çocuklarıyla ilişkileri ve erkeklik alguları incelenir. Nicel çalışmaya 2000 erkek (yaş Ort. = 40.50, SS. = 13.10) katılır. Bulgulara göre, erkeklik rolü büyük ölçüde öğrenilir; aile, din, arkadaşlar ve askerlik gibi faktörler bunda önemli rol oynar. Cinsel deneyim, içki içme, iş sahibi olma veya para kazanma erkeklikle ilişkilendirilir. Sünnet, askerlik, ilk cinsel tecrübe, kendini erkek olarak hissetme açısından önemlidir. Sözel veya davranışsal hakaret, küçük düşürme, aşağılama, namusuna ve şerefine aykırı düşme, erkekliğine gölge düşüren olaylar olarak ele alınır. Erkeklik, otorite, sözünü geçirme, korumacılık, sahiplenme, namus/kıskançlık, güvenilir olma, itibar görme, cinsel iktidar sahibi olma ve işsiz olmama gibi içeriklere sahiptir. Erkeklik öğretileri, namus, şeref, dürüstlük gibi ahlaki değerler ile mertlik, delikanlılık gibi kendini ispat etmeye dayalı özellikler üzerinden inşa edilir. Erkeğin bir işinin olması ve para kazanması (evi geçindirebilme) başarılı olmanın, başka bir ifadeyle, erkek olarak kabul görmenin bir

gereği olarak algılanır. Çünkü “erkek adam karısını çalıştırmaz” şeklinde bir erkeklik normu kabul görmektedir. Araştırmacılar, erkekliğin geleneksel-modernist söylem üzerinden aile içi gündelik ilişkiler bağlamında kurgulandığını ifade ederken, geleneksel söylemin hala çok güçlü olduğunu, modernist söylemin ise soyut kaldığını belirtir. Bu nedenle, yazarlara göre, Türkiye’de erkeklik Batı ülkelerindeki gibi bir kriz içinde değildir.

Bolak-Boratav ve meslektaşlarının (2017) evli erkeklerle yürüttüğü çalışmadan farklı olarak, bu çalışmada, üniversite gençliğinin erkeklikten ne anladığı (erkeklik içerikleri), hangi söylemsel pratiklerle bunu ortaya koyduğu ve diğer erkeklerle erkekliği nasıl müzakere ettiği ele alındı. Ayrıca, Bolak-Boratav ve arkadaşlarının gerçekleştirdiği bireysel görüşmeler yerine bu çalışmada odak grup görüşmelerine başvuruldu. Çünkü, erkeklerin birbirleriyle erkeklik içeriklerini nasıl müzakere ettiğini, ne tür söylemleri ortaya koyup hangilerine itiraz ettiğini görme hedefi güdüldü.

## Metodoloji

**B**u çalışmada, erkekliğin erkekler tarafından nasıl anlamlandırıldığını betimlemeye olanak veren nitel araştırma yöntemi benimsendi, araştırma tekniği olarak ise odak grup görüşmesi tercih edildi. Odak grup görüşmesi, erkeklerin erkekliğin içeriklerini ne şekilde müzakere ettiğini, hangi söylemlere başvurduğunu görmeye olanak tanır. Başka bir ifadeyle, bir katılımcının ortaya attığı görüşlere dair diğer katılımcıların tepkileri (onaylama, itiraz etme, yeni görüşler ve söylemler ortaya koyma gibi söylemsel pratikler) gözlenebilir.

Araştırma kapsamında üç farklı odak grup görüşmesi gerçekleştirildi. Odak grup görüşmelerine Abant İzzet Baysal Üniversitesi psikoloji ve tarih bölümlerinde okuyan öğrenciler davet edildi. Psikoloji bölümünün seçilme nedeni, Türkiye’de psikolojinin kadın alanı olarak görülmesi ve öğrencilerin büyük kısmının (ortalama

%80) kadınlardan oluşmasıdır (bkz. Arık, 2013). Dolayısıyla, psikoloji bölüm öğrencilerinin modernist değerleri daha fazla benimsemiş olacağı varsayıldı. Tarih bölümünün seçilme nedeniyse, bu bölümde okuyan öğrencilerin geleneksel erkeklik değerlerini daha fazla benimseyeceği varsayımıdır. Türkiye'deki tarih ders kitaplarının milliyetçiliği ve milli değerleri (Şimşek ve Alaslan, 2014) öne çıkardığı, milliyetçiliğin de gelenekselcilikle yüksek düzeyde ilişkide (Jost ve Amodio, 2012) olduğu düşünüldüğünde bu varsayım makul görülebilir. Böylece odak gruplarda geleneksel ve modern erkeklik değerlerinin<sup>8</sup> ifade edilmesine olanak tanındığı düşünüldü. Psikoloji bölümü öğrencileriyle iki, tarih bölümü öğrencileriyle bir odak grup görüşmesi gerçekleştirildi. Odak grup görüşmeleri, beş, altı ve yedi kişiden oluştu; minimum 40 dakika, maksimum 1 saat 17 dakika sürdü. Odak gruplara, yaşları 21 ile 23 arasında değişen toplam 18 erkek öğrenci katıldı. Katılımcıların altısı yaşamının büyük kısmını İstanbul'da geçirdiğini, dördü Erzurum'da, diğerleri ise ağırlıklı olarak Batı illerinde yaşadıklarını belirtti.

Katılımcılar önceden kararlaştırılan gün ve saatte görüşmenin yapılacağı odaya çağrıldı. Önceden üzerine düşünmemeleri için katılımcılara araştırmanın konusu söylenmedi, oturum başladığı anda erkeklik konusunda bir araştırma yürütüldüğü belirtildi. Görüşmeleri, erkek bir araştırmacı (bu makalenin ikinci yazarı) gerçekleştirdi. Katılımcıların onayı alındıktan sonra ses kayıt cihazı kullanıldı. Odak grup görüşmesinin başında katılımcılara görüşmeyi istedikleri an bırakabilecekleri belirtildi. Görüşmeler bittikten sonra katılımcılara teşekkür edilerek grupta konuşulanların başkalarıyla paylaşılmaması istendi. Görüşmeler esnasında yarı-yapılandırılmış görüşme tekniği kullanıldı; önceden belirlenen sorular tüm odak grup görüşmelerinde aynı şekilde soruldu. Katılımcılara yöneltilen sorulardan bazıları şunlardır: "Sizce erkeklik nedir? Erkeklik denince ne anlıyorsunuz?", "Erkek her zaman güçlü olmalı mı?", "Erkek gerektiğinde saldırgan olmalı mı?".

Analizler, görüşmelerde alınan ses kayıtlarının tamamının deşifre edilen metinleri üzerinden gerçekleştirildi. Metinlere tematik analiz yöntemi (Braun ve Clarke, 2006; Finfgeld-Connett, 2014; Hayes, 2010)

uygulandı. Hayes'in (2010) anlatımıyla tematik analiz, bilginin temalar altında bir araya getirilmesini içerir. Temalar, fikirler veya veride tespit edilmiş olan konulardır. Aynı temalar farklı kelimeler kullanılarak anlatılabilir, farklı bağlamlarda ortaya konulabilir veya farklı kişiler tarafından ortaya atılabilir.

Çalışmada uygulanan tematik analizin aşamaları (bkz. Hayes, 2010) şunlardır: İlk aşamada veri, analizler için hazırlandı. Bunun için odak grup görüşmeleri esnasında tutulan ses kayıtları tümüyle deşifre edildi. Böylece, sözlü verinin tüm detayları korundu ve analiz esnasında defalarca başvurulabilecek yazılı bir veri elde edilmiş oldu. Temalar, bir yandan teori-temelli, bir yandan veri-temelli bir şekilde oluşturuldu. Başka bir anlatımla, bir yandan, erkeklikle ilgili alanyazındaki teoriler ve bulgular ışığında katılımcıların anlatımlarında yer verdikleri temalar belirlenirken, bir yandan da daha önce bahsedilmemiş yeni temalar çıkarıldı. İkinci aşamada, her bir odak grup görüşmesinin verisi için ayrı bir şekilde indeks kartları oluşturuldu. Bunlara birbirinden farklı bilgileri içeren konular not edildi. Üçüncü aşamada, benzer konular ortak bir tema altında bir araya getirildi. Ancak bu temalar "proto-tema" olarak görüldü, geçici bir tema ismi verildi ve temalar son halini yazılı tüm metnin birkaç kere okunması (her bir tema için her seferinde yeniden) sonunda aldılar. Bu analitik sürecin benimsenmesinin nedeni, insan algısının seçici olması ve bazı bilgileri göz ardı edebilme riskini barındırmasıdır. Bulgular kısmında bu temalara yer verildi ve her bir tema için bir veya iki gözlem örnek olarak alıntulandı.

## **Bulgular ve Tartışma**

### ***Biyolojik/Fiziksel Farklar: "Kavanozu Erkek Açar"***

**K**atılımcılar, "Sizce erkeklik nedir?" sorusuna kadınlarla erkekleri karşılaştırarak cevap verdiler ve cinsiyetler arasındaki biyolojik/fiziksel farklardan söz ettiler. Erkeklerde testosteron hormonunun yüksek olması, erkeğin fiziksel olarak güçlü olması, başlıca farklar olarak ifade edildi. Bunun dışında, kadının doğurganlığının fark

yarattığı söylendi. Fiziksel farklılıklar olarak sakallı, bıyıklı, kısa saçlı, iri, güçlü olmak gibi bedensel özellikler tarif edildi. Bir psikoloji öğrencisi, diğerlerinin ifade ettiği bu özellikleri düşündüğünde kendisinin “erkek olarak görülmeyeceğini” söyledi. Erkeğin fiziksel gücüne vurgu yapmak için “kavanozu evde erkek açar” diyen bir katılımcıya, teknolojinin gelişmesiyle birlikte kavanozu erkeğin açmasına gerek kalmayacağı itirazı geldi.

Erkeğin ne olduğuyla ilgili soruya katılımcıların erkekler-kadınlar karşılaştırması yaparak yanıt vermesi, kendini-kategorileme kuramının (Turner vd., 1987) önermeleriyle tutarlıdır. Kendini-kategorileme kuramı, bireylerin kendini bir grup üyesi olarak sınıflandırırken gruplararası karşılaştırmalar yaptığını ileri sürer. Buna göre, gruplararası farklılıklar, grup içi farklılıklardan daha fazla algılanır, hatta bu durum algısal olarak abartılır (meta-tezat ilkesi). Katılımcılar da erkekleri bir grup olarak kadınlarla karşılaştırılarak cinsiyetler arasındaki biyolojik ve fiziksel farklılıkları grup-içi (erkekler içindeki) farklılıklardan daha fazla algıladığını gösterdi. Kurama göre, bir kez bir karşılaştırma grubu (referans grubu da denilir) söz konusu olduğunda grupsal kimlikler belirgin hale gelir. Böylece, bireysel kimlikler (kişi olarak sahip olunan beceriler, ilgiler, kişilik özellikleri gibi) önemini yitirir; örneğin, kavanozu açamayacak denli “güçsüz” erkekler olabileceğinin önemini yitirmesi gibi. Bunun yanında, katılımcıların anlatımları hegemonik erkeklik kavramının (Connell ve Messerschmidt, 2005) geçerliğini de göstermiştir: Erkeklik, kadınlıkla zıtlık(lar) üzerinden kurulmuş ve erkekliğin kurulumunda kadınlar merkezde yer almıştır (cinsiyetler ilişkiseldir tezi).

Bunun dışında, katılımcılardan bazıları erkekliğin aşamalardan geçilerek kazanıldığına işaret etti. Bu aşamalar, sünnet, askerlik, evlenme, baba olma ve iş-güç sahibi olma olarak ifade edildi. Bu görüşler, Türkiye’de yapılmış diğer araştırma bulgularını destekler niteliktedir (Barutçu, 2013; Bolak-Boratav vd., 2017). Erkeklik, aşamalardan geçilerek kazanılan, bu nedenle de kaybedilmesinden korkulan bir kimliktir (Atay, 2004, Kandiyoti, 1997; Selek, 2008).

### ***Akıl-Duygu İkiliği: “Kafasını Kullanabilenler”***

**C**insiyetler arasındaki duygusal farklılıklar da odak grup görüşmelerinde belirtildi. Kadınların duygusal olması, olumsuz çağrışımlarla [connotations] birlikte ele alındı: Duygusallık, sürekli ilgi bekleme, duygusal olarak zayıf olma ve sır tutamamaya ilişkilendirildi. Duygusallıkla ilgili görüşler müzakere edilirken, kadınların da erkekler kadar “kafasını kullanabildiğini” ifade edenler oldu. Katılımcıların bazıları “akıl-duygu tezatlığı” olarak ifade edilebilecek karşılaştırmalara başvurdu. Erkeğin duygularını mantığının gerisine attığı, kadınların ise duygularıyla hareket ettiği, bu nedenle iknaya ve manipülasyona daha açık olduğu yönünde görüşler bildirildi. Duygusallığı nedeniyle kadının daha boyun eğici, erkeğin ise asi olabildiği belirtildi.

Tüm odak gruplarda erkeğin ne olduğuyla ilgili soruya katılımcıların kadınlar üzerinden cevap vermesi, yukarıda da belirtildiği gibi kendini-kategorileme kuramının önermeleriyle ve hegemonik erkeklik kavramıyla uyusmaktadır. Gruplararası sınırların belirlenmesi, iç-grubun ve dış-grubun benzerlikler ve farklılıklar üzerinden sınıflandırılması, iç-grubun ne olduğu kadar ne olmadığına tarif edilmesini de içerir. Bu çerçevede bakıldığında, örneğin bir katılımcının “kadının zıddıdır erkek” ifadesi, cinsiyet içi farklılıklara oranla cinsiyetler arasındaki farklılıkların abartıldığı önermesiyle uyusur. Kadınlık ve erkeklik birbirinin karşıtı olarak konumlandırılarak bu iki kategorinin toplumsal ve psikolojik farklılıkları abartılır (Atay, 2004). Bu çerçevede kadın duyguyla, erkeğe mantıkla/akılla özdeşleştirilir. Başka bir anlatımla, cinsiyetler belirli bir özellik açısından kalıpyargılanır.

Tüm kalıpyargıların meşrulaştırıcı işlevleri olduğu gibi (Dovidio, Hewstone, Glick ve Esses, 2010; Duckitt, 2010), kadınlara daha fazla duygusallık atfedilmesinin de cinsiyetler arası eşitsizliği meşrulaştırmaya yarayan bir işlevinin olduğu söylenebilir. Bugüne kadar yapılmış araştırmalar, kadınların erkeklere kıyasla daha fazla duygusal

olduđuna dair herhangi bir kanıt sunmazken, bu yöndeki algıların deđişmemesi büyük oranda bununla ilişkilidir. Alanyazındaki bulgular, kadınların erkeklerden daha duygusal olduğunu göstermemiş, ancak, bazı duyguları deneyimleme ve ifade etme biçimlerinin cinsiyete göre farklılaştığını ortaya çıkarmıştır (örn., Else-Quest, Higgins, Allison ve Morton, 2012). Duygular açısından cinsiyetler arasında gözlenen en büyük fark, olumsuz duygularda gözlenmektedir (örn., Brody ve Hall, 2008; McLean ve Anderson, 2009). Kültürlerarası karşılaştırmalı araştırma bulgularına göre, kadınlar üzüntü, korku, utanç, suçluluk gibi olumsuz duyguları (Fischer ve Manstead, 2000; Fischer, Rodriguez-Mosquera, van Vianen ve Manstead, 2004) ve sosyal kaygıyı (Caballo vd., 2014) daha fazla hissetmektedir. Ancak, cinsiyetler arasındaki bu farklar istatistiksel olarak güçlü değildir. Kadınların olumsuz duyguları daha fazla ortaya koymasının sosyalleşme süreçleriyle ve çocuk yetiştirme pratikleriyle ilişkili olması ise makul bir beklentidir. Öte yandan, bu araştırmaya katılan erkeklerin söylemlerine de yansıyan kadının duygusallığı düşüncesi, antik Yunandan bu yana Batı felsefe tarihine damgasını vurmuş olan egemen görüştür; akıl erkekle, duygu ise kadınla özdeş görülür. Protagoras’dan bu yana insan erkektir ve erkek akıldır (Braidotti, 2013).

### ***Rol Farklılıkları***

**O** dak gruplarda cinsiyete özgü roller, evin içi-dışı ikiliği üzerinden ele alındı. Katılımcılar, zaman zaman kendi aile yaşamlarından da örnekler vererek erkeğin “ekmeđi kazanan” olarak görüldüğünü, kadının ise “evden sorumlu” algılandığını ifade ettiler. Görüşmeciler, evdeki ağır işlerle alışveriş gibi dış-dünyayla ilgili işlerden erkeğin sorumlu olduğunu, kadınlarınsa yemek, temizlik, misafir ağırlama gibi işlerden sorumlu tutulduđunu anlattılar. Ancak, cinsiyet rollerinin yetiştirilme tarzıyla ilişkisini kuran ve erkek olarak kendisinin yemek ve temizliđi kız kardeşinden daha fazla bildiđini belirten az sayıda katılımcı da oldu.

Öte yandan, ev içi statü ve otoritede “dışardan evin reisi baba gibi görünür ama içerde asıl reis kadındır”, “erkek dışarda konuşur, kadın evde erkeğin ağzının payını verir” şeklinde ifadeler gözlemlendi. Babanın ev içinde otoriteyi sağlaması kimi zaman itiraz edilen, kimi zaman gerekli görülen bir durum olarak ifade edildi. İtiraz edenlerin bir kısmı kendi evlerinde otoriteyi annenin sağladığını belirtirken, bir kısmı babanın adil bir biçimde otorite kurması gerektiği yönünde ifadelere başvurdu. Örneğin bir katılımcı bunu şu şekilde ifade etti: “[Baba] bu konuda adaletli davranmalı. Kızına koyduğu engeli oğluna da koymalı. Kızına akşam dışarı çıkamazsın diyorsa oğluna da demeli. Buradan sıkıntı çıkıyor. Erkek çıkıyor, kız çıkamıyor. O yüzden kızların yalancılık duyguları gelişiyor, nefret ediyor.”

Kadının çalışma yaşamına dâhil olmasıyla ilgili olumlu tutumların (modernist değerler) olduğu gözlemlendi. Konuya bazıları kadın-erkek eşitliği (eşitlik normu), bazıları ise geçim sorunları (gereklilik normu) açısından yaklaştı. Ayrıca, çalışmanın cinsiyetle alakası olmadığını, hem kadınların hem erkeklerin bu sorumluluğu üstlenmesi gerektiğini (sorumluluk normu) belirtenler, eşlerin “yükü” paylaşmasının öneminden söz ettiler. Buna karşın, eşinin çalışıp kendisinin çalışmadığı bir durumu kabullenemeyeceğini ifade edenler, çoğunluğu oluşturdu: “Eğer çok param olursa eşimin çalışmasına gerek olmadığını söyleyebilirim, ama aynı şeyi o söylese kabul etmem.” Bu yönde görüş belirtenler, “iç güveysi olamam”, “kadın parası yemeyi gururuma yediremem” şeklinde kendini ortaya koydu. Ayrıca, kadının çalışmasının bazı koşullarda ihmal edilebilir olarak algılandığı gözlemlendi. Kadının “gerektiği zaman” çalışmasını destekleyenler, evlendikten veya çocuk sahibi olduktan sonra kadının işi bırakabileceğini belirttiler. Bunu gerekçelendirirken bir psikoloji öğrencisi, bebeğin annesine bağlanması için bunun gerekli olduğunu ifade etti. Bunun dışında, “kadın dediğin evinde oturur anlayışı”, “kadının evlenince işi bırakmasının beklenmesi” bazı katılımcılar tarafından eleştirildi. Kadının eşinden yüksek maaş alması ise katılımcılar nezdinde pek kabul edilebilir bir durum olarak değerlendirilmedi.



Konu çalışma alanlarına geldiğinde, geleneksel cinsiyete özgü mesleklerin geniş ölçüde benimsendiği gözlemlendi. “Kadın inşaatta çalışamaz. Kadın subaylık yapamaz.” diyen katılımcı, bu görüşü iyi bir şekilde örneklemektedir. Cinsiyete uygun meslek seçimi anlayışı, kadın-erkek arasındaki fiziksel farklılıklara dayandırılarak gerekçelendirildi. Bir katılımcı bunun için “Fiziksel olarak farklı oldukları için, güç gerektiren işleri erkek yapar.” söylemine başvurdu. Bir katılımcı, “Erkeği kadın, kadını erkek gibi yetiştirsek; kadın şu an erkeğin yapabildiği işleri yapabiliirdi.” diyerek yetiştirme tarzının önemine dikkat çekti. Buna ek olarak, eğitim alanları olarak psikoloji, PDR (Psikolojik Danışmanlık ve Rehberlik), sosyoloji gibi alanların kadınlar tarafından tercih edildiği ve bu nedenle erkek psikoloji öğrencilerinin özellikle iş başvurularında dezavantaj yaşadığı belirtildi.

Burada aktardığımız katılımcı görüşleri, Türkiye’de yapılan diğer araştırma bulgularıyla tutarlı bir şekilde, cinsiyete özgü rollerin ayrıştırıldığına işaret ediyor (örn., Bolak-Boratav vd., 2017; Onaran, Bükler ve Bir, 1998). Bu bulgular, cinsiyetler arasındaki tutum ve davranış farklılıklarını sosyal roller üzerinden açıklayan sosyal psikoloji alanyazınıyla da tutarlıdır. Toplumsal cinsiyet rol kuramına (Eagly ve Steffen, 1984; Eagly ve Wood, 2011) göre cinsiyetler arasındaki fiziksel farklılıklar (kadının doğurganlığı ve erkeğin gücü) toplumda var olan sosyal yapılarla ve ekonomik ilişkilerle etkileşim içinde cinsiyetler arasındaki iş bölümünü doğurur. Bu iş bölümü, toplumsal cinsiyete özgü rollerle ilgili inançlara yol açar ve bunun ardından cinsiyete özgü duygular, bilişler ve davranışlar ortaya çıkar.

Connell ve Messerschmidt (2005) ise cinsiyet-rol kuramının bir toplumda gözlenen çoklu erkeklikleri ve toplumsal cinsiyet kurulumunun karmaşıklığını ele almadığını belirtir. Biz de bu çalışmada “ev-içi ve ev-dışı” alanların cinsiyete özgü farklı rollere yol açtığını, ancak erkeklerin bu rollerle ilgili tutumlarının farklılaşabildiğini gözlemledik. Erkek cinsiyet rolüyle uyumlu davranan erkekler olduğu gibi, cinsiyet rolüyle uyumlu davranmadığını (örneğin, evde kız kardeşinden daha fazla ev işi yaptığını) söyleyen erkekler de oldu. Bu konuda gözlenen bireysel farklılıkların benimsenen erkeklik değerleriyle (çoklu

erkeklikler) ilişkili olabileceği düşünülebilir. Katılımcıların ifadeleri, hegemonik erkeklik anlayışının tüm erkekler tarafından aynı şekilde benimsenmediğini gösterir niteliktedir. Buradan hareketle, elde edilen bulguların çoklu erkeklik bakış açısını (Connell ve Messerschmidt, 2005) desteklediği söylenebilir. Türkiye’de yapılan araştırmalar da çoklu erkeklik hallerine işaret eder (Bolak-Boratav vd., 2017; Kandiyoti 1997). Bununla tutarlı bir biçimde katılımcılar, yaşanan çevrenin erkeklik anlayışı üzerindeki etkisini vurguladılar; mekânsal ve zamansal karşılaştırmalar yaptılar. Kır-kent, Doğu-Batı, Türkiye-Avrupa gibi ikiliklerin yanı sıra, “bizim evde böyle” şeklinde aile içi rollerin gündelik yaşama yansıdığı mekânlardan bahsedildi. “Doğu’da erkek baskındır kadına karşı ama Batıda centilmenlik vardır. Batıda bir erkek bir kadının çantasını taşıyabilirken, Doğuda öyle bir şey yoktur. Hatta kadın erkeğin arkasında yürür, saygıdan dolayı. Avrupa’da kadın erkeğin önünde yürür, coğrafyaya göre değişir.” denildi. Zamansal olarak, avcı-toplayıcılık, sanayileşme gibi tarihsel veya üniversite çağı gibi yaşamsal dönemler belirtildi; dede-baba veya baba-erkek evlat gibi kuşaklararası karşılaştırmalar yapıldı. Tüm bu katılımcı söylemleri, mekâna ve zamana göre değişebilen çoklu erkekliklere işaret ediyor. Aynı zamanda, sosyal kimlik kuramının kavramlarıyla söyleyecek olursak, belirgin hale gelen erkeklik içerikleri, bağlama özgü olarak değişebiliyor.

İç-grup kalıpyargısıyla uyumlu görünmeyen (örn., dar veya pembe pantolon giyen erkekler) veya davranmayan (örn., kadınsı davranan) erkekler de çoklu erkekliklerin oluşmasında rol oynuyor. Ancak iç-grup kalıpyargısına uymayan erkekliğin, hegemonik erkekliğin baskısıyla marjinalleştirildiği söylenebilir. Kadınsı-erkekliğin marjinalleştirilmesinde iç-gruba yönelik tehdit algısının rol oynadığı da ileri sürülebilir. Tarih bölümü öğrencilerinin katıldığı odak grup görüşmesinden aşağıda yer verilen alıntı buna örnek teşkil edebilecek söylemleri içeriyor.

Alıntı 1:

*C: [Kadınsı olanları] aşağılıyorum. İğreniyorum. Şahsen arkadaşlık bile kurmam. İstese bile.*

*B: Toplum olarak aşağılıyorlar. Hastalık olduğunda bile böyle.*

*F: Benim de hoşuma gitmiyor ama o kişiye de bunu hissettirmiyorum. Çünkü bu o kişinin psikolojik olarak toplumdaki uzaklaşmasına neden olur.*

*C: Ben de aşığılamam. Ona söylemem ama içten içe ısınmam.*

*B: Ben kendimi iyi hissetmesem de kimseyi yargılayamam, hastalığı olabilir.*

*C: Yine de Allah'ın selamını esirgemem.*

*D: Sadece o değil de mesela ipeksi şeyler giyiyor, altın falan takıyor. Bunları önlemeye çalışmalıyız. Biraz erkelerin arasına getirmeliyiz. Sohbet muhabbet etmeliyiz. Dışlamak değil de biraz daha içimize getirirsek adım gibi eminim düzeltiriz o çocuğu. Ama biz de kendimize dikkat etmeliyiz, etkilenmemeliyiz.*

Bu şekildeki dışlayıcı söylemlere karşın, psikoloji bölümü öğrencileri daha anlamacı söylemlere başvurarak kadınsı görünen/davranan erkekleri, hormonlarla, tiroit bezindeki sorunla, baba figürünün eksikliğiyle ve yetiştirilme tarzıyla ele aldı. Bu tutumlar üzerinde psikoloji eğitiminin etkileri olduğu düşünülebilir. Psikoloji öğrencileri, toplumsal olarak damgalamadan ve dışlamadan da söz etti. Öte yandan, Atay (2004) "erkeklikten muzdarip" olan erkeğin iç-grup beklentilerine uygun davranmakla davranmamak arasında ikircikli kalma haline ve erkeğin iç çelişkilerinin ve çaresizliğinin anlaşılmasının önemine değinir. Biz de bu çalışmada birey-içi süreçleri (bilişsel çelişkileri, çaresizlik duygularını ve bunlarla nasıl baş edildiğini) söyleme yansıdığı oranda gözlemleyebildik.

### ***Farklılıkların Eşit(siz)liği: "Abartan" Kadınlar ve Ezilen Erkekler***

**K**atılımcılar, cinsiyet farklılıklarını müzakere ederken ya eşitliğin olamayacağını belirttiler ya da eşitliği savunduklarını söyledikten sonra "ama" deyip görüşlerini ortaya koydular. Eşitliğin olamayacağını söyleyenler, bu görüşlerini çoğunlukla biyolojik veya dini faktörlere ("İslam dinine göre kadın ve erkek eşit değildir.", "İslam'a göre erkek bir tık üstün deniyor.", "Üstündür erkek, yaratılıştan dolayı. Üstün yaratılmıştır.") dayandırarak açıkladı. Bunun yanında "Tarih boyunca

kadına hükmetmek değil de korumaya almak, [erkeğin] gücünden dolayı hâkim olmak” şeklinde stratejik söylemlere başvuranlar da vardı. Başka bir katılımcı, yine tarihe atıf yaparak geleneksel cinsiyetler arası iş bölümünü meşrulaştırıcı bir söyleme başvurdu: “Erkeklik kadınlık ilkel toplumlardan gelir, erkek daha güçlü olduğu için avcılık toplayıcılıkla ilgilenir, kadın ev işleriyle uğraşır.” Ancak erkeğin üstünlüğü söylemine karşı çeldirici söylemlerle itiraz edenler de oldu.

Öte yandan, yetiştiği yerde kadınların “alt-tabaka” olarak görüldüğünü belirtenler, konuya ilişkin bireysel görüşlerini ortaya koymak yerine toplumun gözünden ele alarak konuyu dışsallaştırdılar. Buna karşın, “Eşitliğin olması gerektiğini düşünüyorum ama...” diyenler “Yine de erkeğin baskın olması gerektiğini düşünüyorum, bir şeyleri idare etme açısından” gibi görüşlerle, kadın-erkek ilişkilerinde erkeğin baskın/üstün olması gerektiği yönünde söylemlere başvurdular. Bazı katılımcılar, kadınların ellerinde bir tasma olduğunu ve erkeği bağlamaya çalıştığını, erkeğe güven duymadığını ifade etti. Diğer bazı katılımcılar ise, kadınların erkeği üstün gördüğünü, ilişkilerinde erkeğin üstünlüğünü kabul ettiğini, erkeğin baskın olmasını istediğini, kadınların erkeğin himayesine girmeye çalıştığını, bunun kadınların iç-dünyasında olduğunu belirtti. Erkeklerin ise başka bir erkeğin, arkadaşı olsa bile, üstünlüğünü kabul etmeyeceği söylendi.

Kadın-erkek eşitliğini savunduğunu belirtmek yerine “Her insanın eşit olması gerekir. Kadın erkek açısından bakmamak gerekir.” şeklinde görüşlerini ortaya koyanlar da oldu. Kendini-kategorileme kuramı açısından ele alınacak olursa, bu şekildeki ifadeler için şunlar söylenebilir: Bireyler farklı soyutlama düzeylerinde kendini tanımlar. Bunu yaparken kişilerarası düzey (“ben”), gruplararası düzey (“bizler ve onlar”) ve üst-düzey (“hepimiz insanız”) sınıflamalara başvurur. Bu sınıflandırmaların duygular, düşünceler ve davranışlar üzerinde etkileri vardır. Örneğin, kişilerarası karşılaştırmalara dayanarak kendini kategorileme, bireysel davranışlara yol açarken, gruplararası düzeyde kategorileme grupsal davranışlara yol açar. Erkekler ve kadınlar arasında (gruplararası düzey) karşılaştırma yaparak kadınların erkeklerden statü, kaynaklara erişim, sosyal-politik haklar açısından

daha dezavantajlı olduğunu söylemek yerine hem kadınların hem erkeklerin insan olduğunu ifade etmek (ortak bir üst kimliği vurgulamak), karşılaştırma düzeyini değiştirmek anlamına gelir. Karşılaştırma düzeyinin bu şekilde değiştirilmesinin cinsiyetler arası eşitsizliği gözlerden saklama gibi bir işleve sahip olabileceği ileri sürülebilir.

Eşitliği savunduğunu belirten bazı katılımcılar, kadının eskisi kadar ezilmediğini, bunun belki Doğu'da sürdüğünü belirtti. Artık erkeklerin kadınlardan “bir alta” düştüğünü ifade edenler oldu. İş alanında, hak alanında, kadınların “bir adım” daha önde olduğu, “kadınlara eşitsizlik yapıldı diye daha fazlasının verilmeye çalışıldığı” ama erkeklerin haklarının “gözetilmediği”, erkeklerin zaten hakları var şeklinde “moda girildiği” anlatıldı. Kadınlara pozitif ayrımcılık yapıldığı, ailede kızların “el üstünde tutulduğu”, iş başvurularında daha çok “bayan eleman” arandığı, işverenlerin kadın çalışan istediği, erkek öğrencilerin ev bulmakta sorun yaşadığı söylendi. “Erkek topluma zarar veren biri gibi algılanıyor. Erkek evi mi yıkıyor, tecavüzcü mü anlayamıyorum.” diyen bir katılımcı, erkekleri damgalamanın negatif etkilerinden bahsetti.

Odak grup görüşmelerinde zaman zaman kadınların bazı konuları abarttığı ifade edildi. Örneğin bir katılımcı, erkek öğrencilerin evde kalabildiğini, kadın öğrencilerin ise çoğunlukla yurttan kalmak zorunda olduğunu, ama “kızların bunu aştığını” ifade ederken “ama bazen fazla abartıyorlar. Kız değil, kadın diyorlar. Kelimelere çok takıyorlar. Bayan değil, hanım, hanımefendi değil diyorlar. Artık söylenecek şey bırakmıyorlar.” söylemini ortaya koydu. Bunun dışında, kadının çalışmasının çeşitli olumsuz etkileri ifade edildi. Kadının çalıştığında kendi “sözünün geçmesini” istediği, hatta “aşağılık kompleksinden” dolayı bunu abarttığı ve bu nedenle boşanmaların yaşandığı belirtildi. Çalışan kadının özgüvenli olduğu ve “bırakıp gittiği” şeklinde anlatımlara rastlandı. Bazı katılımcılar, kadınların hak arayışının erkekte nefrete, kadın-erkek arasında uzaklaşmaya ve erkeğin şiddete başvurmasına yol açtığını ifade etti.

Alıntı 2:

*“Kadınlar haklarını elde etmeye çalışıyor, ama abartıyorlar, kendileri için kız veya kadın unvanı hakkında bile bir erkekle tartışabiliyorlar, erkek kız unvanını kullanırsa, kız değil kadın kullanmalısın derler. Bayan değil diyorlar, hanım değil diyorlar.”*

Alıntı 3:

*“Kadınlar biz erkeklerle eşitiz deyip, daha çok hak talep ediyorlar, bu da erkeklerin saldırgan olmasına sebep olabilir.”*

Bunun yanında, erkeklerin de erkeklik baskısı altında olduğu şeklinde söylemlere rastlandı. Örneğin bir katılımcı “Toplum tarafından baskı altında tutulan biziz. Sürekli bir kalıp var ve onun içinde olmazsan adam olmuyorsun. Belli bir model var” dedi. Biraz kinayeli bir şekilde “Çok sorunları varmış erkeklerin... Yüzyıllardır kadınlar eziliyor. Sıra bize geldi gibi düşünüyorum. Biraz da biz yanalım.” diyen bir katılımcının yanında, “Belki yirmi yıl sonra baskın karakter kadın olacak.” şeklinde görüş bildiren başka bir katılımcı, erkeklik hegemonyasını tehdit altında hissettiğini ima eden bir söylem benimsedi.

Burada yer verilen katılımcı görüşlerinin, erkekliğin en çok erkeği ezdiği (Atay, 2004) görüşüyle ve hegemonik erkeklik (Connell, 1995, 1998; Connell ve Messerschmidt, 2005) bakış açısıyla tutarlı olduğu söylenebilir. Hegemonik erkeklik, bir taraftan kadınları ezdiği gibi bir taraftan da erkekleri baskı altında tutar. Diğer bir ifadeyle, hegemonik erkeklik, erkekler üzerinde normatif bir baskı yaratır. Hegemonik erkeklikle ilgili bu görüş, sosyal kimlik kuramının önermeleriyle de tutarlıdır. Sosyal kimlik kuramına göre grup kimliği bireyin duygu, düşünce ve davranışı üzerinde normatif bir etkiye sahiptir. Birey, grup kimliğinin cisimleştiği kalıpyargılarla tutarlı olacak şekilde davranmaya çalışır. Buradan hareketle, erkeklik ideolojisinin hem erkekler hem kadınlar açısından sorun teşkil ettiği söylenebilir. Bu arada, erkekler de erkeklik ideolojisinin baskısı altında olduğunun bir yönüyle farkındadır.

Atay (2004), erkekliğin en çok erkeği ezdiğini, erkekliğin bedelinin yüksek olduğunu<sup>9</sup>, ancak erkeklerin çaresizlik içinde erkeklik üretmek durumunda kaldığını belirtir. Buradaki “bir kimliğin başka bir kimliği ezmesi değil, bir kimliğin bir benliği ezmesi durumu ortaya çıkar.

Erkeklik kadını dışarıdan, erkeği ise içeriden yıkan bir kimliktir.” (Atay, 2004, s. 22). Yazar, erkeklerin erkeklik üretmeye zorlandığını, erkekliğin erkek için de rahatsızlık verici veya pişmanlık uyandırıcı hisler yarattığını, ancak bu hislerin ve erkeklikten duyulan nefretin içe atıldığını ileri sürer. Sonuçta erkekliğin nimetlerinden dolayı külfetlerine de katlanmak gerektiği şeklinde bir olumlama ile ‘orta yol’ bulunur. Atay’ın (2004) bu savıyla ve Connell’in (2005) hegemonik erkeklik kavramıyla uyumlu olacak şekilde katılımcıların bazıları, erkekliğin hem erkekleri hem de kadınları ezdiğini yankılayan söylemler ortaya koydular. Bu tür söylemler, erkeklik iktidarının ve ideolojisinin dezavantajlarının bazı erkeklerce bilindiğini gösterir nitelikteydi; bazıları da bu iktidarın nedenini kadınlarda aradı. Erkeğin egemenlik kurmasının kadınların bir beklentisi olarak görüldüğü ve bu beklentiyle uyumlu davranmak adına erkeklik üretildiği şeklinde söylemlere rastlandı.

Katılımcılar erkekliği, iktidar sahibi olmak, reislik, sözünü geçirmek, karar verme yetkisine sahip olmak, karşı cinse üstünlük kurmak, daha üstün olmak, erkeklik taslamak gibi içeriklerle ifade ettiler. Bunun yanında, “adam olmak” da kullanılan söylemler arasında yer aldı. “Aile adam demeli ona. Ağır olmalı.”, “Sözünün eri, yaptıklarının arkasında durmalı” şeklindeki anlatımların, yüceltilen, idealleştirilen erkeklik içeriklerine işaret ettiği söylenebilir.

Alıntı 4:

*“Erkekler kendini diğer erkekler içinde ezdirmek istemez. Sert duruyum. Dik duruyum.”*

Alıntı 5:

*“Erkeklerin kendi aralarında yüksek sesle konuşması, ben erkeğim havası vardır.”*

Burada Sele’ın (2008) belirttiği *erkeklik miti* karşımıza çıkar. Tüm meşrulaştırıcı mitler (örn., Jost ve van der Toorn 2012, Sidanius ve Pratto, 1999) gibi erkeklik mitleri de erkeklerin statüsünün ve sahip olduğu ayrıcalıkların meşrulaştırılmasını sağlar. Avantajlı konumda olan erkeklerin çoğunlukla bunları koruma yönünde reflekslere sahip olması, dezavantajlıların (kadınlar, eşcinseller gibi) ise bunlara sahip olmamayı

adil, haklı ve meşru bulması gerekir (adil dünya inancı, sistemi meşrulaştırma, sosyal baskınlık kuramı gibi sosyal psikoloji kuramları bu olguyu ele alır). Ancak “genellikle erkekler, ‘erkeklik’ mitinin ağırlığı altında sessizleşiyorlar” (Selek, 2008, s. 13) tespitin tersine, erkekler bağlama özgü olarak bu mitleri söyleme döküyor olabilirler. Söylemler ise bağlama özgü olarak değişebilir (Potter ve Wetherell, 1987).

### *Cinsellik, Bekâret ve Nesneleştirme*

**K**atılımcılar, toplumda erkeğin cinsel ilişkisinin olumlu algılandığını, “erkektir, yapar” denildiğini, erkeğin evlilik öncesi ilişkiye girmesinin sorun olmadığını, ancak kadının bekâretini korumak zorunda olduğunu belirtti. Cinsel ilişki açısından gözlenen bu durumla ilgili şu şekilde bir söylem kuruldu: “Erkek yapınca delikanlı oluyor, kadın yapınca aşüfte.” Başka bir katılımcı ise erkeklerin aleyhine bir söylem ortaya koydu: “[Erkek] iffetin sadece kızlara atfedildiğini söyleyendir. Her türlü pislği yapar ama kadın yapınca, iffetsizlikle suçlayandır. Erkekler pislik yaparsa, erkektir yapar anlayışı vardır ama kadın yapınca iffetine, namusuna laf atılır. Bu da biz erkeklerin sorunu aslında. İffeti sadece kadınlarda arıyoruz ama bazı olaylarda erkekler namussuzdur.”

Bununla ilintili olarak katılımcıların bir kısmı kadınların da evlilik öncesi ilişkiye girmesi gerektiği görüşünü savundu. Bunun yanında erkeğin ve kadının cinselliğinin farklı olduğu, erkeklerin testosteronunun “çok hızlı bir şekilde yükseldiği” ama kadının çıplak bir erkek resmi gördüğünde hemen “tahrik olmadığı” ifade edildi. Kadınların erkeğin cinselliği yönetmesini istediği ve erkeğin her zaman hazır olması gerektiğini düşündüğü, bunun “hazır olma baskısı” yarattığı ifade edildi. Cinsel ilişkiye girme konusunda Avrupa karşılaştırması yapılarak Avrupa’da cinsellik tecrübesinin daha fazla olduğu, ancak bu konunun orada “sıradanlaştığı”, Türkiye’de ise bu konuda toplum olarak “tecrübesizlik” yaşandığı anlatıldı.



Kadının deęerini cinsel kapasitesiyle özdeşleştiren bazı söylemler oldukça çarpıcıydı: “Adet başladıktan sonra 30-35 sene. Ondan sonra kadın bitiyor tabiri caizse... Menopoza girmiş kadın hiçbir işe yaramıyor. Zaten zevk almıyor.” Buna itiraz eden bir katılımcı, erkeğin de 50 yaşından sonra kolay kolay ereksiyon yaşayamadığını belirtti.

Kadının bedeninin cinsel bir nesne olarak görüldüğü ifade edildi. Dizilerde, filmlerde, şirketlerde “Patronun elinin altında hep seksi bir kadın vardır. Ama asıl karakter erkektir. Dünyayı erkek kurtarır algısı yaratılmaya çalışılmaktadır.” denildi. “Eleman alımlarında, patronların bayanlara öncelik vermesinin sebebi müşteri çekmektir. Kadın veya erkeğin iş yapıp yapmaması değil. Kadının bir restoranda durması daha çok müşteri çeker. Kadınlar daha çok güler yüz gösterir.” şeklinde söylemler sergilendi. Benzer biçimde, erkek bedeninin de nesneleştirildiğine dair görüşler ortaya konuldu. Bunun için “Biscolata erkeği” kavramı üzerinde duruldu. Bu anlatımlar, nesneleştirmeye ilgili alanyazınla tutarlıdır (bkz. Morris, 2013).

## Erkek Şiddeti

“Erkek gerektiğinde saldırgan olmalı mı?” sorusu karşısında bazı katılımcılar, kıskançlığın erkeğin saldırganlığını doğurabileceğini ifade etti. Kıskançlık, kadına yönelik erkek şiddetinin temel tetikleyicilerinden biri olarak görülür (Puente ve Cohen, 2003) ve birçok kültürde kıskançlık temelli şiddet meşrulaştırılır (bkz. Alcock ve Sadava 2014). Kadına yönelik erkek şiddetini katılımcıların bir kısmı, koruma içgüdüsü ile gerekçelendirdi. Kadının da erkekten saldırgan davranış beklediği, kadının kendisi için diğer erkeklerle kavgaya eden biri olduğunda bunu sevgi olarak gördüğü, korunduğunu düşündüğü ve kendisini değerli hissettiği anlatıldı. Bu yöndeki söylemler, kadınların cinsiyetçiliği, özellikle de korumacı cinsiyetçiliği [*benevolent sexism*] erkekler kadar benimsediğini gösteren araştırma bulgularını (Becker, 2010; Becker ve Wagner, 2009; Glick, Sakallı-Uğurlu, Akbaş, Orta ve Ceylan, 2016) anımsatır niteliktedir.

Katılımcıların tamamı fiziksel ve sözel şiddet ayrımı yaptıktan sonra fiziksel şiddeti onaylamadıklarını belirttiler. Örneğin bir katılımcı, “ne kadın ne de herhangi bir insan şiddeti hak edecek bir şey yapamaz.” dedi. Bazıları fiziksel şiddeti onaylamadığını “çok uygun değil” şeklindeki ifadelerle ortaya koydu. Buna karşın, “Toplumda erkek vurmali, kırmali” şeklinde bir tutumun olduğu belirtildi. Odak gruplarda zaman zaman topluma atıfla konuşulmasında, toplumsal algıyı betimleme veya erkeklerin toplumun normatif baskısı altında olduğunu ima etme amacı rol oynamış olabilir. Bunun yanında, katılımcıların büyük bir kısmı kadına sözel şiddet göstermek gerektiği görüşünü savundu.

Alıntı 6:

*“Bazı durumlarda olmalı, mesela kız arkadaşınız uzun süre bir yere gidip, size haber vermezse ve siz tepki göstermezseniz ilerde kız erkeği kullanabilir. Ama fiziksel şiddet uygulamam. Kız aldatır, boşanma olur, psikolojik baskı olur ama fiziksel şiddet olmaz.”*

Tarih bölümü öğrencilerinden oluşan odak grupta, katılımcıların bir kısmı tarafından fiziksel saldırganlık meşrulaştırılırken bir kişi psikolojik şiddeti yeğ tutan bir pozisyon aldı:

Alıntı 7:

*G: Namusunu korurken saldırgan olmalıdır. Nefsi müdafaa durumlarında olabilir.*

*B: Genelde namus konularında olur.*

*C: Ailesine laf olur, o zaman saldırgan olur.*

*B: Bence laf olduğunda erkek kendine kızar. Ama kadına saldırır. Başta kendini suçlamaz ama daha sonra kendini suçlayabilir. Olay anında diyemez.*

*G: Saldırganlık erkeğin içinde var olan bir şey. Hayvanlar âleminde de erkekler daha saldırgan olur.*

*C: Erkek aslanlar hayatta kalmak için mücadele ediyor, saldırıyor. Yemek için öldürüyor bir ihtiyaç sonuçta.*

*E: Canımız yandığında saldırgan olmalıyız bence.*

*D: Bazen bir kelime bile dövmekten daha iyi olabiliyor.*

Katılımcıların namusunu korumak, ailesine laf gelmesini engellemek için şiddete başvurulmasını meşru görmesi, namus kültürlerinde gözlenen

bir olgudur. Türkiye namus (haysiyet de denebilir) temelli toplulukçu bir kültür olarak nitelendirilir (örn., Üskül, Cross, Sunbay, Gercek-Swing ve Ataca, 2012). Namus kültürlerinde kadının saflığı, bekareti, sadakati, (baba, eş, abi gibi) erkeğe itaati ve erkeğin üstünlüğü, kabul gören sosyal normlardır (Nisbett ve Cohen, 1996; Osterman ve Brown, 2011; Vandello ve Cohen, 2003). Kadının “namus kodunu” ihlal etmesi durumunda erkeğin şiddete başvurması meşru görülür (Sakallı-Uğurlu ve Akbaş, 2013; Yaman-Efe ve Ayaz, 2010). Katılımcılarımız arasında da biraz korkutulan kadının erkeği aldatamayacağını, erkeğin sözünü geçirmesi ve otoritesini koyması gerektiğini belirtenler oldu. Buna ek olarak, kadınların hak arayışının da erkeği saldırganlığa itebileceği ve bunun da haklı görülebileceğini ima eden söylemlere başvuruldu.

Bolak-Boratav ve arkadaşları (2017) da Türkiye’de evli erkeklerle yaptıkları çalışmada namus, kıskançlık, itibar gibi konuların erkeklikle ilişkilendirildiğini ifade eder, ancak bahsi geçen araştırma bulgularından farklı olarak bu çalışmada katılımcıların bu gerekçelerle şiddeti meşrulaştırdığı gözlemlendi. Boratav ve arkadaşları (2017), katılımcıların şiddet, kavga ve dayakla ilgili sorulara ayrıntılı açıklamalar yapmayı tercih etmediklerini, şiddet uygulama konusunu reddetme eğiliminde olduklarını belirtir. Biz bu çalışmada erkeklerin saldırganlık ve şiddetle ilgili daha rahat konuşabildiğini gözlemledik. Bunda, katılımcılarımızın üniversite öğrencisi olması, odak grup görüşmelerinin sosyal beğenilirliği [*social desirability*] azaltıcı yönde işlemiş olması gibi nedenler rol oynamış olabilir.

## Sonuçlar ve Olasılıklar

**B**undan tam yirmi yıl önce Deniz Kandiyoti erkekliğin pek çalışılmamış olmasından yakınır ve “Türkiye bağlamında erkeklik ve kadınlık kimliklerinin nasıl oluşturulduğunun” (Kandiyoti, 1997, s.180) araştırılması gerektiğini belirtir. “Ataerkilliğin anlaşılabilmesi için merkezi bir konumu olan erkek kimliklerinin sorgulanması konusunda bugüne kadar sistemli hiçbir çalışma yapılmamış olması, açıklanması zor bir olgudur.” (Kandiyoti, 1997,

s.171) der yazar. Aradan geçen zaman içinde, her ne kadar görece az sayıda da olsa, önemli eserler verildi. Bunların içinde görgül çalışmaların sayısı, kuramsal analizlerden ve gözden geçirme yazılarından daha az. Bu nedenle, biz bu çalışmada, bir yandan, alanyazında ileri sürülmüş sosyal psikoloji kuramlarına ve sosyolojik yaklaşımlara dayanarak yeni bir kuramsal çerçeve sentezlemeye çalıştık. Bir yandan da görgül bulgularla bu kuramsal çerçeveyi sınamayı hedefledik. Bu açılarından bakıldığında, bu makalenin alanyazına katkıları daha iyi görülebilir.

Çalışmada yer alan katılımcılar, kadın-erkek eşitliği gibi konularda zaman zaman tarihe atıfla görüşlerini ortaya koydular. Ancak, bu konuda eksik veya hatalı anlatımlar (cinsiyetler arası eşitsizliğin avcı-toplayıcı dönemle başlatılması gibi) gözümüze çarptı. Atay (2004), saban tarımına geçişle birlikte, yani erkeğin geçimde etkin konum kazandığı toplumsallıkla beraber cinsiyetler arası eşitsizliğin gözlendiğini ve erkek iktidarının kurulduğunu belirtir. Yazar, kadının üretim sürecinde etkin olduğu besin toplayıcılığı veya çapa tarımı (bahçe tarımı) gibi ekonomik süreçlerde ise cinsiyetler arasında eşitsizliğin ortaya çıkmadığını, kadın iktidarının gözlenmediğini ifade eder. Yazara göre, erkeklik kadınlık kimliğinden ve pratiğinden farklı olarak bir iktidar pratiği olarak kurumsallaşmıştır.

Türkiye’de geleneksel olarak kabul gören erkeklik aşamalarının sünnet, askerlik, iş bulma, evlilik olduğu ifade edilir (Bolak-Boratav vd., 2017; Selek, 2008). Görüşme yaptığımız erkekler bu aşamaların birçoğunu geçmemiş olsa da “erkeklikten ne anlıyorsunuz?” sorusuna cevap verirken bu aşamalara atıf yaparak konuştular. Dolayısıyla, burada elde edilen bulgular yorumlanırken, katılımcıların içinde bulunduğu gelişimsel dönem (psikolojide ergenliğin son dönemi veya ilk yetişkinlik dönemi olarak belirtilen) göz ardı edilmemeli. Yine Selek’in (2008, s. 24) ifade ettiği gibi “[o]kullar, iş alanları, sosyal birliktelikler ve aktiviteler, erkeklerin hâkim kodlara göre şekillendikleri, dolayısıyla kırıldıkları alanlardır.” Bu çerçevede hem odak görüşmesinin kendisinin yarattığı müzakere edici ortamın hem de katılımcıların gelecekte deneyimleyecekleri koşulların, bağlamların ve ikili veya grup ilişkilerinin

katılımcıların sahip oldukları erkeklik temsilleri üzerinde belirli etkiler ortaya çıkaracağı düşünülebilir.

Odak grup görüşmesi, katılımcılar arasında kısa süreli de olsa kimlik müzakereleri (Deaux, 2006) dediğimiz durumlar ortaya çıkardı. Bir söylemi ortaya koyan katılımcılar ya sessizce dinlenildi ya da karşı söylemlerle çeldirildi. Bu noktada, aynı bölümde okuyan öğrenciler arasındaki gruplararası ve kişilerarası süreçlerin, bunun yanında, güç ilişkilerinin söylemsel stratejilerin ortaya konmasında rol oynadığı varsayılabilir. Kimin kiminle tartışmayı göze aldığı, kimin görüşlerine kimin itiraz ettiğinin veya edebildiğinin altında yatan bu dinamiklerin farkında olunması gerekli görünüyor. Buna ek olarak, söylemlerde zaman zaman “klişe olmasın ama...”, “cinsiyetçi söylemler kullanmak istemiyorum ama...” şeklinde ifadelere başvuruldu. Katılımcılar, kendi görüşlerini meşrulaştırmak ve/veya karşı tarafın düşüncesini önsel olarak belirlemek (ön almak) amacıyla bu tür söylemsel stratejiler izlemiş olabilir. Bunun yanında, bu yazıda betimlenen bulgular, mekânın (okul, fakülte hatta bölüm), arkadaşlık ağlarının (network) ve odak grubun kendi dinamiklerinin etkisine açıktır. Buna ek olarak, bu çalışmada elde edilen bulgular, kültüre ve bağlama özgü bir biçimde ortaya çıkmıştır; yerel ve coğrafi koordinatların (yaşamın büyük kısmının geçtiği yerler, üniversite öğrencisi olarak yeni yerleşilen şehir) etkisi altındadır.

Bu çalışmada üniversite öğrencisi olan erkeklerin erkekliği nasıl algıladığı, nasıl müzakere ettiği ele alındı. Gelecek çalışmalarda farklı sosyal gruplardan (sınıfsal, etnik, mesleki) erkeklerin ne tür erkeklik özellikleri üzerinde durduğu, erkeklikle ilgili ne tür (karşı)söylemler ortaya koyduğu, diğer erkeklerle bu konuyu nasıl müzakere ettiği ele alınabilir. Bölgesel ve karşılaştırmalı erkeklik (Peace ve Pringle, 2001) veya erkekliğin coğrafyası (Connell ve Messerschmidt, 2005) kavramları da bu tür çalışmalar için yol gösterici niteliktedir. Ayrıca, bu çalışmanın katılımcılarının savunduğu bazı görüşler, örneğin kadınların erkeklerden beklentileriyle ilgili atıfları, kadınların dâhil edildiği çalışmalarla incelenebilir. Bu çerçevede gelecek çalışmalarda kadınların da erkekliği nasıl algıladığı, erkekliğe ne tür özellikler atfettiği, erkeklerden

ve erkeklikten ne beklediđi ele alınabilir. Bunun için sadece kadınlardan oluşan odak grup görüşmeleri gerçekleştirilebileceđi gibi kadınlar ve erkeklerin birlikte tartışmasına olanak tanıyan odak gruplar da oluşturulabilir. Böylece erkekliđin kadınlıkla tezatlık üzerinden nasıl ele alındıđı daha detaylı bir şekilde çalışılabilir.

<sup>1</sup>Brym (1998), cinsiyet ve cinselliğin fizyolojik/biyolojik bir temeli olmakla birlikte bunları isimlendirme, tanımlama, teşvik etme, bastırma ve biçimlendirme sürecinin bütünüyle kültürel olduğunu belirtir (akt. Atay, 2004).

<sup>2</sup> Atay (2004, s. 12, dipnot 3), “[t]oplumsal kurumların birer ‘kültürel icat’ olarak alınmayıp doğal gereksinimler sonucunda ortaya çıktıkları inancıyla haklılaştırıldığı ve sorgulamaksızın kabullerinin sağlandığı sürece” doğallaştırma [*naturalisation*] ismini verir. Yazara göre doğallaştırmadan “en çok nasibini alan cinsiyet ve cinselliktir.”

<sup>3</sup> Kişiler arası ve gruplar arası karşılaştırmalara dayalı kimlik süreçleri, Turner ve arkadaşlarının (1987) ileri sürdüğü kendini-kategorileme kuramının temel önermelerinden biridir.

<sup>4</sup>Erkekler ve erkeklik çalışmaları hakkında disiplinler arası bir gözden geçirme için Edley ve Wetherell (1995)’e bakılabilir. Erkeklik çalışmalarının antropolojik açıdan eleştirisi için ise bkz. Cornwall ve Lindisfarne (1994).

<sup>5</sup>O dönem yeniden güçlenen feminist hareket içinde erkekler ve erkeklik konusunda farklı görüşler gündeme gelir. Her şeyi baskılayan erkeklere ve erkeklığe karşı mücadele etmek ile erkeklığı anlamak arasında konumlanan bu farklı görüşler arasındaki tartışmalar hala sürüyor. Bu tartışmaların alevlendiği konulardan biri, erkeklerin 8 Mart etkinliklerine katılıp katılmaması üzerinedir.

<sup>6</sup>Erkeklik sosyolojisi alanında 19. yüzyılda ortaya konulan çalışmalar cinsiyet farklarıyla ilgilenmiş ve toplumsal cinsiyet o dönemde biyolojik temelleriyle ele alınmıştır. Kısa bir tarihçe için bkz. Carrigan, Connell, Lee (1985).

<sup>7</sup>Erkeklerin baskıcı davranışının kaynağını erkeklik rolünde gören cinsiyet rol kuramları, cinsiyetler arası güç ilişkilerinden bahsetmez. Erkek ve kadın davranışlarını açıklamada sosyal roller yaklaşımını benimseyen Alice Eagly’nin 1970’lerde ileri sürdüğü cinsiyet rolleri yaklaşımının sosyal psikoloji alan yazınındaki ağırlığını günümüzde de koruduğu söylenebilir. Eagly’nin önermeleri temelinde biyoloji ve psikoloji disiplinlerinin buluşmasının teşvik edildiği Avrupa Sosyal Psikoloji Derneği’nin desteğiyle 24-27 Haziran 2017 tarihleri arasında Berlin’de düzenlenen “Gender roles in the future? Theoretical foundations and future research directions” isimli toplantı, cinsiyet rolleri bakış

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açısının önümüzdeki yıllarda da alanı belirleyeceği izlenimi veriyor. Biyoloji ve psikoloji disiplinlerini buluşturma çabasıyla somutlanan bakış açısı, erkeklik sosyolojisi alanının önermelerine kapalı gibi görünüyor.

<sup>8</sup>Schwartz (2012), değerleri muhafazakârlık (geleneksellik, uyma ve güvenlikle ilgili değerler) ve değişime açıklık (uyarım ve öz-yönlendirme ve hazcılıkla ilgili değerler) olarak ayırt eder.

<sup>9</sup>Benzer bir biçimde Connell (1998) da erkeklerin sahip olduğu toplumsal avantajlarının bedelini ödediğini, bu bedellerin bazen çok yüksek olduğunu ifade eder.



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# Muscles, Moustaches and Machismo: Narratives of Masculinity by Egyptian English-Language Media Professionals and Media Audiences

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## **Abstract:**

This study utilizes ethnographic methods to inquire how ideas of masculinities are perceived by English-language media professionals and media audiences in Egypt. Using semi-structured interviews and a survey, the aim is to find common narratives on how masculinity is perceived on personal levels and what terms are used to describe men and masculinities, which in turn can be used as the basis for further analysis of Egyptian media content. The word “narrative” in itself is used to convey personal experience, and the telling of those experiences, rather than generalizable data applicable to the larger population. Found are several common themes, such as emphasized heterosexuality, and the expectation of men as providers and protectors, which is related, by the respondents, to the nation and the military. Protection and militarism relates to ideas of strength, honor, and courage. Men are almost exclusively seen as possessors of power. The ‘head of the household,’ and the head of state, both portrayed as iconized leaders, emerge as the quintessence of Egyptian masculine identity, whether that identity is contested or not.

**Keywords:** masculinities; media; audiences; Egypt; identity; gender expression.

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## Kaslar, Bıyıklar ve Maçızım: Mısırlı İngilizce Konuşan Medya Profesyonellerinin ve Medya İzleyicilerinin Erkeklik Anlatıları

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### Özet:

Bu çalışma erkekliklerle ilgili görüşlerin, Mısır'da İngilizce konuşan medya profesyonelleri ve medya izleyicileri tarafından nasıl algılandığını incelemek için etnografik metotlardan faydalanır. Amaç, yarı-yapılandırılmış mülakatlar ve anketler aracılığıyla, erkekliğin kişisel düzeylerde nasıl algılandığı ve erkekler ile erkeklikleri betimlemek için hangi terimlerin kullanıldığı ile ilgili ortak anlatıları ortaya çıkarmaktır; ki bu ortak anlatılar Mısır medyası içerikleri ile ilgili daha sonra yapılacak analizlere temel teşkil edebilir. "Anlatı" kelimesi, geniş toplum için geçerliliği olan, genellenebilecek verilerden ziyade, bizzat kişisel deneyimleri ve bu deneyimlerin anlatılmasını ifade etmek için kullanılır. Bulgular, vurgulanmış heteroseksüellik ve görüşmeciler tarafından ulus ve askeriye ile ilişkilendirilen erkeklerden geçim sağlayıcılık ve korumacılık beklentileri gibi birçok ortak temayı içerir. Korumacılık ve militarizm, güç, namus ve cesaret fikirleriyle bağlantılıdır. Erkekler münhasıran erk sahibi olarak görülmektedir. Her ikisi de ikonlaşmış liderlerce sergilenen 'evin reisi' ve devletin başı rolleri Mısırlı erkek kimliğinin - bu kimlik tartışmaya açık olsa da olmasa da - özünü oluşturan özellikler olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** erkeklikler, medya, izleyiciler, Mısır, kimilik, toplumsal cinsiyet ifadesi

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**M**asculinity as a concept and an idea is getting increasingly debated and studied. There are many different ways of approaching it, and, while often described as a new or an emerging field of study, it can be traced back at least half a century, perhaps even as far as Freud and Jung (see Connell, 2005; Kimmel, Hearn and Connell, 2003; Gardiner, 2002; Whitehead, 2002). However, despite many established fields dedicated to the study of men and masculinities, there is a recurring problem, namely how to define masculinity:

The concepts “masculine” and “feminine”, Freud observed in a melancholy footnote, “are among the most confused that occur in science”. In many practical situations the language of “masculine” and “feminine” raises few doubts. We base a great deal of talk and action on this contrast. But the same terms, on logical examination, waver like the Danube mist. They prove remarkably elusive and difficult to define. (Connell, 2005, p. 3)

The problem with some of the approaches taken in previous studies is that it ignores the self-understood masculinity, or the perception of the masculine in terms other than academic. That, however, is the core of this study, to explore everyday narratives of masculinity, what is “maleness” or “manhood,” in the descriptions made both by media professionals, represented herein by journalists, producers, editors and translators working with news production in any way, and by media audiences in an Egyptian context. This is to provide a grounded basis for analyses exploring the construction and representation of masculinities in Egyptian media. Rather than applying an arbitrarily chosen academic definition of masculinity, in-depth interviews can let theories emerge from the material. The focus of this research project is as such not only a preliminary exploration of how masculinity is represented and constructed in Egyptian media, but also to find common themes in the descriptions of men as a category and hierarchies of different descriptions. While the study is still a work-in-progress and the findings are preliminary, what clearly stands out is the high status of the military in terms of male ideals, showing deep entanglement of masculinity and

militarism in the Egyptian context. For example, several respondents refer to the military as a 'factory of men,' and one young man, critical of the military as an institution, laments the fact that many mothers in Egypt want their sons to join the army, 'to make a man out of him.' Former president and military officer Gamal Abdel Nasser is the man most often named as an 'exemplary man' by respondents, his predecessor Anwar Sadat is spoken of as a national father, and the current president and former field marshal Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, too, is described as a representative of 'ideal masculinity,' although in a more suave form than the previous presidents. It is, however, important to note that there are many other examples of masculinities in Egypt, as shown by recent studies that highlight the caring and nurturing man (see Naguib, 2015; Ghannam, 2013; Inhorn, 2012), and that focusing on military masculinities was not an aim of this study, but rather reflects the thoughts and concerns of the respondents. Furthermore, and here I am following the recommendations of Amar (2011), it is crucial that highlighting and challenging militarized masculinity and gendered security politics does not misrecognize and depoliticize social forces. Moving forward with the findings of this study – particularly how media professionals and audiences alike emphasize the military and/or militarism in discussion on men's media representation – it is necessary to ask what role this plays in Egyptian cultural politics under the current regime, while still paying attention to the classed and racialized aspects of military participation and representation, as well as resistance against military institutions. Questions for future studies include whether the same entanglements of masculinity and militarism can be found in Egyptian online press, too. If so, in what ways do the gendered representations of militants, whether military soldiers, terrorists, or jihadists, relate to the state's security narrative? Indeed, exploration of how gendered notions and ideals are used in reporting on military activity, particularly reports on terrorism and the anti-terrorist efforts of the Egyptian army, seems to be the most interesting direction of future research this study may take.

As previously mentioned, this study takes its starting point in narratives of media professionals as well as media audiences. This approach acknowledges that the dynamics between audience and media does not necessarily mean a passive role of the audience, as simply the receivers of information. Indeed, it could be argued that the expectations of their audiences are something that media institutions are well aware of, meaning that, rather than somehow molding their audiences, their news production deliberately follows the audiences' views (Abdelmoez, 2017). Therefore, this is not a study on the impact of media in the construction of hegemonic expressions of masculinity, but rather a look into the perception of the same expressions in media audiences. That being said, observing the importance of the perceived naturalness to binary gender expressions (Butler, 1990), and the meaning of stereotypical representations to construct gender boundaries (Dyer, 2002), it could be hypothesized that media have a large impact on how masculinity is perceived throughout society. This view is supported by many of the respondents in this study, both with the perspective that men are stereotypically portrayed and that women are underrepresented and marginalized in the media. As the overarching theme of this study is gender representation in the Egyptian media landscape, the two study groups, media audiences (consumers) and media professionals (producers, journalists, editors, etc.) have been selected in acknowledgment of the truism that news production does not solely involve producers. Media audiences interact with texts and messages, utilize and decode them according to their own needs and interests, and therefore also participate in creating meaning. Thus, while talking to media professionals provides insight into journalistic practice and how gender is thought about and discussed in the media institutions, media audiences can show how this is received, perceived, and utilized.

The idea of this pilot study is as mentioned to find place- and culture-specific constructions of masculinities and its hierarchies, and let the definitions appear from the data, rather than applying an already constructed framework that might feel foreign to the people implicated by the study. Inspiration here comes from Connell and Messerschmidt's

elaboration on the interplay of local, regional and global levels in constructed masculinities:

Let us consider specifically the relation between regional and local masculinities. Hegemonic masculinity at the regional level is symbolically represented through the interplay of specific local masculine practices that have regional significance, such as those constructed by feature film actors, professional athletes, and politicians. The exact content of these practices varies over time and across societies. (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005, p. 849)

A theoretical notion to which this study relates is performativity, which informs how the findings can be understood and applied for future research. This concept was derived from linguistics and the philosophy of language, and it has been adapted to gender studies by Judith Butler (1990). Simply put, Butler asserts that gender and its expressions are not natural, but constructed to appear as such, through means of repetition. Accordingly, gender is not the expression of identity, but identity can rather be understood as constructed through “gender acts”. The idea of gender performativity is largely based on post-structural and social constructivist thinking that language does not necessarily *describe* an objectively true reality, but discursively *creates* it. It is, however, important to note that this does not make gender insignificant. Performativity does not mean artificiality; rather, gender is figured as a product of its own repetition in language and other forms of signification. Butler states that there need not be an “actor behind the act” because the actor is constructed *within* the act:

As a consequence, gender cannot be understood as a role which either expresses or disguises an interior ‘self,’ whether that ‘self’ is conceived as sexed or not. As performance which is performative, gender is an “act,” broadly construed, which constructs the social fiction of its own psychological interiority. (Butler, 1988, p. 528)

Gender is the repeated stylization of the body, a set of repeated acts within a highly rigid regulatory frame that congeal over time to produce the appearance of substance, of a natural sort of being. (Butler, 1990, p. 25)

If, as argued by Butler, gender is something we do rather than something we are, or have, then what constitutes “masculinity” or “femininity” is indeed not internal, but given to us, through social conventions and contexts. Here, the media play an important part in, in some ways, “teaching” gender. The representation of men and masculinity is not (only) a description of an already existing reality but is a lesson for men on how to enact hegemonic masculinity. When such ideals are enacted by individuals, they are not only individual actions, but collaborative ones. They rely on the social conventions of gender, and are expressed in a particular context in which they become part of a gender “complicity.” The acts, as such, are then “stylized performances [of gender] that are coded into cultural life” (Wood, 2013, p. 63). I want to reiterate that Butler (1990) does not hold gender to be “a performance” but “performative,” an important distinction. Since gender does not exist before it is done, Butler argues that it is the act itself “doing” gender, not the subject. Similarly, Carlshamre (2014) speaks of human bodies as artifacts, modified to suit certain ideals about sex/gender – despite the fact that this is portrayed as “natural” and biological. Pointing towards practices to “design” our bodies, from plastic surgery to haircuts, Carlshamre argues: “It is as if we do not really trust nature to distinguish the sexes well enough, but must help ourselves to become what we supposedly already are” (p. 144).

The reiterability of gender is really a key point as it is never constructed from scratch, but rather, because “always-already” ubiquitously at work, reiterated and cemented in interpersonal meetings, thus reconfirming and entrenching current norms. Swedish queer theorist, Fanny Ambjörnsson, elaborates and clarifies Butler’s theories, especially regarding the consequences of gender non-conformity. It is not enough to *be* (or *identify as*) a man, one must also continuously *enact* one’s tenuous maleness in order to be seen as a “real”

man (Ambjörnsson, 2006). This is where I situate the theoretical crux of this study: how is performative, or “enacted,” masculinity understood by media audiences and professionals? Performativity theory, as such, provides an understanding of the findings as an ongoing process which will, I believe, reveal a form of gender affordance; certain ideals and identities are realized and take material form, making it possible to become the thing to which it itself refers.

### Previous research

The present study relates to and primarily draws on contributions to masculinity studies: both general theories on the different mechanisms concerning masculinity, as well as some specific ones to Egypt and the Middle East, as well as media studies. A primary, and very important point, emphasized by Gardiner (2002), is that there is no consistent meaning to the term “masculinity” and that the relationship between feminisms, queer theory and the study of men and masculinities have been a complicated one. Berggren (2014), however, argues that the connection have been there, only not made sufficiently visible, and that bringing feminist phenomenology, particularly that of Sara Ahmed, into studies of men and masculinities acts to revitalize the theoretical framework: “conceptualizing masculinity as *sticky* allows us to see both that subjects are positioned by competing discourses, and that through repeated enactment, the cultural signs of masculinity tends to stick to bodies” (Berggren, p. 247).

The intersection of gender and media has been an important one to gender studies scholars, although very little has been written about the representation and the construction of masculinities in Arab media. The study of gender in Middle Eastern societies and cultures, furthermore, is marked by a strong focus on women. Farha Ghannam’s book *Live and Die Like a Man* (2013) stands as the clearest exception to this, and is an elaborate account of men’s lives in Egypt, based on 20 years of research in the neighborhood of al-Zawiya al-Hamra’. While keeping a critical distance, Ghannam offers a much-needed

problematization of masculinity in Egypt, in relation to class and social norms, as well as political systems and religion. At the same time, Ghannam challenges what she sees as discourses of dehumanization of Muslim men in the global media, by providing detailed accounts of men's lives, and the forces that forms what she calls "masculine trajectories." There is much inspiration to get from this work, but it also highlights the urgent need for more research, based on ethnographic methods, on the role of men and masculinities in contemporary Egypt.

Noha Mellor's article "Countering cultural hegemony: Audience research in the Arab world" (2013) is also highly relevant for the first part of this study, as it highlights different approaches of audience research and understanding the impact of media in the Arab world. In this review of Arab audience research, Mellor (2013) argues for an understanding of 'audience' as both diverse and fragmented, particularly as doing otherwise risks viewing 'audience' as passive, rather than active, in their engagement with the media. Mellor (2013) concludes that there is a "vast room for interpretive research based on the ethnographic and cultural turn in audience research, centering on the processes of the interpretation rather than on the authority of the (imported) texts" (p. 212).

The present pilot study, as such, functions as a step towards filling both these voids with ethnographic audience research focusing on interpretation of masculinity and the portrayal of men in Egyptian media, and thus aims to bring together masculinity studies with media ethnography and audience research in the context of contemporary Egypt.



## Method

This study is based on nine semi-structured interviews conducted in Cairo, Egypt, between September and November 2014, each taking between 60 and 90 minutes. Language was mainly English with Egyptian Arabic used only to discuss terms considered language-specific. Respondents included five media professionals, and four readers/viewers of Egyptian English-language media. These two groups of participants were chosen in order to gain insights both from people working in the media, as they can reveal how gendered ideals inform the work from within media institution, and from outsiders, as the audiences also play a part in decoding and interpreting the very same media messages.

Furthermore, in order to broaden the data, a small survey consisting of key questions from the interviews was distributed through the online link-sharing website Reddit, on a specific “subreddit” (essentially a discussion forum) dedicated to Egypt. 27 people responded to the survey. This quickly and efficiently produced several interesting and useful answers, but the in-depth interviews remain the core of the study. The respondents for these are both media professionals, and from the audiences of Egyptian English-language media. These were selected through a combination of help from previous contacts, and the so called “snowballing-method,” which means that each respondent was asked to name a few other possible respondents. Usually when using this method, data collection ends when it reaches a *saturation point*, meaning that the respondents no longer provide new information or when patterns have appeared and most answers are repetitions of what previous respondents have said. However, considering the fact that this study was only supposed to provide a basis for a larger media analysis, it was not deemed necessary to reach this saturation point. Any and all insights were considered valuable, and can act as a starting point of a content analysis of Egyptian English-language media. The interviews, as mentioned, aimed at eliciting narratives of masculinity that would produce key terms that could be used in

investigating the representation of masculinities in Egyptian media. Therefore, no attention was paid to make sure that the sample was representative in regard to gender, religion, class, etc. In other words, sampling did not aim at generalizability or being representative of the population. Therefore, there is a risk of sampling bias, as it is very likely that the respondents who decided to participate had; 1) a greater interest in the topic at hand, 2) a greater personal interest in sharing their thoughts, and 3) a greater opportunity to speak candidly and critically about fairly controversial issues.

The first group of interview respondents, media professionals, consisted of one online editor, aged between 30-49, identifying as “straight male” (note that sexual orientation/identity was not asked, only gender identity), one freelance translator, aged between 15-29, identifying as man, one journalist, aged between 15-29, identifying as male, one researcher, aged between 30-49, identifying as female, and one journalist, aged between 15-29, identifying as female. The second group, media audiences, consisted of one artist, aged between 50-64, identifying as woman, one musician, aged between 30-49, identifying as female, one architect, aged between 30-49, identifying as male, and one activist, aged between 15-29, identifying as female. The only qualifier for the second group was that the respondent considered themselves part of the target group of any Egyptian news outlet, and somewhat regularly interacted with the news media.

### **Interview Questions**

The interview and questions themselves have been structured after a model suggested by Bryman (2012), mixing introductory and clarifying questions with solicitations of examples. After having been informed about the research purpose and after having given their consent, each respondent was first asked for basic demographics including age, gender identity and educational background. Respondents from the “media professionals” group were asked about their media affiliation (institution) and their professional role (journalist, editor, producer, or

translator). Those from “media audiences” were asked about their profession. Both groups were asked about their primary sources of news media, of which the most common were Al-Ahram, Ahram Online, Al-Masry Al-Youm, Youm7 and Mada Masr. The main questions of the interviews are all centered on the topics of masculinity, media and gender representation, and are all followed by additional questions, as well as clarifying questions and solicitations of examples. In all stages of the interviews the interviewer, as far all possible, refrained from imposing, suggesting or even mentioning possible answers. This is necessary because doing so would defeat the purpose of circumventing traditional or academic narratives (or tropes) of masculinity in order to explore the situated and uninterrupted understandings. Therefore, only the meaning of the questions was elaborated upon when needed, without suggestion of possible answers other than what had already been provided by the respondent.

The survey followed a similar pattern as the interviews, and the questions were a selection of key questions from the interviews. Open comment-style fields were used for answers rather than multiple choices, with the only exception being in regards to age group. This was done in order to encourage the respondents to answer in their own words, and when necessary use Arabic terms, allowing for an as unobtrusive collection of data as possible. The respondents of the survey overwhelmingly identified as male, with fifteen answering “male”, not including one instance of “straight”, two “straight male”, and “*Dakar*”, literally meaning man, but in Egypt considered carrying connotations of machismo.

## Findings and analysis

### Provide, Protect and Control

Overall, professional life dominated as a theme when discussing “men’s roles” in society and in life. Even in cases when the topic was family life, most respondents correlated this to professional life through a strong emphasis put on the expectation of men to “provide” for their family. Several respondents talked about how men are judged by how well they can fulfill the role as breadwinner for their family. One media professional stated:

Men are normally not involved in home issues; they are only involved in bringing money and bringing bread. What do you expect to find more? I think that’s it, it has always been like that. And I think women are expecting, even when they are getting married to a man, what they ask about is ‘is he able to provide a good life, or not?’ They don’t think much about how collaboration would be in building this family, they think ‘is [this] man, can [this] man be more responsible to provide the life for the family?’ That’s the main question here, when someone is trying to get married.

Many times providing was mentioned next to protecting, as one survey respondent answered on the question of what “masculinity” means: “It means to sacrifice safety or comfort to protect women and children. It means to sacrifice comfort to provide for a family... It means that the prosperity and safety of my family rests on my shoulders.” This correlation also emphasizes the fact that both providing and protecting also relates to a third aspect mentioned by respondents: controlling. In fact, one survey response mentions providing and controlling in the same sentence, answering on whether masculinity is “natural to men,” saying that “I like to think yes, since instinctively we like to be in control and more people than not think of themselves as the providers.” A media audience interviewee adds to the same point, although speaking about what comes to mind when hearing the word “masculinity,” saying:

It's a source of pride, to have. You're the one who control women, you're the breadwinner. You have to appear as a masculine man in the streets, wear modest clothes. Stuff like that, which I think is a very backwards way of expressing oneself.

Some were even harsher in their words on this question, with one respondent saying "I think about to be unfair. I think about violence." On the follow-up question whether this is similar to "macho," this respondent said:

Yes, it's similar. But, I refer, when I hear the word 'macho,' I refer to jealousy more, and competition among males. It's not about... controlling the female; it's like competing with each other. But masculinity, that's when the female gets hurt, or treated in a bad way.

Interestingly, the same respondent viewed "masculinity" and "maleness" as the same thing, but "manhood" as something different. When asked about the difference, the answer was that manhood is something positive:

I don't really use the word 'maleness,' I just heard it from you now, but manhood is about character. It's about personality of someone, and it refers to positive points in his personality, it's not like masculinity. It's about to be fair, actually, and to be strong and to be protective and, I don't know, to be responsible.

Being protective, for a man, thus signifies a positive trait to this respondent. Considering the perceived difference between "masculinity," which included controlling, and "manhood," being something positive, there is no correlation made between "protective" and "controlling." At the same time, much of this respondent's answers revolved around men being controlling of women in close relationships to them, particularly brothers' behavior towards their sisters. However, the same behavior was by others described as "protective," meaning that it could be used in

either a positive or negative meaning, although in the former case the same behavior would be labeled as “controlling” instead. Therefore, it is still possible to argue for their connection, which several respondents did:

They [young men] think that the whole protection thing maybe involves the need to control women. So maybe that’s an expression of that desire to control women, or to feel more powerful vis-à-vis women, and therefore prove their virility, their manhood, and then to act as protector. I mean the logic is odd, of course.

The same connection was by others made between “providing” and “controlling:”

A ‘real man’ will be judged, if he is successful, if he can build a family and finance it. That’s very important. [He will be judged on] if he can control the family well.

Two other respondents had this to say about control and masculinity:

I believe it’s a culture in Egypt [...] and this culture helps, maybe not just men, men and women, to control someone weaker than them, and feel that they are strong enough and that they have power. I believe they know they do something wrong, and it is okay because power is very seducing, you know? It’s about being unfair. It’s about refusing a girl to choose, they don’t want her to choose, because they want to feed their power.

I believe the societal understanding of masculinity in Egypt is quite a fucked up one. Thinking about it... It’s sort of a birthright of control. You have the birthright to control things, and to be able to change, and to be able to lead. And, quite paradoxically, this entails very little responsibility. I remember when I was a kid, my friends used to brag about that they don’t do things around the house, because this is

what females do. Like 'I do not clean, I do not do my bed, I do not do whatever, because this is what girls do.' So basically it feels like being a male comes with almost limitless privileges, with little responsibility regarding your immediate context, be it the family or the society.

As we can see, providing, protecting, and controlling are all aspects that nearly every respondent relates to the role that men are expected to take in Egyptian society. While these aspects may or may not intersect, they also exist on multiple levels; not only relating to the family and to the society, but also to the nation. Protection and guardianship on the national level is a task placed with the military, and there are parallels to be drawn between the familial or paternal protectionism spoken of by the respondents, and the trope of a national family, wherein the nation is symbolized as a woman (see Baron, 2005) in need of protection from a male guardian, the military. Viewing this parallel with performativity theory in mind, one could argue that an emphasis on familial protectionism as an integral part of masculinity also acts to construct militarized forms of masculine identity; it encourages men's participation in the state's military apparatus, the "security industry," and by extension the militarized masculinity – which includes the expectation of men to sacrifice their bodies to the state.

Providing for and protecting one's family could be seen as a project of procreation and preservation, to carry on one's legacy. This legacy, however, is mostly inherited from father to son. One respondent claimed to be thankful for not being a man, as it meant that when she told her father that she would not be going to the medical school like he had wanted, he was accepting of it because it was more important for her brother, as the only son, to do so:

He said 'Ok. Anyway, I have my son. For me, you are a woman; you will always be a woman. Even if you are successful, one day you will marry and you will not carry the name.' That's what my father told me, an educated person.

It is clear that when fathering is considered central to Egyptian masculinity; it is usually the fathering of sons. It might be possible to speak of “lineal masculinity,” although that would require studies looking into the past and how notions of ancestry relate to masculine ideals through generations. However, the hinting towards patrilineal legacy given by some respondents, together with the outright account of (male) inherited family feuds and men trying to save their family name, which we will return to, does show that, at least in Upper Egypt, family legacy is closely tied with masculinity. Men are the ones who defend the family name, they are the ones who carry on the family name, and it is their death that is the end of the family.

The emphasis on men’s role as protectors of women also perpetuates the ubiquitous “damsel in distress” trope, which in itself could be seen as devaluing women’s agency, or at least symptomatic of the perceived role of women in public society, something which in turn feeds violence directed at women both at home and on the streets. This relates to the Egyptian term *balṭagy* (بلطجي), or “thug”, which is a term often used to separate culturally and socially sanctioned violence from other forms. It is the embodiment of villain masculinity, and the concept, as used on Egyptian streets rather than in laws, “focuses mainly on the improper uses of violence in daily life” (Ghannam, 2013, p. 123). By constructing the threat of the “thug”, or villain, men can position themselves as protectors of women, thus remaining in a place of control and authority. Men constructed themselves as heroic by imagining other men as “villainous.” The Hero, after all, is defined by his courageous struggle with his enemy, the Villain, usually referred to in Egypt as *balṭagy*. Thus men assert their belonging to a group of men engaged in courageous conflict with another group of men. Men also construct the non-masculine non-man in order to exemplify the man who did not conform to masculinity, the equivalent of which in British would be “nonce” or “sissy,” what is in Egypt called *shāz* (شاذ), “deviant,” a term often used to describe non-heterosexual men.



## Sexuality, Family and Nation

**M**y early reflections on it were purely sexual. Masculinity was basically a sexual attitude, rather than a social construct. – Young male respondent.

A commonly mentioned aspect of masculinity, related to control, is sexuality. Several respondents talked about what they termed “the hypocrisy” regarding some men’s view of female sexuality: “Macho people also do not allow sexual liberties for women. They don’t respect a woman that is sexually liberated, at the same time they treat women as sexual objects, so they’re very hypocritical.” This respondent also related the term “macho” to “masculinity,” in the sense that it is a way to act, expected of men by society at large. Furthermore, the respondent who differentiated between manhood and masculinity gave similar remarks:

If in the street a girl and her boyfriend or lover is walking, holding hands, or... his hand on her shoulder, or even kissing or anything, it’s not allowed. People won’t let them go by in an intimate way, walk in an intimate way. But if someone harass her, or touch her, touch her without her consent, that’s okay. But if she agrees, then it’s not okay. If she says no for someone controlling her, that’s wrong, and if she says yes for someone she loves, that’s also wrong. But if she’s under control, although the same action is happening - it’s about touching her body - without her choice it is okay, you know?

What this tells us is that female sexuality is explained as subject to double-punishment, or as the saying goes: “damned if you do, damned if you don’t.” Conversely, one respondent talked about how being a man, in Egypt, comes with freedoms. As a teenager, this respondent reminisced, he was able to stay out late without issues of “virginity.” Generally, male sexuality seems to be closely tied to a sense of masculinity, and often comes up in interviews, no matter who the respondent is. As an example

of this, on the question of gender identity one interview respondent and three survey respondents not only said “male,” but actually answered “straight male,” as if to emphasize that they are “proper men.” Not surprisingly, these same men were also the ones who emphasized the “naturalness” of male stereotypes, such as muscularity and intelligence. One of these respondents said, on what the term “masculinity” means to him: “Masculinity and manhood: Courage, strength, honor.” Strength, of course, being another idea connected to the trope of the protective man. Upon being asked to name examples of men that to them symbolize this as a male ideal mainly two people were named: President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, and the former President Gamal Abdel Nasser. I say “mainly” because there was one man who was mentioned once, in a survey response, as a symbol of the “masculine traits” of being “quiet and strong,” and that man was late American actor Charles Bronson. Although Bronson was only mentioned once as an idealized man in Egypt, presidents el-Sisi and Nasser came up in nearly every interview and in several survey responses. While these men are quite obviously tied to symbolisms of the Egyptian nation, there were others mentioned as “idealized men” that have played important, albeit very different, roles in the construction of a national, masculine identity: Actors Rushdy Abaza (“the Clark Gable of Egypt”) and Omar Sharif.

One respondent related both Nasser and el-Sisi back to the family as an idea, as providers and as protectors. According to this respondent, the political elite in Egypt since the revolution of 1952 have constructed an idea of the nation modeled as a family, and the leader, be it Nasser, Sadat or el-Sisi, as a father.<sup>1</sup> This, the respondent says, is clearly shown in the fact that Sadat, during the October War of 1973, spoke about the fighter pilots as “my sons.” The mother in this scenario is Egypt, such as in the statue “Nahdet Misr” outside Cairo University, once again casting the men (soldiers) as the protectors and women as the protected. The respondent emphasizes that women had been cast in this role before Nasser’s revolution as well, and points to the fact that during the inauguration of the statue of “Mother Egypt,” women were not allowed to attend.

On the question of what exemplifies an idealized man, some respondents chose to list traits or attributes, while others listed “exemplary men.” The two most commonly listed attributes were muscles and moustaches. Interestingly, only a few respondents mentioned beards, while nearly everyone (including many survey respondents) pointed to moustaches as a “masculine attribute.”

The men exemplifying masculinity, such as the already mentioned Nasser, el-Sisi, Rushdy Abaza and Omar Sharif, and others, such as writer Taha Hussein and television presenter Tamer Amin, not only symbolize a national identity, but also far-reaching stereotypical portrayals of “masculine men.” The non-Egyptian men that respondents mentioned as examples of masculinity highlight some common themes: Clark Gable, Charles Bronson, Hugh Jackman and Javier Bardem. It seems clear that these names correspond with the listed traits; muscles, moustaches, sometimes beards, and always somewhat “rugged.” These stereotypical qualities could be related to Richard Dyer’s (2002) argument that the most important function of stereotypes is to construct and maintain clear boundaries, in this case gender boundaries. These gender boundaries, however, do not only separate men from women, but also men from other men. When there is a clearly promoted “successful way of being a man,” there is, of course, subordinated and marginalized ways as well. What is important to understand about this is that while a majority of Egyptian men are not necessarily muscly, mustachioed or generally Nasser or Abaza-like, these qualities and these men represent an ideal, which is upheld in society at large and promotes a structure from which most men benefit (cf. Connell, 2005). What these interviews have found is that, while this type of masculinity is idealized, respondents commonly explain the meaning of masculinity as the lack of what is *not* considered masculine. Not having long hair, not wearing make-up, not wearing pink, not dressing in shorts, etc. can hardly be seen as ideals, but quite possibly everyday practices and performances that constitute “common” masculinity.

Much of the answers on what masculinity entails implies heterosexuality: Providing for a family, protecting women, procreation –

it all points to a heteronormative understanding of masculinity. Non-heterosexual practices and identification is only referred to as victims of normative masculine ideals or its hegemony. For example, some respondents spoke of gay-identified men in the discourse of the famously homophobic television presenter Tamer Amin as a way for Amin to reassure his viewers of his own masculinity and/or sexuality. This is somewhat similar what Pascoe (2007) found studying high school boys in America: "Boys lay claim to masculine identities by lobbing homophobic epithets at one another. They also assert masculine selves by engaging in heterosexist discussions of girls' bodies and their own sexual experiences" (p. 5). Engaging in heterosexist discussion may also appear as a favorite pastime of Tamer Amin who, apart from the accusations of homophobia, has also been criticized for blaming sexual harassment on the victims. The expectation of heterosexuality, its connection to masculinity, and the reiteration of straightness by male respondents may very well be correlated to the fact that non-heterosexual practices and identities are incredibly stigmatized in Egyptian society. In a study by Pew Research Center (2014), as many as 95% of Egyptians stated that they do not think homosexuality should be accepted. What may be even more telling is that this number has made some LGBTs glad, saying "5% is more than expected!"

Men's harassment of women is a hot topic in Egypt, and was brought up to discussion by most respondents. Rizzo (2014) writes that harassment can be seen as a backlash towards increased female participation in the public sphere, and an attempt to uphold male ownership of public spaces through marginalization of women in those spaces. Harassment is still, by men and women alike, often blamed on the victims themselves, and especially women's appearance is blamed. In a study sponsored by UN Women, more than a third of victims of harassment claimed that women have themselves to blame. 72.6% of perpetrators claimed the reason for them harassing is that the woman was not decent in her appearance, while 75.7% of victims reported wearing conservative clothing and no make-up (El Deeb, 2013). This suggests that the idea of female decency is more important than how

they really dress, and that men are often perceived as responsible for enforcing the dress code. The protective brother is, of course, constructed in relation to the street thugs who would take first chance to punish a woman for her appearance, even if it is more about power than actual appearance. Thus, the brother's power and ability to control is confirmed while the sister's agency is taken away, and the "proper" masculinity is constructed in relation to the *baltagy*, or the "problematic" masculinity.

### Aggression, Violence and Military

Some of the so far mentioned responses have related to aggression. When spoken of, this was often related to sex, with sexual harassment, of course, being a topic many relates to violence as well as aggression and masculinity.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, the fact that military men are very commonly named as "exemplarily masculine" shows that certain idealized masculinities are indeed connected to aggression. The military, one respondent said, is viewed as "the factory of men:"

If I'm gonna trace how manhood, or how masculinity, is produced, I would refer automatically to the practices of training soldiers in the army. One funny exercise is [that] they have to sing a song. And this song is very degrading... you know, degrading from an army point of view, like when you pretend to be a female; this is degrading from the military point of view. So you have to sing a song, like one of the rights of passage to be graduated from the military is to sing a song, saying how feminine you are. So it's very funny because the ritual involves, like in order to be able to be a man, you have to prove how female you are, which is very paradoxical. It feels like it's [...] crushing the man in you, in order to construct the bigger man, which is the army.

Another respondent lamented the fact that many mothers in Egypt want their sons to go to the military, “to make a man out of him,” and that there is a pride in the army and an idealization of military masculinity that is not just upheld by men. The problem, according to this respondent, is that militarism relates not only to state violence, but also to violence against women, especially in the light of femininity being considered something degrading:

If they are taught that the feminine is the lesser human body, or lesser person, then, you know, that certainly contributes to the fact that they are not respecting women on the street. Because they’re told, you know; that women are trash.

Connell (2005) writes that “[v]iolence on the largest possible scale is the purpose of the military; and no arena has been more important for the definition of hegemonic masculinity in European/American culture” (p. 213). Given the many respondents who focus on the military as a masculine project, as a source of harassment and violence against women, it is possible to argue for the same being true in Egypt. In fact, this could be said to be the single most notable finding; that military men (particularly military leaders) are constantly named as the most exemplary men, and that the military at large is seen as a prime institution for the construction of masculinity. In order to better understand the actual workings of the Egyptian military as a “factory of men”, it would be necessary to do detailed ethnographic study of the military itself, something that could prove challenging. However, what can be drawn from the study at hand is the perception of the military as a masculine institution, and of military performances and pageantry – such as parades and televised military exercises, for example shown in the music video to the pop song “Teslam El Ayadi” – as key areas for performing hegemonic masculinity.

Emma Sinclair-Webb (2006) writes about how the Turkish Armed Forces plays a great part in daily life, often more so than other countries. Interestingly, the Egyptian military seems to, on the one hand, be seen as

rather elusive, or maybe even Kafkaesque, in the sense that its presence is always known but rarely seen in media, “unless it’s 6th of October, the annual thing where they show movies about war,” as one respondent said. At the same time, as another respondent talked about, the Egyptian Armed Forces are involved in many public projects; they own factories and run constructions (cf. Abul-Magd, 2013; Morsy, 2014); and as previously mentioned, they often figure in popular cultural productions (cf. LeVine, 2015; Mostafa, 2017). As such, they could hardly be portrayed as having a small role in society. Sinclair-Webb further writes that in Turkey, as a result of the important every-day role of the army compared to other countries, “the versions of ideal masculinity generated by the army as a primary institutional site of hegemonic masculinity have a more inescapable social and cultural impact on men” (Sinclair-Webb, 2006, p. 69). Again, the same could also be said about Egypt, especially in the light of respondents’ answers about the Egyptian Armed Forces as a “factory of men.” This further strengthens the argument made earlier that the role of the military, as defender of the nation, correlates to the role of the man, as protector of women. Even in times of peace, the soldier as a guardian of the nation “presumably occupies a significant place in the national ‘imaginary’ and established a military version of manhood as inescapable and a marker against which other masculinities get measured” (Sinclair-Webb, 2006, p. 70).

Violence is, of course, seen as a male/masculine practice outside of the military as well. A respondent from Upper Egypt talked about the concept of *al-tār* (التار or الثأر – *al-tha’r* in Modern Standard Arabic), which means “vendetta,” and is sometimes called “blood feuds.” This relates to family and clan fighting, in which when someone from a family is killed, the men of that family meet to decide who will retaliate by killing a man of the other family. This is a vicious circle, usually going on for generations without anyone really knowing how it started, but can according to the respondent be ended when one of the families only have one man left to carry on their name. In order to save the family name, this man will take his burial shroud, called a *kafan* (كفن), and go to the other family, who will then have the opportunity to decide then and

there to kill this man, thus ending the patrilineal legacy of this family. Because of the humiliation involved in offering your own life, the respondent says, “they usually leave him.”

### Key findings

Several common themes emerge in media audiences and media professionals’ personal reflections on what masculinity signifies and how they perceive different performances of masculinity. Most themes are interrelated but often mentioned separately. For example, *heterosexuality* could be explicitly referred to or merely implied, but was invariably an integral part of what is considered “true” or “proper” masculinity. The possibility of affirming one’s masculinity by publicly performing heterosexuality and denouncing alternative sexualities recurs in the answers of the respondents. Related to this “compulsory heterosexuality” is, of course, the *family*, which comes with the expectation of men as *providers* and *protectors*. These expectations also extend, and were related by respondents, to the *nation* and the *military*. In fact, both media professionals and audiences alike heavily associate masculinity and manhood with the military. Participating in military activity was seen as a way of “becoming” a man. Protection and militarism, in turn, were related to ideas of *strength*, *honor*, and *courage*, as well as weakness, shame, and cowardice in relation to men failing to protect women, such as the men called *balṭagy* or *shāz*. Providing on the other spectrum was by a few respondents related to *responsibility* and *honesty*, while both providing and protection were by others related to *control*. Men are almost exclusively seen as *possessors of power*. Indeed, the *father figure*, ultimately represented by the iconized leader (of the nation as well as the military), is viewed as the quintessence of Egyptian masculine identity, thus bringing us back to the (heteronormative) family. Any one of these aspects could be starting points of their own, leading to meanings embedded within them, to be used in research aimed at exploring different aspects of masculinity in Egypt. Most pressing, however, not least because of the return of a military officer to



the presidency, may be the connections between the military, national security narratives and ideal masculinity.

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### **Notes**

1. The respondent commented that Mubarak followed this model early in his presidency, although to a lesser extent than Sadat. Morsi was not mentioned at all, although he too talked about Egypt as his “family and clan.” Mubarak, furthermore, also spoke to the protestors during the 2011 revolution as his “children.” Hafez (2012, p. 39) writes that “In his role as president, Mubarak adopted the father idiom, which was legitimated through the construction of mythical power that reined in chaos to ensure the safety and stability of the masses.”

2. One correlation between aggression and male sexuality may be found in the language. One of the media professionals talked about how the word *yinīk* (بنيك), a vulgar but common word for having sex, relates to penetration. As such, a woman (in most cases) cannot have sex with a man, because it is the man having sex with the woman. This, the respondent means, perpetuates the perceived naturalness of male sexual dominance or even aggression.

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## **'In a Queer Time and Place': Queerolization in *Giovanni's Room* and *Black-Label***

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### **Abstract:**

James Baldwin and Léon Damas have never been compared in terms of their representation of exile and uprootedness in the capital of France. More than the geographical and material distance from their respective native countries, which in fact they have left with a certain disgust, there is the constant discomfort of engaging with the Other (the same sex individual or the other ethnic different sex partner). Both writers have therefore been pioneers in the description of a double impasse and a double line to cross: as black subjects in a white dominated world, and as men who felt also attracted to same sex-partners. While Damas was not (at least not outing his gayness as Baldwin has done) queer, he addresses in *Black-Label* (1956) many of the same anxieties as those in *Giovanni's Room* (1956) and they are related to performing black masculinity in a white dominant heterosexual racist society (Gyssels 2010).

**Keywords:** gender bias, racial and sexual ambiguity, queer, racism, colonialism, creolisation, black diaspora, négritude poetry, African American post-Restoration novel, French Guiana (Guyane) and Antilles

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## **Kuir Bir Zamanda ve Mekanda: *Giovanni'nin Odası* nda ve *Kara Etiket* te Kuirleşme**

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### **Özet:**

Baldwin ve Léon Damas'ın eserleri, Fransa'nın başkentinden sürgün ve yerinden edilmenin temsili bakımından daha önce hiç karşılaştırılmadı. Aslında keskin bir tiksintiyle terkettikleri şahsi anatavatanlarının coğrafi ve cismani uzaklığından ziyade, onlarda Öteki ( hemcins birey veya öteki etnik farklı seks partneri) ile ilgilenmenin sürekli rahatsızlığı bulunmaktadır. İki yazar da beyaz egemenliği altındaki siyahi özneler olarak ve aynı cinsle ilgi duyan erkekler olarak, iki çıkmazın ve kesişen iki çizginin anlamlandırılmasında öncülük etmişlerdir: Damas kuir olmamasına rağmen (en azından Baldwin kadar geyliğini dışa vurmamasına rağmen) o *Kara Etiket*'te *Giovanni'nin Odası*'ndaki çoğu kaygıya gönderme yapmıştır ve bu kaygılar, siyahi erilliğin beyaz egemen heteroseksüel ırkçı toplumdaki rolüne ilişkin olmuştur

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** cinsiyet önyargısı, ırkçı ve cinsel anlaşmazlık, kuir, ırkçılık, kolonileşme, melezleşme, siyah diaspora, siyahi şiir, Siyahilerde fakirlik, Afrikan Amerikan Post-Restorasyon dönemi romanı, Fransız Guyanası ve Antiller.

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The cowardice of this time and place – this era – is nowhere more clearly revealed than in the perpetual attempt to make the public and social disaster the result, or the issue of a single demented creature, or perhaps, half a dozen such creatures, who have, quite incomprehensibly, gone of their rockers and must be murdered and locked up. (James Baldwin quoted in Halberstam, 2005, p. 45)

[The sailor] seemed – somehow – younger than I had ever been, and blonder and more beautiful, and he wore his masculinity as unequivocally as he wore his skin. He made me think of home – perhaps home is not a place but simply an irrevocable condition. (Baldwin, 1977, p. 70)

### Queerolizing Europe

This article revisits Léon-G. Damas' collection of poetry *Black-Label*, published more than half a century ago, in 1956, the year the first Congress of Black Writers took place (in his absence) in the Sorbonne. In that exact same year, the African American author James Baldwin published his second book, *Giovanni's Room*, an “all-white novel” in which he came out of the closet: through his protagonist, the homosexual black male was confessing his “double otherness”, transgressing racial, linguistic, nationalist and gender-related boundaries. In her seminal work *In a Queer Time and Place*, Judith Halberstam defines “queer subjects” as those who “live (deliberately, accidentally, or of necessity) during the hours when others sleep and in the spaces (physical, metaphysical, and economic) that others have abandoned” (Halberstam, 2005, p. 10). This description matches both *Black-Label*, in which the poet repeatedly wanders through the streets of Paris at night and feels lonely, uprooted, and suffocated, and Baldwin's narrator David in *Giovanni's Room*. Both protagonists are liminal characters who feel diminished, oppressed, and compressed by the verticality of the city's towers. Their feeling of displacement is triggered

by their mutual awareness of being “in between”. In Léon Damas’ case, a constant duality weighs on him, felt from his childhood on to his adulthood, due to his education and “assimilation”. The institutions have imprinted on his mind a “double consciousness” (W. E. B. DuBois, [1903] 1994), which also has repercussions on the performance of gender as yet another obstacle in addition to color prejudice in a society dominated by white men. Damas alludes to this as a “double impasse” and prays for forgiveness in an ironic passage faking devotion: “and why should we bear a grudge to THOSE one of whom I am / and God be blessed / GOD BE BLESSED / It’s enough for me / to have two feet” (*Black-Label* 1956<sup>1</sup>, p. 79). While claiming “normality” (two feet), he assumes on the other hand to be “other”, “different”, and therefore a “sinner” in the eyes of the white, heterosexual dominant wo/man.

I analyze both works of fiction to make a twofold argument: first, Damas has remained in the shadow of the other cofounders of *négritude*, especially in the year 2006, when Léopold Sédar Senghor was celebrated through a series of conferences and publications. Similarly, the canonization of Aimé Césaire has taken mythical proportions as soon as he died in 2008. Yet, Senghor did not tackle Anne McClintock’s “triangle” of “race, sex, class”, as she has shown in her seminal essay *Imperial Leather, Race, Class and Gender in a Colonial Contest* (1995). Moreover, that very same Senghor has called Damas an easy poet (Senghor, 1948, p. 5 and Senghor, 1979), a judgment that has subsequently been picked up by Edouard Glissant (who barely deals with Damas’ poetry, while he remains the second French-Caribbean cofounder of the *négritude*-movement) as well as by the *créolistes* (Gyssels, 2014a, n.p.). In contrast to the opinions of his fellow writers, I believe that his poetry resists easy interpretation and that there are many silences and gaps that ask for interpretation: those “slippages” or “knots” concern several taboos, such as interracial sex and homoerotic desire (Reid-Pharr, 1996, pp. 372-394).

Ahead of his time, Damas believed in a Creole Europe in which different sexualities and performances of Black male/femalehood could be envisioned. It had to be a “Queer Europe” as well, a democratic and



multicultural world in which various “differences” would be accepted by the Republic of France. Its slogan “Liberty, equality, fraternity” nevertheless did not translate into reality in the late seventies of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, so at least Damas did not see it come into fruition. Damas not only understood créole/ Créole as the result of physical *métissage*, but also of a *third space*<sup>2</sup> in the gender-politic and the attitudes towards male and female. French Caribbeans, or any individuals coming from the colonies for that matter, experienced a strange “intrusion” upon their arrival in France, which transfigured both their mental and physical state. Living in a kind of “interstice”, those individuals could not easily connect with the Other, both in terms of ethnicity or gender. The black or colored man had a hard time capturing the attention of the white female (*Pigment’s* second poem, “Captation”, brilliantly illustrates this), and the small supply of women of color automatically drove men to develop strong bonds of male friendship which were not entirely devoid of homosexual desire (see the Harlem Renaissance poets, Langston Hughes and Claude McKay, two of Damas’s “Idols”). The loosening of gender roles, however, was a utopian belief, “a Dream Deferrd” (to speak with Hughes), though it was shared precisely by those *métis* like the African American Baldwin and the Afro-Guyanese “son of three rivers”<sup>3</sup> Damas (Damas, 1956; “sang-mêlé des TROIS FLEUVES”, declaring that he is of mixed-blood, tagged in caps in “Si depuis peu” (*Névralgies* 1972, p. 122)). Both authors considered Europe a better place to defend (and in the case of Baldwin, to affirm) these “differences” and to have their *queerness*, in combination with their *creoleness*, both sharing a mixed origin which, to a certain degree, is undecipherable (Gyssels, 2007a; Gyssels, 2008 and 2010) accepted. In this article, I want to take a closer look at two forerunners in the large immigration wave to France in the nineteen fifties, when a small number of individuals of color settled in the “city of light”, France’s capital. In spite of France’s strong reputation in terms of hospitality and freedom, of being a non-segregated society, those expats perceived their difference, and hence their invisibility in Europe’s capitals, not only in terms of skin color but also in terms of the performance of their sexual identity. Given the racist undertones of their

adoptive countries<sup>4</sup> and the open discrimination, black males developed what was considered a different pattern of masculine behavior. Eventually it turned out to “deviate” from the overall white (and bourgeois) dominant society, in which gender roles were still firmly encoded and profoundly rooted in the collective mind.

The following analysis will focus on the relation between (controlled, even compressed (“*désirs comprimés*”)) sexuality and migration in the autofictions of Léon Damas and James Baldwin, two exiled blacks in Paris, two nomadic subjects (Braidotti, 1994) who struggle with the double, even triple consciousness of being in the margins. They wrote their respective “confessionals” about Paris’ and their solitude, their isolation and their resistance to the marginalisation in parallel ways. Specifically, their attempts to be “accepted” and understood in their mixed feelings about black masculinity echo each other. Both argue that to be fully creolized implies accepting and assuming one’s gender and sexuality.

### **Complexion in *Black-Label*: The Slippage of “Creole”**

Connections between gender and race in *négritude*-poetry have received little scholarly attention (except for Heidi Kalikoff, who re-examines Césaire’s *Cahier* in that respect (Kalikoff, 2009)). In his third collection, *Black-Label*, the French-Guyanese poet Damas uses “Creole” in various ways. The shifts in signification already show a willingness to imbue the word with more than just its general meaning of “individual from European descent born in the West Indies” or “originating from the Caribbean, born in the French Antilles” (Gyssels, 2007a, pp. 131-135). Damas uses “creole” in its first signification (“*mon enfance créole*”) or to speak in his mother tongue, the Creole of French Guyana (“*prier en créole*”). It is quite surprising that Damas’ most famous poem “Hoquet” illustrates what childhood for a child of mixed “race” means. Yet while one could expect the word “Creole” to crop up in this context, it is censurized by the authoritative mother who forbids the child to speak it:

Did I or did I not tell you that you must speak French  
 the French of France  
 the French of the French  
 the French French  
 Disaster  
 tell me about the disaster  
 tell me about it  
 (...)

No sir  
 you must learn that we do not allow in our home  
 neither ban  
 nor jo  
 nor gui  
 nor tar  
 the *mulattos* do not do that  
 leave **it** to the *negres* (Lillehei, 2011, n.p. bold added)

The pronoun “it” (“ça”) at the end of the poem concludes that both talking and behaving “Creole” (without making explicit what this means) are blocked out, erased. In *Névralgies* (1966), the last collection of poems he would publish during his life, he has included this stanza:

And God may preserve us  
 From any libidinous temptation  
 Even *Creole* (“Foi de marron”, Damas, 1972, p. 101; italics mine)<sup>5</sup>

Reminiscing on his years in his native Guyana, Damas repeatedly uses the word “disaster” in his most famous poem “Hoquet”, a title referring to oppressed language, to the suffocation of the voice, or the obstruction of the larynx due to the severe restrictions dictated by a matrifocal substitute mother (Burton, 1990, pp. 14-27). His “Creole infancy” or colonial education is suffocating because he learns all about color prejudice and the prohibition against flirting or fantasizing about interracial love.

As the subsequent passage from *Black-Label* shows, Damas already hints at the association between speaking/praying in Creole and

being very submissive to the authorities who rule the country and the church. The word “Creole” occurs at the very end of the first Movement, in the following context:

PAST CENTURIES SAW  
 and centuries to come will see  
 with each Dusk  
 on the haunted cotton tree  
 initiated blackbirds  
 that come to pray  
 without gloves or mitaines  
 pray on their knees  
 pray with a rhythm  
 pray in creole

*PIÈ PIÈ PIÈ*  
*priè Bondjé*  
*mon fi*  
*priè Bondjé*  
*Angou ka bouyi*  
*Angou ké bouyi* (Damas, 1956, p. 32; italics in original)

Quite rapidly, the poet switches to ambivalent meanings in order to express his mixed feelings about what it means to be black and male, in other words, to connote black masculinity as a highly problematic terrain, a “marasm” or “mangrove”. More precisely, the poet aims at relationships which are cursed because of pigmentation (being colored) which gradually also refers to a repressed masculinity. “Creole” points to the need and willingness to love and to be loved beyond color differences and beyond rigid boundaries of male/female, and consequently to the heartbroken individual whose relationships are repeatedly forbidden or interrupted because of “color prejudice”:

Beware of that kind of love that does not dare to say to itself

I'm love, end of question.

And because I am love, end of question, the  
Doubt is there, and the pain without remedy

It seems that Love has been impossible  
In the Islands of Creole lights and shadows  
Where one always says "SI" instead of "YES"

(...)

Where one says often *t'chup*

Never Love reminds herself

In these Islands of Creole lights and shadows (Damas, 1956, p. 42)

In the above passage, in the middle of Movement II, "Creole" again loses its literal, linguistic meaning ("prier en créole" and answering "si" instead of the normative standard French "yes" for every question that requires a positive answer) as well as its reference to geographic origin and location ("aux Iles de lumière et d'ombre créoles"). Instead, it shifts to a psychological sense in which the real affirmation of one's feelings is either repressed ("Never Love reminds herself") or betrayed.

"Creole" suggests a heightened awareness of the incapacity to obtain this freedom in a context of exile, diaspora and segregation, albeit legally prohibited as in the French Republic. In Baldwin's words, in the quote above, it is all about the capacity and freedom to wear his masculinity as unequivocally and freely as the color of his skin.

As an individual of color born in the Caribbean, Damas "transvests" Creoleness not only as a borrowed "cultural identity" through the politics of assimilation imposed by the French mother country, but also as a controlled, comprised passion. His motif all over the third Movement of *Black-Label*, namely "Désirs comprimés d'un bel enfant de chœur", underscores the ways in which the colonial society back home (Cayenne) as well as in the "mère-patrie" (Paris) make

childhood a traumatizing apprenticeship of many forbidden “sins” and many dreadful tasks. The French-Guyanese intellectuals feel the oppression of the color prejudice imposed by both whites (Creoles) and the *élite de couleur* all their life. Colonial mimicry (a term Bhabha actually borrowed from Frantz Fanon’s “mimétisme” or “lactification”) estranges the Self not only in reformatting the mind, but also in whitening the body, as it were. *Creoleness* happened to be associated with unbridled and dangerous love, which would stand in the way of a full acceptance by the French and a successful integration in the French society. Hence this warning in the third Movement, where “Creole” gains a sexual connotation:

you told me about yourself  
 about your convalescence marked by doubts and anxiety  
 of your senses closed to the reality  
 of your infirmity to enjoy  
 enjoy with intensity  
 of all those tiny little things which make up  
 a soul *euphemistically Creole* (Damas, 1956, italics mine)

In this particularly elliptic sequence of *Black-Label* in which the poet deliberately leaves gaps (Sommer, 1994, pp. 528-542 and 1999) that give the reader a feeling of “incompetence”, the term “Creole” appears one last time. Significantly, it does so in the very last Movement of *Black-Label*. This time, in a fake prayer, the poet laments the loss of a loved one, a triangle of women (or men?) in the moonlight. As if to exorcize his bad luck in love, as if to transcend the state of “Limbé” (the Baudelairian “spleen” as well as the Caribbean “limbo”), the poet plays/performs the typical “coup de dés”, both in an intertextual hint to Stéphane Mallarmé (*Un coup de dés*) and to the popular Afro-Caribbean game of playing domino: not only is this a typically male, even macho game<sup>6</sup>, playing dominoes also often happens in a kind of male competition over women. Trying to overcome his own remorse and his own spitefulness, he prays now just for some tenderness and reciprocal love, unlimited and boundless love, as essential as the daily bread one eats to survive and to cure his “blues”. Evocative of sickness and discomfort, he uses a prayer

to simulate the permission to obtain the kind of rare love, of forbidden affection without restrictions. As a matter of fact, he attracts bad luck this time and refuses to surrender to some superstitious ritual to play “pile ou face” (heads or tails) to find out if the Other loves him truly:

I ask God (...) that he might give each of us  
 so little of the daily bread  
*of love en pile in the Creole way,*  
 never heads or tail  
 always heads or tale  
 and heads or tale  
 and heads or tail and heads or tail and heads or tail

*repiquée la mazurka*<sup>7</sup> (Damas, 1956, p. 81)

Trying to leave a world behind that overflows with energy and joy only in appearance (the mazurka dance, a vivid performance reminiscent of Plantation folklore), Damas shares the unseen stitches (“repiqué”) felt by the dancers.

Music and, more precisely, the blues genre are equally important in James Baldwin’s short story “Sonny’s Blues” (Albert, 1984, pp. 178-185). But it is his second novel that runs parallel to *Black-Label* in terms of creolizing a white, heterosexual, arrogant Paris that sees itself as “Nombriil du Monde” (the navel of the world) (Damas, 1956, p. 53): the protagonist, David, is not “Creole” in terms of origins, since he is a white American spending some years in Paris where he has an affair with Giovanni, an Italian who will be jailed for murdering his white “souteneur”. As I have shown elsewhere (Gyssels, 2010), both in *Black-Label* and *Giovanni’s Room*, Creolization implies the double transgression of racial and gender borders. For both authors, the location of this attempt at transgression is Europe, far away from the narrow-minded and severe racial prejudices of their respective environments, Cayenne and Harlem. Both authors react against the damage caused by the interiorization of black male patterns of behavior, the black man being torn between two opposite role models when it comes to performing

black maleness. Richard Wright, a close friend of both authors, had indeed portrayed the dual scheme. Between the so-called violent black man, Bigger Thomas (in Wright's *Native Son*) and the subaltern, sexless Uncle Tom, there seemed to be less space to aspire to less masculine behavior, a more feminine way of engaging in sexual and intimate relationships. These two models have been firmly imprinted in the minds of black and white readers alike, and both Baldwin and Damas flew to France in the hope of escaping this mentality and the constraints of a particular family structure, determined by centuries of slavery in the Caribbean. The "matrifocal" family, in which black mothers who face the absent father are both mothering and fathering, has been the environment for Baldwin, Damas, and so many other black male writers from the African diaspora.

Yet "overdetermined from outside", overcome by an "unusual clumsiness" (Fanon quoted in Judy, 1996, p. 78) "the lived sexual experience" of the Creole turns out to be bizarre, estranging to the point of "queerness". However delusive Paris turned out to be for the two uprooted black intellectuals, the fictional rendering of their sojourn in the French capital translate this yearning for a blurring of racial and gender boundaries, a constant longing to emancipate from the strict rules governing black masculinity, particularly in the host society where they came to liberate themselves from the burden of color and a stereotyped maleness they could not and would not live up to. This subtle and ambiguous in-between situation of Creoles (coming from the New World, of mixed "blood") and Queerness (explicitly so in Baldwin's case) could be designated by the word "queerolization", a corporeal scheme that problematizes both physical and sexual being in the everyday experience of white Europe ("l'expérience vécue du Noir" passing over the sexual [adventures or affairs]). This is an aspect that has been glossed over in Damas' poetry and that translates, as I will demonstrate, into an acute awareness of otherness when it comes to being close and intimate with the double Other (the white woman). In Baldwin's case, his gayness unsettled fixed boundaries of languages, ethnicity, nationality and sexual preferences even more. So their respective identities were



perceived as bringing trouble or being troublesome in the eyes of the Other, the white man and woman in Europe. They discover quickly that, although France is not a segregated society, the lines between “ethnicities”, “classes”, and gender remain very tenuous up to the late sixties :

Private property  
 Guarded domain  
 no trespassing  
 Dogs and Niggers forbidden on the lawn (Damas, 1972 quoted in Snyder, 1976, pp. 31-43)

In the poem “Toujours tu viendras”, Damas actually draws a line between the two stanzas of the poem, making visual that yearning and dreaming can cross all distances and that the possessed mind (by the lover, by fever, by exile) can overcome all kinds of margins and frontiers (*Névralgies* 1972, p. 127).

### **The Fact of Blackness (Fanon) or the Male Body In/Difference**

**G***iovanni's Room* brilliantly illustrates what Fanon meant when he was talking about “The Lived Experience of the Black Man” (Chapter 3 from Fanon's *Black Skin, White Masks* (1967)), in which also sexual aspects of the exiled condition are described, especially coming from an African American homosexual. Echoing Fanon's “Regarde, maman, un Nègre” (“Look! A Negro!”), David is confronted with several occasions where people stare at him, where Parisians (male and female) pass him by on the sidewalks and gape with instantaneous contempt, envy and even desire. David talks about the look in the eyes of a sailor he once met:

There was a sailor, dressed all in white, coming across the boulevard, walking with that funny roll sailors have and with that aura, hopeful and hard, of having to make a great deal happen in a hurry. (...) [W]e came abreast and, as though he had seen some all-revealing panic in my eyes, he

gave me the look contemptuously lewd and knowing; just such a look as he might have given, (...) to the well-dressed nymphomaniac or trollop who was trying to make him believe she was a lady. (...) I was certain that there would erupt into speech, out of all that light and beauty, some brutal variation of Look, baby. I know you. I felt my face flame, I felt my heart harden and shake (...). (Baldwin, 1977, p. 70)

The “Look, baby, I know you” sounds like a variation on Fanon’s “Look, a Negro”. Both writers recount in detail their efforts to become fully integrated in the French society, to be accepted by the French people, to dress, speak and behave as French citizens. Nevertheless, the Creole individual feels ridiculous and silently hides his shame and his pain. The city of lights displaces and destabilizes foreigners of a darker complexion and with sexual needs that do not fit the dichotomist male/female structure. David interweaves a lot of sociological remarks about French society, which appears to him as quite a stereotyped network of bourgeois and nuclear families. Both writers reveal an uncomfortable feeling regarding the family and founding a “normal” family. France turns out to be a false El Dorado or a “Dream Deferred”, to use Langston Hughes’ words once again. Baldwin’s narrator is upset by people’s awkward reactions during his nightly escapes. They make David feel uncertain, anxious, and *queer*, especially when Giovanni takes him to nightbars kept by female bartenders:

Behind the counter sat one of those absolutely inimitable and indomitable ladies, produced only in the city of Paris, but produced there in great numbers (...). All over Paris they sit behind their counters like a mother bird in a nest and brood over the cash-registers as though it were an egg. (...) [T]hough some are white haired and others not, some fat, some thin, some grandmothers and some but lately virgins, they all have exactly the same, shrewd, vacant, all-registering eye (...). (Baldwin, 1956, pp. 73-74)

These upsetting nightly dwellings strangely echo Damas' wanderings in *Black-Label*, in which the speaker similarly tries to forget his displacement and dislocation, but gets even more uprooted as he discovers that wherever he turns, he remains an outsider. This symbolically comes to David's mind whenever Giovanni calls him an American, which he continues to resent, aware that he is different from all the other Americans he sees around him, the crowds of tourists which appear to him as a same-color and sexless "unit":

At home, I could have distinguished patterns, habits, accents of speech (...). At home, I could have seen the clothes they were wearing, but here I only saw bags, cameras, belts and hats, all, clearly, from the same department store. At home, I would have had some sense of the individual womanhood of the woman I faced: here the most ferociously accomplished seemed to be involved in some ice cold or sun-dried travesty of sex, and even grandmothers seemed to have had no traffic with the flesh. And what distinguished the men was that they seemed incapable of age; they smelled of soap, which seemed indeed to be their preservative against the dangers and exigencies of any more intimate odor; the boy he had been shone somehow, unsoiled, untouched, unchanged through the eyes of the man of sixty (...). I was seeing (...) but a part of the truth and perhaps not even the most important part; beneath these faces, these clothes these accents, rudenesses, was power and sorrow, both unadmitted, unrealized, the power of inventors, the sorrow of the disconnected. (Baldwin, 1977, p. 68)

However big their efforts, both protagonists are wandering through a city rapidly associated with unbelonging, and therefore despair or even death. The impossibility of having stable and enduring relationships dawns on them. High buildings become symbols of dangerous, phallus-like instruments of domination and (s)exploitation: further on in the novel, sex-work is condemned all the more as people of color seem to be

obliged to prostitute themselves in order to survive. Creolization, then, is often synonymous with “chosification” in the white (wo)men’s eyes and implies a progressive “process” of emasculation. In *Another Country*, the towers of the cathedral in Chartres also have the most disturbing and deranging effect on the protagonist, which only confirms its importance in Baldwin’s work (Baldwin, 1984, p. 217). This verticality is opposed to the horizontal “river” crossing the Republic’s capital, which is also linked to suicide and crime. In Baldwin’s novel, “la Seine” is the mythical river Styx:<sup>8</sup>

Look, said Giovanni, as we crossed the river. This old  
whore, Paris, as she turns in bed, is very moving.

I looked out, beyond this heavy profile, which was grey —  
from fatigue and from the light of the sky above us. The  
river was swollen and yellow. Nothing moved on the river.  
(Baldwin, 1956, p. 66)

For Damas, the Seine is the graveyard of newborn babies who are  
thrown away, probably because of their mixed origins:

Watch watch  
Caught from the Seine  
At the very moment of the Seine<sup>9</sup>  
The gentile and beautiful  
The newborn  
Child born out of sin (Damas, 1956, p. 49)

The child born out of prohibited relations between black and white  
sojourns in a “limbo” state and is “evacuated” through the city’s mighty  
river: the poet translates his disgust of their “civilization”, a nice word that  
he will break into pieces:

I feel ridiculous  
among them accomplice  
among them pimp  
among them cut-throat  
hands frightfully red

with the blood of their ci-vi-li-za-tion (Lillehei<sup>10</sup>, 2010, n.p.)

Echoing the first poem analyzed here, “Contre notre amour”, *Black-Label* once again insists on Creolization as race-mixing, which the majority of the French population therefore perceives as sinful and blamable, as morally despicable. Creolization and thus *métissage* as the result of love between people of different color seem to traumatize Damas. However, both protagonists’ efforts at integration remain in vain. The closeness and intimacy in *Black-Label* and *Giovanni’s Room* show that in the underground subculture of Paris, there unquestionably were “contacts” with the Other. In Baldwin’s “all-white novel”, the affair between the Italian beauty Giovanni and the American David is upsetting for the latter, who fights against his giant, ghostly monster, Goliath: the queerness and homosexuality that he has repressed for years. His lover Giovanni blames David for terminating their affair out of cowardice and weakness. He reproaches him for his inability to “give himself totally”, a rebuke which echoes Damas’ warning quoted above:

You will never give it to anybody, you will never let anybody touch it – man or woman. You want to be *clean*. (...) [Y]ou do not want to **stink**, not even for five minutes (...). (Baldwin, 1956, pp. 206-207; italics in original, bold added)

Again, the violating type of love that both artists seem to instil through their characters is linked to impurity, to insanity, even to physical and mental reactions that push the Other further and further away. Overcome by loss and loneliness, the poet and the American exile seek refuge in their maiden’s rooms during the day and come out at night, when they find soulmates and friends equally “queer”. *Giovanni’s Room* includes several night scenes during which the lonely strangers escape to find some solace from the daily humiliations and despise. However unpleasant the reactions by white people, for whom blackness/*négritude* has become associated with bad manners, lack of hygiene, and perspiration<sup>11</sup>, both poet and author continue to struggle for a change in race/gender relations.<sup>12</sup> A conversation with Jacques, another gay man who questions David’s love affair with Giovanni, is particularly revealing:

(...) [I]f you think of them as dirty, then they *will* be dirty (...).

You will end up trapped in your own dirty body, forever and forever and forever – like me. (Baldwin, 1956, pp. 83-84)

Baldwin's narrator, the white American David or the author's fictional double, experiences his forbidden love for Giovanni. Later, Giovanni's murder in self-defence against sexual harassment is seen as scandalous, a love that shakes the very foundations of the French republic:

It was a terrific scandal, if you were in Paris at the time you certainly heard of it, and saw the picture printed in all the newspapers, of Giovanni, just after he was captured. (...)

Such a scandal always threatens, before its reverberations cease, to rock the very foundations of the state. (Baldwin, 1956, pp. 218-219)

The idea of scandal addressed in both texts concerns this *queerolization*, the intimacy between individuals of different color, or even of the same sex. The condemnation of that kind of relationship is bound to have traumatized the two authors. They were under the threat of being considered decadent as "Creoles" and ambiguous in terms of gender. In "Limbé", Damas deals with a sexual encounter between a black man and a white woman (Damas, 1972, pp. 43-45). In spite of the many comments upon this famous poem, the theme of "forbidden sexuality with the Other" (the white woman in Paris) has been glossed over. However, the poet talks about prostitutes as "Marchands d'amour", a masculine epithet for a female profession, and about the feeling of total disgust and loss by the supposedly Creole man. To summarize, this contact with pale-faced women ("blèmes", which he uses often: "dépit blème") leads to another "disaster". Sex with the Other completely diminishes, even infantilizes the adult black man. Reclaiming his toys, his "Rose of Cayenne", the poet gives rise to the extreme distance between the sexes, the cultures (the European decadence in which women have to sell their bodies) and ethnicities. Cross-racial encounters of this kind seem to reinforce the confusion

between typically male and female gender-related issues and performances. A destabilized masculinity pervades “Limbé”, one of Damas’ better-known poems, which too many critics simply reduce to a nostalgic cry for his native Guyana. However, “Limbé” also expresses a third-sex code in the manner of his admired Jamaican friend, Claude McKay, to whom Damas has dedicated *Pigments*. McKay dreamt of a space in private and public spheres where black men could perform a feminine-identified masculinity as expressed in “Limbé”. The Creoleness of the Guyanese poet always stands in the way of interracial alliances which were considered queer at the time. The Paris of the fifties is a world of overt racism, miscegenation, and an aversion to “creolization” as a process of overthrowing boundaries of skin color and of changing fixed identities (including gender norms).

Both Damas’ alter ego in *Black-Label* and David, Baldwin’s similarly fictional double, wander by night in a city that is not at all comforting. Paris is even compared to a prostitute. The “dark nature” comes to the surface again, and David never gets rid of this queerness:

The city, Paris, which I loved so much, was absolutely silent. There seemed to be almost no one on the streets (...). I could almost hear the collective, shivering sigh – were lovers and ruins, sleeping, embracing, coupling, drinking, staring out at the descending night. Behind the walls of the houses I passed, the French nation was clearing away the dishes, putting little Jean Pierre and Marie to bed, scowling over the eternal problems of the sou [*sic*], the shop, the church the *unsteady State*. (Baldwin, 1956, pp. 206-207)

The word “scandal”, common to both texts, points to the impossible and shocking ideal of Creolization brought to the French capital by these immigrants of dark(er) complexion.

In words that echo Fanon’s *Black Skin, White Masks*, Damas evokes the feeling of being reduced to a poor thing when his desire is mocked by Ketty. The poet seems to be torn between Ketty and Sicy-la-Chabine. The first seduces him in his “chambre de bonne”, the room where the female servants used to sleep, but then refuses to have sex with him:

And my ugly desire  
 A poor poor dead thing (...)  
 NEVER EVER WITH YOU (Damas, 1956, p. 46)<sup>13</sup>

The rejection by the blonde is the SCANDAL<sup>14</sup> in his own life; the word referring to untranslatable and forbidden interracial relationships. *Giovanni's Room* equally scandalized Richard Wright and many other African American readers and critics alike. The fear of Creolization in the Parisian circles and the night life of these two lonely dwellers are described through intimate narratives which offer a sound picture of how these post-colonial subjects discovered France's capital. For David, it is his homosexual affair with Giovanni that will definitely cause his depression and feelings of guilt when his lover commits a crime.

### Trans-Caribbean and Trans-Gender

While both Baldwin and Damas had a soul which was “euphemistically Creole”, fifty years later, African Americans, Africans and Caribbeans are no longer a manifest and visible minority in the streets of Paris. Members of the second and third generations of immigrants regard Paris as their “native city” and protest loudly against what they perceive as racial prejudice and rampant discrimination by the authorities. Fifty years after the foundation of *Présence Africaine*, fifty years after the first Congress of Black Artists was launched at the Sorbonne, the African Damas imbued “Creole” with a new meaning, crossing the last line. Struggling against the prejudices against his “race”, he also fought lines of another nature. Baldwin, for his part, delivered with his autobiographic circumfession, an “outing novel”. Both *Black-Label* and *Giovanni's Room* are symbolically set in an attic: poor lodgings and depressive housing were the curse for many uprooted single men originating from the colonies (West Indies, Africa). Léon Damas and James Baldwin ruminated in their attics on what it means to be “colored black” and enclosed in a “male” or masculinist “jacket”: they call for a revision of “Creole” as the utopian wish for blurring the boundaries between opposites such as gender, class, and color. The fact



that Minister of Justice Christiane Taubira quoted *Black-Label* and “Grand comme un besoin de changer d’air” (Damas, 1972, p. 87) in her defense of gay marriage proves that she “filled the gaps” in Damas’ elliptic poetry. She understood like nobody else how much this close friend of Langston Hughes and Claude McKay (but also launched by André Gide) was ahead of his time and transgressed all the lines that separate individuals, be they distinct in terms of “class”, “race”, or “gender”, both in his own society and in the Caribbean archipelago as a whole, notorious for its general denial of homosexuality, as well as the stigmatization in the “mère-patrie” (Mariott, 2006, pp. 161-169). To conclude with one last “stanza” that Damas kept on rewriting from *Névalgies* (Damas, 1972, pp. 108-109) to the recently published *Mine de riens*<sup>15</sup>:

Against our love  
Which dreamed of living in a free space  
Which dreamed of living its own life  
Of living a live  
Which would be  
Neither shameful  
Nor leprous  
Nor faked  
nor portioned  
nor haunted (Damas, 1956, p. 106)

<sup>1</sup> A translation of *Black-Label*, blocked from editing by the ayant droit Marcel Bibas exists thanks to the collaborative project with Femi Ojo-Ade, Christine Pagnouille, and myself. I quote from our unofficial translation. Gyssels, Kathleen, Christine Pagnouille. «The Négraille's Testament : Translating *Black-Label*», in *Intimate Enemies. Translation in Francophone Contexts*. Kathryn Batchelor and Claire Bisdorff, eds. Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2013, pp. 124-140.

<sup>2</sup> Whereas Homi K. Bhabha hardly addresses the third space in sexualized or gendered terms, McClintock and Halberstam interrogate the fatal attraction between individuals from the same sex but from different ethnicities in a context of colonization. In *Imperial Leather*, male homosexuality proves to be an important, yet taboo terrain in each of the European empires. (McClintock, 1995)

<sup>2</sup> Hereby Damas claims his Amerindian roots (Gyssels, 2009).

<sup>3</sup> Hereby Damas claims his Amerindian roots (Gyssels, 2009).

<sup>4</sup> In this respect, one should notice that Baldwin spent considerable time in Istanbul as an expatriate, although his prolonged stays and eventual residency was in Paris. See Fortuny, 2010; Zaborowska, 2008.

<sup>5</sup> All translations are by Kathleen Gyssels and Christine Pagnouille, with the help of Femi Ojo-Ade.

<sup>6</sup> See for instance Frank Martinus Arion, *Dubbelspel*, 1973 (new edition and English translation *Double Play*, London: Faber and Faber, 1989), in which four men play dominoes every Sunday at the home of one of them. The novel tells the story of one of these games, a game which is historic and very eventful for all of the men. (<http://www.doubleplaythemovie.nl/popup.html>)

<sup>7</sup> See for instance Frank Martinus Arion, *Dubbelspel*, 1973 (new edition and English translation *Double Play*, London: Faber and Faber, 1989), in which four men play dominoes every Sunday at the home of one of them. The novel tells the story of one of these games, a game which is historic and very eventful for all of the men. (<http://www.doubleplaythemovie.nl/popup.html>)

<sup>8</sup> David tries to forget Giovanni by making love to an American girl in Paris. After having slept with Sue, he wants to bring himself back to normal life: "I wanted to have babies". Yet then he quickly thinks about suicide by throwing himself in the river: "And this was perhaps the first time death occurred to me as a reality. I

thought of the people before me who had looked down at the river and gone to sleep beneath it. I wondered about them. I wondered how they had done it – it, the physical act.” (Baldwin, 1956, p. 150) The river is said to be crying like a wounded beast in *Black-Label*: “(des) cris de bête blessée dont s’inquiétait la Seine bien malgré elle/malgré la mansarde/malgré la neige en plein dans la mansarde/ (...) malgré le téléphone arme blanche” (Damas, 1956, p. 44).

<sup>9</sup> Pronounced as “scène”, Damas plays at the confusion between the words (Seine/scène), again hinting at the various “scandals” caused by the intrusion of “creole” or “queer” individuals into the white, generally bourgeois milieux of the city. Like Baldwin, he claims that those incidents and faits-divers (which he repeatedly parodies in his poems, see for instance *Mine de riens*, a posthumous collection which came out in 2012 under another title (*Dernière escale*, Paris: Le Regard du Texte, 2012, by Marcel Bibas and Sandrine Poujols). In “A la rubrique des chiens crevés”, or “Sauvage-de-bon-sens”), these kinds of “social and public disorders” rock the very foundations of a country preoccupied with maintaining order and “purity”, with controlling its unwanted intruders, and which institutionalizes marginalization based on color, religion, origin, even language and non-normative gender identities.

<sup>10</sup> I refer to the bilingual online version of an unpublished MA thesis by Alexandra Lillehei, submitted to Wesleyan College (April 2011): [https://wescholar.wesleyan.edu/etd\\_hon\\_theses/706/](https://wescholar.wesleyan.edu/etd_hon_theses/706/)

<sup>11</sup> Bodily reactions are indicative of his uncomfortable situation and “malaise”: “mains moites” (“sweaty hands”) and “orteils qui exhalent la chaleur du morne” (“sweaty toes”) are some of the symptoms that repeat themselves all over the poem. In both texts the irresolvable attraction to the other is jeopardized by strong stereotypes of colour, impurity, lack of bodily hygiene, to the point of stinking. In “De la profuse et diffuse odeur fauve” (*Mine de riens / Dernière escale*, posthumous collection, 2012, pp. 113-118), Damas points to the denigrating representation of Creoles and blacks alike as disgusting, repulsive because of their bodily odour. If the love the poet aspires to is impossible in his native land, his quest in Europe is even further jeopardized by strong restrictions and taboos.

<sup>12</sup> Previous affairs with friends from the same sex are suddenly remembered as the narrator, David, falls in love with Giovanni. It turns out that David accepted the latter’s offer to sleep at his place because he has been sent out of his room.

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David remembers how beautiful Joey's body was: "*brown, (...) sweaty, the most beautiful creation I had ever seen till then.*" (Baldwin, 1956, p. 11) The homosexual affair is described as having opened a "cavern" in which the narrator has fallen: "A cavern opened in my mind, black, full of rumor, suggestion, of half-heard, half-forgotten, half-understood stories, full of dirty words. I could have cried, cried for shame and terror, cried for not understanding how this could have happened to me, how this could have happened *in me.*" (Baldwin, 1956, pp. 12-13)

<sup>13</sup> It is after this deception that the poet evokes "la mazurka créole" (Baldwin, 1956, p. 49) together with other dances and rhythms to cure his sadness in the "Cabane Cubaine", a Parisian club famous for its Afro-Caribbean public and music, a gateway to queerolisation as the bar allowed both white and black audiences and non-heteronormative relations in the intimate atmosphere of the obscure dance club. See also Claude McKay's portrayal of Marseille and its nightclubs gathering African, Caribbean, and European single men often in search of tenderness and love.

<sup>14</sup> In English and in another font in the original Gallimard edition, 1956, p. 46.

<sup>15</sup> *Mine de riens*, posted by Damas' Martinican friend in Washington D.C., Christian Filostrat.

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**RESEARCH-in-PROGRESS**

# **Muscles, Moustaches and Machismo: Narratives of Masculinity by Egyptian English-Language Media Professionals and Media Audiences**

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## **Abstract:**

This study utilizes ethnographic methods to inquire how ideas of masculinities are perceived by English-language media professionals and media audiences in Egypt. Using semi-structured interviews and a survey, the aim is to find common narratives on how masculinity is perceived on personal levels and what terms are used to describe men and masculinities, which in turn can be used as the basis for further analysis of Egyptian media content. The word “narrative” in itself is used to convey personal experience, and the telling of those experiences, rather than generalizable data applicable to the larger population. Found are several common themes, such as emphasized heterosexuality, and the expectation of men as providers and protectors, which is related, by the respondents, to the nation and the military. Protection and militarism relates to ideas of strength, honor, and courage. Men are almost exclusively seen as possessors of power. The ‘head of the household,’ and the head of state, both portrayed as iconized leaders, emerge as the quintessence of Egyptian masculine identity, whether that identity is contested or not.

**Keywords:** masculinities; media; audiences; Egypt; identity; gender expression.

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## Kaslar, Bıyıklar ve Maçızım: Mısırlı İngilizce Konuşan Medya Profesyonellerinin ve Medya İzleyicilerinin Erkeklik Anlatıları

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### Özet:

Bu çalışma erkekliklerle ilgili görüşlerin, Mısır'da İngilizce konuşan medya profesyonelleri ve medya izleyicileri tarafından nasıl algılandığını incelemek için etnografik metotlardan faydalanır. Amaç, yarı-yapılandırılmış mülakatlar ve anketler aracılığıyla, erkekliğin kişisel düzeylerde nasıl algılandığı ve erkekler ile erkeklikleri betimlemek için hangi terimlerin kullanıldığı ile ilgili ortak anlatıları ortaya çıkarmaktır; ki bu ortak anlatılar Mısır medyası içerikleri ile ilgili daha sonra yapılacak analizlere temel teşkil edebilir. "Anlatı" kelimesi, geniş toplum için geçerliliği olan, genellenebilecek verilerden ziyade, bizzat kişisel deneyimleri ve bu deneyimlerin anlatılmasını ifade etmek için kullanılır. Bulgular, vurgulanmış heteroseksüellik ve görüşmeciler tarafından ulus ve askeriye ile ilişkilendirilen erkeklerden geçim sağlayıcılık ve korumacılık beklentileri gibi birçok ortak temayı içerir. Korumacılık ve militarizm, güç, namus ve cesaret fikirleriyle bağlantılıdır. Erkekler münhasıran erk sahibi olarak görülmektedir. Her ikisi de ikonlaşmış liderlerce sergilenen 'evin reisi' ve devletin başı rolleri Mısırlı erkek kimliğinin - bu kimlik tartışmaya açık olsa da olmasa da - özünü oluşturan özellikler olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** erkeklikler, medya, izleyiciler, Mısır, kimilik, toplumsal cinsiyet ifadesi

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**M**asculinity as a concept and an idea is getting increasingly debated and studied. There are many different ways of approaching it, and, while often described as a new or an emerging field of study, it can be traced back at least half a century, perhaps even as far as Freud and Jung (see Connell, 2005; Kimmel, Hearn and Connell, 2003; Gardiner, 2002; Whitehead, 2002). However, despite many established fields dedicated to the study of men and masculinities, there is a recurring problem, namely how to define masculinity:

The concepts “masculine” and “feminine”, Freud observed in a melancholy footnote, “are among the most confused that occur in science”. In many practical situations the language of “masculine” and “feminine” raises few doubts. We base a great deal of talk and action on this contrast. But the same terms, on logical examination, waver like the Danube mist. They prove remarkably elusive and difficult to define. (Connell, 2005, p. 3)

The problem with some of the approaches taken in previous studies is that it ignores the self-understood masculinity, or the perception of the masculine in terms other than academic. That, however, is the core of this study, to explore everyday narratives of masculinity, what is “maleness” or “manhood,” in the descriptions made both by media professionals, represented herein by journalists, producers, editors and translators working with news production in any way, and by media audiences in an Egyptian context. This is to provide a grounded basis for analyses exploring the construction and representation of masculinities in Egyptian media. Rather than applying an arbitrarily chosen academic definition of masculinity, in-depth interviews can let theories emerge from the material. The focus of this research project is as such not only a preliminary exploration of how masculinity is represented and constructed in Egyptian media, but also to find common themes in the descriptions of men as a category and hierarchies of different descriptions. While the study is still a work-in-progress and the findings are preliminary, what clearly stands out is the high status of the military in terms of male ideals, showing deep entanglement of masculinity and

militarism in the Egyptian context. For example, several respondents refer to the military as a 'factory of men,' and one young man, critical of the military as an institution, laments the fact that many mothers in Egypt want their sons to join the army, 'to make a man out of him.' Former president and military officer Gamal Abdel Nasser is the man most often named as an 'exemplary man' by respondents, his predecessor Anwar Sadat is spoken of as a national father, and the current president and former field marshal Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, too, is described as a representative of 'ideal masculinity,' although in a more suave form than the previous presidents. It is, however, important to note that there are many other examples of masculinities in Egypt, as shown by recent studies that highlight the caring and nurturing man (see Naguib, 2015; Ghannam, 2013; Inhorn, 2012), and that focusing on military masculinities was not an aim of this study, but rather reflects the thoughts and concerns of the respondents. Furthermore, and here I am following the recommendations of Amar (2011), it is crucial that highlighting and challenging militarized masculinity and gendered security politics does not misrecognize and depoliticize social forces. Moving forward with the findings of this study – particularly how media professionals and audiences alike emphasize the military and/or militarism in discussion on men's media representation – it is necessary to ask what role this plays in Egyptian cultural politics under the current regime, while still paying attention to the classed and racialized aspects of military participation and representation, as well as resistance against military institutions. Questions for future studies include whether the same entanglements of masculinity and militarism can be found in Egyptian online press, too. If so, in what ways do the gendered representations of militants, whether military soldiers, terrorists, or jihadists, relate to the state's security narrative? Indeed, exploration of how gendered notions and ideals are used in reporting on military activity, particularly reports on terrorism and the anti-terrorist efforts of the Egyptian army, seems to be the most interesting direction of future research this study may take.

As previously mentioned, this study takes its starting point in narratives of media professionals as well as media audiences. This approach acknowledges that the dynamics between audience and media does not necessarily mean a passive role of the audience, as simply the receivers of information. Indeed, it could be argued that the expectations of their audiences are something that media institutions are well aware of, meaning that, rather than somehow molding their audiences, their news production deliberately follows the audiences' views (Abdelmoez, 2017). Therefore, this is not a study on the impact of media in the construction of hegemonic expressions of masculinity, but rather a look into the perception of the same expressions in media audiences. That being said, observing the importance of the perceived naturalness to binary gender expressions (Butler, 1990), and the meaning of stereotypical representations to construct gender boundaries (Dyer, 2002), it could be hypothesized that media have a large impact on how masculinity is perceived throughout society. This view is supported by many of the respondents in this study, both with the perspective that men are stereotypically portrayed and that women are underrepresented and marginalized in the media. As the overarching theme of this study is gender representation in the Egyptian media landscape, the two study groups, media audiences (consumers) and media professionals (producers, journalists, editors, etc.) have been selected in acknowledgment of the truism that news production does not solely involve producers. Media audiences interact with texts and messages, utilize and decode them according to their own needs and interests, and therefore also participate in creating meaning. Thus, while talking to media professionals provides insight into journalistic practice and how gender is thought about and discussed in the media institutions, media audiences can show how this is received, perceived, and utilized.

The idea of this pilot study is as mentioned to find place- and culture-specific constructions of masculinities and its hierarchies, and let the definitions appear from the data, rather than applying an already constructed framework that might feel foreign to the people implicated by the study. Inspiration here comes from Connell and Messerschmidt's

elaboration on the interplay of local, regional and global levels in constructed masculinities:

Let us consider specifically the relation between regional and local masculinities. Hegemonic masculinity at the regional level is symbolically represented through the interplay of specific local masculine practices that have regional significance, such as those constructed by feature film actors, professional athletes, and politicians. The exact content of these practices varies over time and across societies. (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005, p. 849)

A theoretical notion to which this study relates is performativity, which informs how the findings can be understood and applied for future research. This concept was derived from linguistics and the philosophy of language, and it has been adapted to gender studies by Judith Butler (1990). Simply put, Butler asserts that gender and its expressions are not natural, but constructed to appear as such, through means of repetition. Accordingly, gender is not the expression of identity, but identity can rather be understood as constructed through “gender acts”. The idea of gender performativity is largely based on post-structural and social constructivist thinking that language does not necessarily *describe* an objectively true reality, but discursively *creates* it. It is, however, important to note that this does not make gender insignificant. Performativity does not mean artificiality; rather, gender is figured as a product of its own repetition in language and other forms of signification. Butler states that there need not be an “actor behind the act” because the actor is constructed *within* the act:

As a consequence, gender cannot be understood as a role which either expresses or disguises an interior ‘self,’ whether that ‘self’ is conceived as sexed or not. As performance which is performative, gender is an “act,” broadly construed, which constructs the social fiction of its own psychological interiority. (Butler, 1988, p. 528)

Gender is the repeated stylization of the body, a set of repeated acts within a highly rigid regulatory frame that congeal over time to produce the appearance of substance, of a natural sort of being. (Butler, 1990, p. 25)

If, as argued by Butler, gender is something we do rather than something we are, or have, then what constitutes “masculinity” or “femininity” is indeed not internal, but given to us, through social conventions and contexts. Here, the media play an important part in, in some ways, “teaching” gender. The representation of men and masculinity is not (only) a description of an already existing reality but is a lesson for men on how to enact hegemonic masculinity. When such ideals are enacted by individuals, they are not only individual actions, but collaborative ones. They rely on the social conventions of gender, and are expressed in a particular context in which they become part of a gender “complicity.” The acts, as such, are then “stylized performances [of gender] that are coded into cultural life” (Wood, 2013, p. 63). I want to reiterate that Butler (1990) does not hold gender to be “a performance” but “performative,” an important distinction. Since gender does not exist before it is done, Butler argues that it is the act itself “doing” gender, not the subject. Similarly, Carlshamre (2014) speaks of human bodies as artifacts, modified to suit certain ideals about sex/gender – despite the fact that this is portrayed as “natural” and biological. Pointing towards practices to “design” our bodies, from plastic surgery to haircuts, Carlshamre argues: “It is as if we do not really trust nature to distinguish the sexes well enough, but must help ourselves to become what we supposedly already are” (p. 144).

The reiterability of gender is really a key point as it is never constructed from scratch, but rather, because “always-already” ubiquitously at work, reiterated and cemented in interpersonal meetings, thus reconfirming and entrenching current norms. Swedish queer theorist, Fanny Ambjörnsson, elaborates and clarifies Butler’s theories, especially regarding the consequences of gender non-conformity. It is not enough to *be* (or *identify as*) a man, one must also continuously *enact* one’s tenuous maleness in order to be seen as a “real”



man (Ambjörnsson, 2006). This is where I situate the theoretical crux of this study: how is performative, or “enacted,” masculinity understood by media audiences and professionals? Performativity theory, as such, provides an understanding of the findings as an ongoing process which will, I believe, reveal a form of gender affordance; certain ideals and identities are realized and take material form, making it possible to become the thing to which it itself refers.

### Previous research

The present study relates to and primarily draws on contributions to masculinity studies: both general theories on the different mechanisms concerning masculinity, as well as some specific ones to Egypt and the Middle East, as well as media studies. A primary, and very important point, emphasized by Gardiner (2002), is that there is no consistent meaning to the term “masculinity” and that the relationship between feminisms, queer theory and the study of men and masculinities have been a complicated one. Berggren (2014), however, argues that the connection have been there, only not made sufficiently visible, and that bringing feminist phenomenology, particularly that of Sara Ahmed, into studies of men and masculinities acts to revitalize the theoretical framework: “conceptualizing masculinity as *sticky* allows us to see both that subjects are positioned by competing discourses, and that through repeated enactment, the cultural signs of masculinity tends to stick to bodies” (Berggren, p. 247).

The intersection of gender and media has been an important one to gender studies scholars, although very little has been written about the representation and the construction of masculinities in Arab media. The study of gender in Middle Eastern societies and cultures, furthermore, is marked by a strong focus on women. Farha Ghannam’s book *Live and Die Like a Man* (2013) stands as the clearest exception to this, and is an elaborate account of men’s lives in Egypt, based on 20 years of research in the neighborhood of al-Zawiya al-Hamra’. While keeping a critical distance, Ghannam offers a much-needed

problematization of masculinity in Egypt, in relation to class and social norms, as well as political systems and religion. At the same time, Ghannam challenges what she sees as discourses of dehumanization of Muslim men in the global media, by providing detailed accounts of men's lives, and the forces that forms what she calls "masculine trajectories." There is much inspiration to get from this work, but it also highlights the urgent need for more research, based on ethnographic methods, on the role of men and masculinities in contemporary Egypt.

Noha Mellor's article "Countering cultural hegemony: Audience research in the Arab world" (2013) is also highly relevant for the first part of this study, as it highlights different approaches of audience research and understanding the impact of media in the Arab world. In this review of Arab audience research, Mellor (2013) argues for an understanding of 'audience' as both diverse and fragmented, particularly as doing otherwise risks viewing 'audience' as passive, rather than active, in their engagement with the media. Mellor (2013) concludes that there is a "vast room for interpretive research based on the ethnographic and cultural turn in audience research, centering on the processes of the interpretation rather than on the authority of the (imported) texts" (p. 212).

The present pilot study, as such, functions as a step towards filling both these voids with ethnographic audience research focusing on interpretation of masculinity and the portrayal of men in Egyptian media, and thus aims to bring together masculinity studies with media ethnography and audience research in the context of contemporary Egypt.

## Method

This study is based on nine semi-structured interviews conducted in Cairo, Egypt, between September and November 2014, each taking between 60 and 90 minutes. Language was mainly English with Egyptian Arabic used only to discuss terms considered language-specific. Respondents included five media professionals, and four readers/viewers of Egyptian English-language media. These two groups of participants were chosen in order to gain insights both from people working in the media, as they can reveal how gendered ideals inform the work from within media institution, and from outsiders, as the audiences also play a part in decoding and interpreting the very same media messages.

Furthermore, in order to broaden the data, a small survey consisting of key questions from the interviews was distributed through the online link-sharing website Reddit, on a specific “subreddit” (essentially a discussion forum) dedicated to Egypt. 27 people responded to the survey. This quickly and efficiently produced several interesting and useful answers, but the in-depth interviews remain the core of the study. The respondents for these are both media professionals, and from the audiences of Egyptian English-language media. These were selected through a combination of help from previous contacts, and the so called “snowballing-method,” which means that each respondent was asked to name a few other possible respondents. Usually when using this method, data collection ends when it reaches a *saturation point*, meaning that the respondents no longer provide new information or when patterns have appeared and most answers are repetitions of what previous respondents have said. However, considering the fact that this study was only supposed to provide a basis for a larger media analysis, it was not deemed necessary to reach this saturation point. Any and all insights were considered valuable, and can act as a starting point of a content analysis of Egyptian English-language media. The interviews, as mentioned, aimed at eliciting narratives of masculinity that would produce key terms that could be used in

investigating the representation of masculinities in Egyptian media. Therefore, no attention was paid to make sure that the sample was representative in regard to gender, religion, class, etc. In other words, sampling did not aim at generalizability or being representative of the population. Therefore, there is a risk of sampling bias, as it is very likely that the respondents who decided to participate had; 1) a greater interest in the topic at hand, 2) a greater personal interest in sharing their thoughts, and 3) a greater opportunity to speak candidly and critically about fairly controversial issues.

The first group of interview respondents, media professionals, consisted of one online editor, aged between 30-49, identifying as “straight male” (note that sexual orientation/identity was not asked, only gender identity), one freelance translator, aged between 15-29, identifying as man, one journalist, aged between 15-29, identifying as male, one researcher, aged between 30-49, identifying as female, and one journalist, aged between 15-29, identifying as female. The second group, media audiences, consisted of one artist, aged between 50-64, identifying as woman, one musician, aged between 30-49, identifying as female, one architect, aged between 30-49, identifying as male, and one activist, aged between 15-29, identifying as female. The only qualifier for the second group was that the respondent considered themselves part of the target group of any Egyptian news outlet, and somewhat regularly interacted with the news media.

### **Interview Questions**

The interview and questions themselves have been structured after a model suggested by Bryman (2012), mixing introductory and clarifying questions with solicitations of examples. After having been informed about the research purpose and after having given their consent, each respondent was first asked for basic demographics including age, gender identity and educational background. Respondents from the “media professionals” group were asked about their media affiliation (institution) and their professional role (journalist, editor, producer, or

translator). Those from “media audiences” were asked about their profession. Both groups were asked about their primary sources of news media, of which the most common were Al-Ahram, Ahram Online, Al-Masry Al-Youm, Youm7 and Mada Masr. The main questions of the interviews are all centered on the topics of masculinity, media and gender representation, and are all followed by additional questions, as well as clarifying questions and solicitations of examples. In all stages of the interviews the interviewer, as far all possible, refrained from imposing, suggesting or even mentioning possible answers. This is necessary because doing so would defeat the purpose of circumventing traditional or academic narratives (or tropes) of masculinity in order to explore the situated and uninterrupted understandings. Therefore, only the meaning of the questions was elaborated upon when needed, without suggestion of possible answers other than what had already been provided by the respondent.

The survey followed a similar pattern as the interviews, and the questions were a selection of key questions from the interviews. Open comment-style fields were used for answers rather than multiple choices, with the only exception being in regards to age group. This was done in order to encourage the respondents to answer in their own words, and when necessary use Arabic terms, allowing for an as unobtrusive collection of data as possible. The respondents of the survey overwhelmingly identified as male, with fifteen answering “male”, not including one instance of “straight”, two “straight male”, and “*Dakar*”, literally meaning man, but in Egypt considered carrying connotations of machismo.

## Findings and analysis

### Provide, Protect and Control

Overall, professional life dominated as a theme when discussing “men’s roles” in society and in life. Even in cases when the topic was family life, most respondents correlated this to professional life through a strong emphasis put on the expectation of men to “provide” for their family. Several respondents talked about how men are judged by how well they can fulfill the role as breadwinner for their family. One media professional stated:

Men are normally not involved in home issues; they are only involved in bringing money and bringing bread. What do you expect to find more? I think that’s it, it has always been like that. And I think women are expecting, even when they are getting married to a man, what they ask about is ‘is he able to provide a good life, or not?’ They don’t think much about how collaboration would be in building this family, they think ‘is [this] man, can [this] man be more responsible to provide the life for the family?’ That’s the main question here, when someone is trying to get married.

Many times providing was mentioned next to protecting, as one survey respondent answered on the question of what “masculinity” means: “It means to sacrifice safety or comfort to protect women and children. It means to sacrifice comfort to provide for a family... It means that the prosperity and safety of my family rests on my shoulders.” This correlation also emphasizes the fact that both providing and protecting also relates to a third aspect mentioned by respondents: controlling. In fact, one survey response mentions providing and controlling in the same sentence, answering on whether masculinity is “natural to men,” saying that “I like to think yes, since instinctively we like to be in control and more people than not think of themselves as the providers.” A media audience interviewee adds to the same point, although speaking about what comes to mind when hearing the word “masculinity,” saying:

It's a source of pride, to have. You're the one who control women, you're the breadwinner. You have to appear as a masculine man in the streets, wear modest clothes. Stuff like that, which I think is a very backwards way of expressing oneself.

Some were even harsher in their words on this question, with one respondent saying "I think about to be unfair. I think about violence." On the follow-up question whether this is similar to "macho," this respondent said:

Yes, it's similar. But, I refer, when I hear the word 'macho,' I refer to jealousy more, and competition among males. It's not about... controlling the female; it's like competing with each other. But masculinity, that's when the female gets hurt, or treated in a bad way.

Interestingly, the same respondent viewed "masculinity" and "maleness" as the same thing, but "manhood" as something different. When asked about the difference, the answer was that manhood is something positive:

I don't really use the word 'maleness,' I just heard it from you now, but manhood is about character. It's about personality of someone, and it refers to positive points in his personality, it's not like masculinity. It's about to be fair, actually, and to be strong and to be protective and, I don't know, to be responsible.

Being protective, for a man, thus signifies a positive trait to this respondent. Considering the perceived difference between "masculinity," which included controlling, and "manhood," being something positive, there is no correlation made between "protective" and "controlling." At the same time, much of this respondent's answers revolved around men being controlling of women in close relationships to them, particularly brothers' behavior towards their sisters. However, the same behavior was by others described as "protective," meaning that it could be used in

either a positive or negative meaning, although in the former case the same behavior would be labeled as “controlling” instead. Therefore, it is still possible to argue for their connection, which several respondents did:

They [young men] think that the whole protection thing maybe involves the need to control women. So maybe that’s an expression of that desire to control women, or to feel more powerful vis-à-vis women, and therefore prove their virility, their manhood, and then to act as protector. I mean the logic is odd, of course.

The same connection was by others made between “providing” and “controlling:”

A ‘real man’ will be judged, if he is successful, if he can build a family and finance it. That’s very important. [He will be judged on] if he can control the family well.

Two other respondents had this to say about control and masculinity:

I believe it’s a culture in Egypt [...] and this culture helps, maybe not just men, men and women, to control someone weaker than them, and feel that they are strong enough and that they have power. I believe they know they do something wrong, and it is okay because power is very seducing, you know? It’s about being unfair. It’s about refusing a girl to choose, they don’t want her to choose, because they want to feed their power.

I believe the societal understanding of masculinity in Egypt is quite a fucked up one. Thinking about it... It’s sort of a birthright of control. You have the birthright to control things, and to be able to change, and to be able to lead. And, quite paradoxically, this entails very little responsibility. I remember when I was a kid, my friends used to brag about that they don’t do things around the house, because this is



what females do. Like 'I do not clean, I do not do my bed, I do not do whatever, because this is what girls do.' So basically it feels like being a male comes with almost limitless privileges, with little responsibility regarding your immediate context, be it the family or the society.

As we can see, providing, protecting, and controlling are all aspects that nearly every respondent relates to the role that men are expected to take in Egyptian society. While these aspects may or may not intersect, they also exist on multiple levels; not only relating to the family and to the society, but also to the nation. Protection and guardianship on the national level is a task placed with the military, and there are parallels to be drawn between the familial or paternal protectionism spoken of by the respondents, and the trope of a national family, wherein the nation is symbolized as a woman (see Baron, 2005) in need of protection from a male guardian, the military. Viewing this parallel with performativity theory in mind, one could argue that an emphasis on familial protectionism as an integral part of masculinity also acts to construct militarized forms of masculine identity; it encourages men's participation in the state's military apparatus, the "security industry," and by extension the militarized masculinity – which includes the expectation of men to sacrifice their bodies to the state.

Providing for and protecting one's family could be seen as a project of procreation and preservation, to carry on one's legacy. This legacy, however, is mostly inherited from father to son. One respondent claimed to be thankful for not being a man, as it meant that when she told her father that she would not be going to the medical school like he had wanted, he was accepting of it because it was more important for her brother, as the only son, to do so:

He said 'Ok. Anyway, I have my son. For me, you are a woman; you will always be a woman. Even if you are successful, one day you will marry and you will not carry the name.' That's what my father told me, an educated person.

It is clear that when fathering is considered central to Egyptian masculinity; it is usually the fathering of sons. It might be possible to speak of “lineal masculinity,” although that would require studies looking into the past and how notions of ancestry relate to masculine ideals through generations. However, the hinting towards patrilineal legacy given by some respondents, together with the outright account of (male) inherited family feuds and men trying to save their family name, which we will return to, does show that, at least in Upper Egypt, family legacy is closely tied with masculinity. Men are the ones who defend the family name, they are the ones who carry on the family name, and it is their death that is the end of the family.

The emphasis on men’s role as protectors of women also perpetuates the ubiquitous “damsel in distress” trope, which in itself could be seen as devaluing women’s agency, or at least symptomatic of the perceived role of women in public society, something which in turn feeds violence directed at women both at home and on the streets. This relates to the Egyptian term *balṭagy* (بلطجي), or “thug”, which is a term often used to separate culturally and socially sanctioned violence from other forms. It is the embodiment of villain masculinity, and the concept, as used on Egyptian streets rather than in laws, “focuses mainly on the improper uses of violence in daily life” (Ghannam, 2013, p. 123). By constructing the threat of the “thug”, or villain, men can position themselves as protectors of women, thus remaining in a place of control and authority. Men constructed themselves as heroic by imagining other men as “villainous.” The Hero, after all, is defined by his courageous struggle with his enemy, the Villain, usually referred to in Egypt as *balṭagy*. Thus men assert their belonging to a group of men engaged in courageous conflict with another group of men. Men also construct the non-masculine non-man in order to exemplify the man who did not conform to masculinity, the equivalent of which in British would be “nonce” or “sissy,” what is in Egypt called *shāz* (شاذ), “deviant,” a term often used to describe non-heterosexual men.

## Sexuality, Family and Nation

**M**y early reflections on it were purely sexual. Masculinity was basically a sexual attitude, rather than a social construct. – Young male respondent.

A commonly mentioned aspect of masculinity, related to control, is sexuality. Several respondents talked about what they termed “the hypocrisy” regarding some men’s view of female sexuality: “Macho people also do not allow sexual liberties for women. They don’t respect a woman that is sexually liberated, at the same time they treat women as sexual objects, so they’re very hypocritical.” This respondent also related the term “macho” to “masculinity,” in the sense that it is a way to act, expected of men by society at large. Furthermore, the respondent who differentiated between manhood and masculinity gave similar remarks:

If in the street a girl and her boyfriend or lover is walking, holding hands, or... his hand on her shoulder, or even kissing or anything, it’s not allowed. People won’t let them go by in an intimate way, walk in an intimate way. But if someone harass her, or touch her, touch her without her consent, that’s okay. But if she agrees, then it’s not okay. If she says no for someone controlling her, that’s wrong, and if she says yes for someone she loves, that’s also wrong. But if she’s under control, although the same action is happening - it’s about touching her body - without her choice it is okay, you know?

What this tells us is that female sexuality is explained as subject to double-punishment, or as the saying goes: “damned if you do, damned if you don’t.” Conversely, one respondent talked about how being a man, in Egypt, comes with freedoms. As a teenager, this respondent reminisced, he was able to stay out late without issues of “virginity.” Generally, male sexuality seems to be closely tied to a sense of masculinity, and often comes up in interviews, no matter who the respondent is. As an example

of this, on the question of gender identity one interview respondent and three survey respondents not only said “male,” but actually answered “straight male,” as if to emphasize that they are “proper men.” Not surprisingly, these same men were also the ones who emphasized the “naturalness” of male stereotypes, such as muscularity and intelligence. One of these respondents said, on what the term “masculinity” means to him: “Masculinity and manhood: Courage, strength, honor.” Strength, of course, being another idea connected to the trope of the protective man. Upon being asked to name examples of men that to them symbolize this as a male ideal mainly two people were named: President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, and the former President Gamal Abdel Nasser. I say “mainly” because there was one man who was mentioned once, in a survey response, as a symbol of the “masculine traits” of being “quiet and strong,” and that man was late American actor Charles Bronson. Although Bronson was only mentioned once as an idealized man in Egypt, presidents el-Sisi and Nasser came up in nearly every interview and in several survey responses. While these men are quite obviously tied to symbolisms of the Egyptian nation, there were others mentioned as “idealized men” that have played important, albeit very different, roles in the construction of a national, masculine identity: Actors Rushdy Abaza (“the Clark Gable of Egypt”) and Omar Sharif.

One respondent related both Nasser and el-Sisi back to the family as an idea, as providers and as protectors. According to this respondent, the political elite in Egypt since the revolution of 1952 have constructed an idea of the nation modeled as a family, and the leader, be it Nasser, Sadat or el-Sisi, as a father.<sup>1</sup> This, the respondent says, is clearly shown in the fact that Sadat, during the October War of 1973, spoke about the fighter pilots as “my sons.” The mother in this scenario is Egypt, such as in the statue “Nahdet Misr” outside Cairo University, once again casting the men (soldiers) as the protectors and women as the protected. The respondent emphasizes that women had been cast in this role before Nasser’s revolution as well, and points to the fact that during the inauguration of the statue of “Mother Egypt,” women were not allowed to attend.

On the question of what exemplifies an idealized man, some respondents chose to list traits or attributes, while others listed “exemplary men.” The two most commonly listed attributes were muscles and moustaches. Interestingly, only a few respondents mentioned beards, while nearly everyone (including many survey respondents) pointed to moustaches as a “masculine attribute.”

The men exemplifying masculinity, such as the already mentioned Nasser, el-Sisi, Rushdy Abaza and Omar Sharif, and others, such as writer Taha Hussein and television presenter Tamer Amin, not only symbolize a national identity, but also far-reaching stereotypical portrayals of “masculine men.” The non-Egyptian men that respondents mentioned as examples of masculinity highlight some common themes: Clark Gable, Charles Bronson, Hugh Jackman and Javier Bardem. It seems clear that these names correspond with the listed traits; muscles, moustaches, sometimes beards, and always somewhat “rugged.” These stereotypical qualities could be related to Richard Dyer’s (2002) argument that the most important function of stereotypes is to construct and maintain clear boundaries, in this case gender boundaries. These gender boundaries, however, do not only separate men from women, but also men from other men. When there is a clearly promoted “successful way of being a man,” there is, of course, subordinated and marginalized ways as well. What is important to understand about this is that while a majority of Egyptian men are not necessarily muscly, mustachioed or generally Nasser or Abaza-like, these qualities and these men represent an ideal, which is upheld in society at large and promotes a structure from which most men benefit (cf. Connell, 2005). What these interviews have found is that, while this type of masculinity is idealized, respondents commonly explain the meaning of masculinity as the lack of what is *not* considered masculine. Not having long hair, not wearing make-up, not wearing pink, not dressing in shorts, etc. can hardly be seen as ideals, but quite possibly everyday practices and performances that constitute “common” masculinity.

Much of the answers on what masculinity entails implies heterosexuality: Providing for a family, protecting women, procreation –

it all points to a heteronormative understanding of masculinity. Non-heterosexual practices and identification is only referred to as victims of normative masculine ideals or its hegemony. For example, some respondents spoke of gay-identified men in the discourse of the famously homophobic television presenter Tamer Amin as a way for Amin to reassure his viewers of his own masculinity and/or sexuality. This is somewhat similar what Pascoe (2007) found studying high school boys in America: "Boys lay claim to masculine identities by lobbing homophobic epithets at one another. They also assert masculine selves by engaging in heterosexist discussions of girls' bodies and their own sexual experiences" (p. 5). Engaging in heterosexist discussion may also appear as a favorite pastime of Tamer Amin who, apart from the accusations of homophobia, has also been criticized for blaming sexual harassment on the victims. The expectation of heterosexuality, its connection to masculinity, and the reiteration of straightness by male respondents may very well be correlated to the fact that non-heterosexual practices and identities are incredibly stigmatized in Egyptian society. In a study by Pew Research Center (2014), as many as 95% of Egyptians stated that they do not think homosexuality should be accepted. What may be even more telling is that this number has made some LGBTs glad, saying "5% is more than expected!"

Men's harassment of women is a hot topic in Egypt, and was brought up to discussion by most respondents. Rizzo (2014) writes that harassment can be seen as a backlash towards increased female participation in the public sphere, and an attempt to uphold male ownership of public spaces through marginalization of women in those spaces. Harassment is still, by men and women alike, often blamed on the victims themselves, and especially women's appearance is blamed. In a study sponsored by UN Women, more than a third of victims of harassment claimed that women have themselves to blame. 72.6% of perpetrators claimed the reason for them harassing is that the woman was not decent in her appearance, while 75.7% of victims reported wearing conservative clothing and no make-up (El Deeb, 2013). This suggests that the idea of female decency is more important than how

they really dress, and that men are often perceived as responsible for enforcing the dress code. The protective brother is, of course, constructed in relation to the street thugs who would take first chance to punish a woman for her appearance, even if it is more about power than actual appearance. Thus, the brother's power and ability to control is confirmed while the sister's agency is taken away, and the "proper" masculinity is constructed in relation to the *baltagy*, or the "problematic" masculinity.

### Aggression, Violence and Military

Some of the so far mentioned responses have related to aggression. When spoken of, this was often related to sex, with sexual harassment, of course, being a topic many relates to violence as well as aggression and masculinity.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, the fact that military men are very commonly named as "exemplarily masculine" shows that certain idealized masculinities are indeed connected to aggression. The military, one respondent said, is viewed as "the factory of men:"

If I'm gonna trace how manhood, or how masculinity, is produced, I would refer automatically to the practices of training soldiers in the army. One funny exercise is [that] they have to sing a song. And this song is very degrading... you know, degrading from an army point of view, like when you pretend to be a female; this is degrading from the military point of view. So you have to sing a song, like one of the rights of passage to be graduated from the military is to sing a song, saying how feminine you are. So it's very funny because the ritual involves, like in order to be able to be a man, you have to prove how female you are, which is very paradoxical. It feels like it's [...] crushing the man in you, in order to construct the bigger man, which is the army.

Another respondent lamented the fact that many mothers in Egypt want their sons to go to the military, “to make a man out of him,” and that there is a pride in the army and an idealization of military masculinity that is not just upheld by men. The problem, according to this respondent, is that militarism relates not only to state violence, but also to violence against women, especially in the light of femininity being considered something degrading:

If they are taught that the feminine is the lesser human body, or lesser person, then, you know, that certainly contributes to the fact that they are not respecting women on the street. Because they’re told, you know; that women are trash.

Connell (2005) writes that “[v]iolence on the largest possible scale is the purpose of the military; and no arena has been more important for the definition of hegemonic masculinity in European/American culture” (p. 213). Given the many respondents who focus on the military as a masculine project, as a source of harassment and violence against women, it is possible to argue for the same being true in Egypt. In fact, this could be said to be the single most notable finding; that military men (particularly military leaders) are constantly named as the most exemplary men, and that the military at large is seen as a prime institution for the construction of masculinity. In order to better understand the actual workings of the Egyptian military as a “factory of men”, it would be necessary to do detailed ethnographic study of the military itself, something that could prove challenging. However, what can be drawn from the study at hand is the perception of the military as a masculine institution, and of military performances and pageantry – such as parades and televised military exercises, for example shown in the music video to the pop song “Teslam El Ayadi” – as key areas for performing hegemonic masculinity.

Emma Sinclair-Webb (2006) writes about how the Turkish Armed Forces plays a great part in daily life, often more so than other countries. Interestingly, the Egyptian military seems to, on the one hand, be seen as



rather elusive, or maybe even Kafkaesque, in the sense that its presence is always known but rarely seen in media, “unless it’s 6th of October, the annual thing where they show movies about war,” as one respondent said. At the same time, as another respondent talked about, the Egyptian Armed Forces are involved in many public projects; they own factories and run constructions (cf. Abul-Magd, 2013; Morsy, 2014); and as previously mentioned, they often figure in popular cultural productions (cf. LeVine, 2015; Mostafa, 2017). As such, they could hardly be portrayed as having a small role in society. Sinclair-Webb further writes that in Turkey, as a result of the important every-day role of the army compared to other countries, “the versions of ideal masculinity generated by the army as a primary institutional site of hegemonic masculinity have a more inescapable social and cultural impact on men” (Sinclair-Webb, 2006, p. 69). Again, the same could also be said about Egypt, especially in the light of respondents’ answers about the Egyptian Armed Forces as a “factory of men.” This further strengthens the argument made earlier that the role of the military, as defender of the nation, correlates to the role of the man, as protector of women. Even in times of peace, the soldier as a guardian of the nation “presumably occupies a significant place in the national ‘imaginary’ and established a military version of manhood as inescapable and a marker against which other masculinities get measured” (Sinclair-Webb, 2006, p. 70).

Violence is, of course, seen as a male/masculine practice outside of the military as well. A respondent from Upper Egypt talked about the concept of *al-tār* (التار or الثأر – *al-tha’r* in Modern Standard Arabic), which means “vendetta,” and is sometimes called “blood feuds.” This relates to family and clan fighting, in which when someone from a family is killed, the men of that family meet to decide who will retaliate by killing a man of the other family. This is a vicious circle, usually going on for generations without anyone really knowing how it started, but can according to the respondent be ended when one of the families only have one man left to carry on their name. In order to save the family name, this man will take his burial shroud, called a *kafan* (كفن), and go to the other family, who will then have the opportunity to decide then and

there to kill this man, thus ending the patrilineal legacy of this family. Because of the humiliation involved in offering your own life, the respondent says, “they usually leave him.”

### Key findings

Several common themes emerge in media audiences and media professionals’ personal reflections on what masculinity signifies and how they perceive different performances of masculinity. Most themes are interrelated but often mentioned separately. For example, *heterosexuality* could be explicitly referred to or merely implied, but was invariably an integral part of what is considered “true” or “proper” masculinity. The possibility of affirming one’s masculinity by publicly performing heterosexuality and denouncing alternative sexualities recurs in the answers of the respondents. Related to this “compulsory heterosexuality” is, of course, the *family*, which comes with the expectation of men as *providers* and *protectors*. These expectations also extend, and were related by respondents, to the *nation* and the *military*. In fact, both media professionals and audiences alike heavily associate masculinity and manhood with the military. Participating in military activity was seen as a way of “becoming” a man. Protection and militarism, in turn, were related to ideas of *strength*, *honor*, and *courage*, as well as weakness, shame, and cowardice in relation to men failing to protect women, such as the men called *balṭagy* or *shāz*. Providing on the other spectrum was by a few respondents related to *responsibility* and *honesty*, while both providing and protection were by others related to *control*. Men are almost exclusively seen as *possessors of power*. Indeed, the *father figure*, ultimately represented by the iconized leader (of the nation as well as the military), is viewed as the quintessence of Egyptian masculine identity, thus bringing us back to the (heteronormative) family. Any one of these aspects could be starting points of their own, leading to meanings embedded within them, to be used in research aimed at exploring different aspects of masculinity in Egypt. Most pressing, however, not least because of the return of a military officer to

the presidency, may be the connections between the military, national security narratives and ideal masculinity.

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### **Notes**

1. The respondent commented that Mubarak followed this model early in his presidency, although to a lesser extent than Sadat. Morsi was not mentioned at all, although he too talked about Egypt as his “family and clan.” Mubarak, furthermore, also spoke to the protestors during the 2011 revolution as his “children.” Hafez (2012, p. 39) writes that “In his role as president, Mubarak adopted the father idiom, which was legitimated through the construction of mythical power that reined in chaos to ensure the safety and stability of the masses.”

2. One correlation between aggression and male sexuality may be found in the language. One of the media professionals talked about how the word *yinīk* (بنيك), a vulgar but common word for having sex, relates to penetration. As such, a woman (in most cases) cannot have sex with a man, because it is the man having sex with the woman. This, the respondent means, perpetuates the perceived naturalness of male sexual dominance or even aggression.

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# Siyasal Alanda Erkekliğin İnşası: Kürt Siyasi Hareketinde Cinsiyetin Yeniden Konumlanması

Bahar Mermertaş \*

## Özet:

Bu çalışma, Kürt siyasi hareketinin “kadınları özgürleşmeye, erkekleri ise erkekliklerini öldürmeye” çağıran söyleminin gündelik hayatlar içerisindeki ataerkil pazarlıklarda ve erkekliğin inşasında nasıl bir rol oynadığını anlamak üzere yola çıkmıştır. Bu araştırmanın ana sorunsalı Kürt siyasi hareketinin yasal temsilcisi olan BDP’ nin cinsiyet söyleminin gündelik hayat içerisinde erkek siyasetçiler cephesinden incelemektir. Araştırma konusu; erkeklerin kadınlarla yakın ilişkilerinde (eşleri, kız kardeşleri, anneleri ve kızları) bu özgürlükçü söylemin nasıl yorumladığı, kadın-erkek ilişkilerinin gündelik yaşam pratiklerinde nasıl kurulduğu ve ataerkilliğin bu özgürlükçü söylem içinde nasıl konumlandığı ana eksenlerindedir. Bu çalışmanın amacı, ataerkil örüntülerin özgürlükçü söylemin içinden nasıl ve hangi biçimlerde sızarak aile içi pratiklere etnisite ve sosyal sınıf düzleminde yansıdığını tartışmaktır. Araştırma için 10 erkek siyasetçi ve 5 siyasetçi yakını (eşi, kızı, annesi, kız kardeşi vb.) ile görüşüldü. Kamusal alanda cinsiyetlerin yeniden belirlenişi, kırılmaya maruz kalan ataerkil örüntüler özel alanda aynı paralellikte ilerlememektedir. Cinsiyet politikasının özel alanda harekete geçmesini etkileyen farklı değişkenler mevcuttur. Erkeklerin hem kamusal hem de özel alanda bu değişimin öznesi olmadıklarını söylemek yanlış olmayacaktır. Meydana gelen değişim kimi zaman her anlamda referans aldıkları hareketin öncüleri ve Abdullah Öcalan’ın çizdiği perspektiflerin

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hayata geçirilmesiyle, itme gücüyle gerçekleşmektedir. Kimi zaman ise hareket içerisinde yapılanmasını oluşturan ve etki alanını genişleten kadın siyasetçiler veya yaşamlarındaki kadınların yön vermeleri ile bir dönüşüm sağlamışlardır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Cinsiyet Roller, Toplumsal Cinsiyet, Erkeklik, Kürt Siyaseti, Özel Alan



## Construction Of Masculinity In The Political Sphere: Re-Positioning Of Gender In Kurdish Political Movement

Bahar Mermertas \*

### Abstract

This study aims to understand the role of the Kurdish political movement that ask for “the women to liberate themselves and the men to kill their masculinities” in the the constructing of masculinities and in the patriarchal bargains in the course of everyday lives. The main problematic of this study is to analyze the gender discourse of the PDP (Peace and Democracy Party, BDP), i.e., the legal representative of Kurdish political movement in Turkey, from the view of the male politicians and in the context of the sociology of personal life. This thesis is mainly addressing these questions; how the men interpret this libertarian discourse in their close relations with the women (their wives, sisters, mothers and daughters), how relations between the men and the women are established during personal life practices and how the patriarchy is positioned in the context of this libertarian discourse. So this study is discussing how and in what forms the patriarchal patterns overrun the libertarian discourse and reverberate in domestic family life in terms of ethnicity, religion and social classes. For this research, I interviewed with ten male politicians and five relatives of the politicians(wife, daughter, mother, sister, etc.). The reformation of genders and the change of patriarchal patterns in public sphere do not conform to patterns in private sphere. There are different variables that shape the gender relations in private sphere. It will not be wrong to

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assert that the men are not the agents of this change both in public and private sphere. At times, the transformation within the party was possible through the driving leaders of the movement and the perspectives of Abdullah Öcalan who they occasionally may refer on this issue. At other times, the female politicians who are well organized in the movement and have great influence on it, and the other women who are the close relatives of the male politicians are the real causes that transform the male politicians.

**Key words:** Gender Roles, Social Gender, Masculinity, Kurdish Politics, Private Sphere

## Giriş

Ulusal davalar, milliyetçi hareketler ve ulus kurtuluş hareketleri bir yandan kimlik mücadelesi, ulusu kurtarma ve özgürlük mücadelesi verirken bir yandan da cinsiyetleri ulusal davaya çeşitli şekillerde davet etmektedir. Cynthia Enloe (2003) cinsiyet ile vatandaşlık, etnisite, ulus ve ırk ilişkisine bakarken, toplumsal cinsiyet ile etnisite/ulus/ırk ilişkilerinin birbirlerini etkilediği görüşündedir. Ulus inşa süreçlerinde ve milliyetçi hareketlerde, cinsiyet özelliklerine göre kadınlar ve erkeklere yeni görevler verilir, yeni kadınlık ve yeni erkeklikler inşa edilir. Çünkü “kadınlık ve erkekliğin günlük hayattaki biçimleri değiştirilmeden hiç kimse, hiçbir cemaat, hiçbir milli hareket militarize edilemez” (Enloe, 2011, s. 219). Kadınlar ve erkekler için, mevcut düzen içerisinde toplumsal cinsiyet rollerine göre, ulusun kurtuluşu için yeni projeler çizilir ve vaatlerle ulusal davalara çağrılırlar. Ulus inşasından geçerken ulusun kadın ve erkek üyeleri artık yeni formlara bürünmektedir. Buna rağmen, milliyet ve milliyetçilik konusundaki hegemonik kuramların çoğu (Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1990; Kedourie, 1993; Smith, 1986, 1995; Greenfeld, 1992) cinsiyet ilişkilerini konuyla ilgisi yokmuş gibi ihmal etmişlerdir. Oysaki cinsiyet ve cinsiyet ilişkileri ulusal hareketlere eklenen ve sonuç olarak dönüşüme uğrayan yapılardır. Tartışmalı bir alan olarak özel alan, özel alana sıkıştırılmış kadınlık, militarizmin tamamen görünmeyen, konuşulmayan yanıdır. Kadınlar, milliyetçiliğin siyasalın devindiği kamusal alandan dışlandıkları için militarizm ve milliyetçilik ile ilgileri yokmuş ve tek aktör erkeklermişçesine bir tahayyül oluşmaktadır. Çünkü “Eril mekan’lar otorite, çatışma ve rekabet ile ‘dişil mekanlar’ estetik objeler, duygusal anlatılar ve empati ile kodlanır” (Sancar, 2013, s. 25).

Görünürde, yasalar ve toplumsal sözleşmeler, kamusal alanda cinsiyet eşitliğini büyük ölçüde eşitlemiştir. “Carole Pateman’a göre sistem, modern liberal devlette ataerkillikten kardeşliğe (fraternity) dönüşmüştür. Ataerkillikte baba (veya baba figürü olan kral) hem erkek hem de kadını yönetir, kardeşlikte ise erkekler, kadınları özel ev içi

alanda yönetme hakkına sahiptir ama kamusal, siyasi alanda kendi aralarında toplumsal eşitlik düzeni sözleşmesini kabul etmişlerdir” (Akt. Yuval-Davis, 2010, s. 28). Ancak toplumsal sözleşmelerle eşitliğin kurulmuş olduğunu varsaydığımızda dahi kamusal/siyasal alanda uygulamada bir eşitlikten söz etmek mümkün değildir. Tam da bu noktada kamusal alan ve özel alan kavramlarının tartışmalı olduğunu, sınırlarının aslında çok da belirgin olmadığını belirtmek gerekir. Jürgen Habermas (1997) kamusal alanın bir alan olmanın ötesinde bir ilişki biçimi olarak tanımlamaktadır. “...kamusal hayata katılabilmenin koşulu, bir aile reisi olarak, özel hayat alanında özerk olmaktır [...] *poliste* bir şahsın konumu, *oikostaki* despotluğuna bağlıdır” (Habermas, 1997, s. 60). Modern toplum tarihinin bir ürünü olan bu ayırım doğrultusunda araçsal akıl, amaç yönelimli akıl, yani erkek akıl modern topluma en uyumlu düşünme biçimi olduğundan dolayı erkek egemen bir sistemi doğurup beslemektedir (Uçan, 2012, s. 266). Hannah Arendt de (1994), kamusal alanı antik çağda, özgür erkek bireylerin farklarını ortaya koyarak üstünlüklerini gösterebileceği yer olarak tanımlamaktadır. Dolayısıyla Habermas, *Kamusal Alanın Yapısal Dönüşümü*’nde (2002) kadınların siyasal kamudan dışlanmasını, sadece erkeklerin buraya kendilerine ayrılmış bir kontenjanmışçasına hâkim olması anlamında değil, siyasal kamunun yapısı ve özel alanla ilişkisi itibarıyla cinsiyete özgü bir şekilde belirlenmesine de değinerek alanın cinsiyetlendirildiğini ortaya koymaktadır.

Bu çalışmada da Kürt siyasi hareketinin ve özelde BDP (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi)’nin erkek siyasetçilerinin kamusal alan ve özel alanı kapsayan cinsiyet söylemini yakın ilişki içinde oldukları kadınlarla nasıl kurdukları, kendilerini bu cinsiyet söyleminin neresinde gördükleri ve geleneksel ataerkil örüntülerin içinde yeniden kurulan erkeklikler anlaşılma çalışılmıştır. Buradan yola çıkıldığında BDP’nin kadın özgürlüğü ve erkeğin dönüşümünü odağa alan siyasal söyleminin, gündelik hayat içerisindeki ataerkil pazarlıklarda<sup>1</sup> ve erkekliğin inşasında nasıl bir rol oynadığını anlamak amaçlanmıştır. Bu çerçevede düşünüldüğünde, siyasal hareketin cinsiyet özgürlüğü söyleminin, erkek siyasetçilerin özel alanlarındaki ilişkilerine nasıl yansıdığı önemlidir. Cinsiyet ilişkilerinin,

toplumun alışlagelen din ve ataerkil yapıdan kendini sıyrıp cinsiyete duyarlı hale gelip, gel(e)mediği problemlili bir durumdur. Bu yönüyle politikacı erkeklerin cephesinden, kurdukları yakın ilişkilerinde (eşleri, kız kardeşleri, anneleri ve kızları) bu özgürlükçü söylemi nasıl yorumlandıkları, kadın-erkek ilişkilerinin gündelik yaşam pratiklerinde nasıl kurulduğu ve geleneksel ataerkil erkekliğin bu özgürlükçü söylem içinde nasıl yeniden inşa olduğunun bir tartışması yürütülmüştür.

Araştırma, 2012-2014 yıllarında yüksek lisans tez çalışması kapsamında, 10 erkek siyasetçi ve 5 siyasetçi yakını (eşi, kızı, annesi, kız kardeşi vb.) ile gerçekleştirilen derinlemesine mülakatlara dayanmaktadır. Görüşmeci profili belirlenirken farklı yaş ve eğitim durumu, evli ve bekâr olmak suretiyle farklı olmalarına dikkat edildi. Çünkü bu değişkenlerin cinsiyet düzenine bakış açısını etkileyeceği düşünülmektedir. Mülakat yapılacak kişilere ulaşma noktasında kartopu yöntemi kullanıldı. Bunun yanında daha önce planlanmadığı halde, konuya dair özel merakları nedeniyle kadın siyasetçilerle de mülakatlar gerçekleştirme imkânı bulundu. Kadın siyasetçilerle görüşmeler, parti binalarında erkeklerle yapılan görüşme öncesi veya sonrasında tamamen sohbet sırasında gönüllü, randevusuz görüşme yapma şeklinde gelişmiştir.

### Cinsiyet ve Kürt Hareketi

**D**oğum ile beraber bir bedenın hangi cinsel organa sahip olduğu kişinin cinsiyetini belirleyen toplumsal bir ön kabuldür. Cinsel organın kendisi başlangıçta cinsiyeti kuran bir mekanizmadır. Butler (2008), cinsiyetin, toplumsal cinsiyeti önceleyen doğal bir süreç olmayıp, onun da toplumsal bir olgu ve kurgu olduğunu teorize ederek cinsiyet kavramının da aynı toplumsal cinsiyet gibi bir kültürel inşa olduğunu, bu nedenle de, 'cinsiyetin' çoktan bir 'toplumsal cinsiyet' olduğunu ileri sürer. Toplumsal cinsiyet (gender), cinsiyetin (sex) kültürel bir yorumu değildir, cinsiyetin kendisi zaten toplumsal cinsiyetlendirilmiş bir kategoridir. Bu durumda kadınlık ve erkekliğin kurulmasında cinsiyet kavramı inşayı başlatmakta ve çoğu zaman cinsiyetin sosyal inşa olduğunu açıklamak için kullanılan 'toplumsal cinsiyet' kavramı cinsiyet kavramı

tartışıldığında işlevsiz kalmaktadır. “Eril veya dişil bir bedenle doğarız. Ama bu bedenin biçimlendirilmesi içerisinde doğulan kültüre özgü algılamalar vasıtasıyla olur. Bedensel farklılıklarla doğarız ama bu bedensel farklılıkların biçimlendirilmesi, yok edilmesi, derecelendirilmesi topluma, kültüre, sınıfa ve kişiye bağlı olarak değişir” (Demren, 2001, s. 74). Dolayısıyla doğuştan getirildiği varsayılan ‘kadın’ ve ‘erkek’ cinsiyeti ile ilgili özellikler; zamanla içinde yaşanılan toplumun kültürü tarafından yorumlanarak yapılandırılmakta ve toplumun kadın ve erkekten beklentileri de buna göre şekillenmektedir. Kadınlık ve erkeklik cinsiyet hiyerarşileri içerisinde kurulup şekillenmektedir.

Son yıllara kadar cinsiyet hiyerarşisinin kurulumunda eşitsiz kurulan ilişkiler kadın mağduriyeti üzerinden okunmaktaydı. Eşitsiz cinsiyet ilişkilerini sadece kadın odaklı ve kadın mağduriyeti üzerinden düşünmek eşitsizlik ve sömürü dinamiklerini açıklamak noktasında eksik kalabilmektedir. Ayrıca eşitsizliğin tarafı olarak ‘erkek olmak’ zorunda olmanın kendisi zorlayıcı ve dayatmacı bir süreçtir. “Erkeklik, diğer erkekler için ve onların önünde, dişillığe karşı ve dişil olma korkusuyla kurulan bir kategoridir” (Bourdieu 2001, s. 53); ve “erkeklik davranış ve değerlerinin biyolojik bir zorunluluktan kaynaklanan kültürel oluşumlar olarak değil, toplumsal bağlamlarda gerçekleşen iktidar örüntüleri içinde şekillenen farklı farklı sosyal tarzlar, “inşa”lar olduğu kabulüne doğru kayan bir yaklaşımın egemen olmaya başladığını” söylemek mümkündür (Sancar 2011, s. 29). Dolayısıyla erkekliğin “testosteron hormonu seviyesine, kromozom dizilimine, üreme organlarına endekli bedensel-biyolojik bir kıstas olmadığını, toplumsal ve kültürel çerçeveler içinde muhtelif mücadelelerle şekillenen, bireyin yön verdiği ancak toplumsal etkileşimle anlam kazanan ve sürekli yeniden yorumlanan, tartışılan bir ‘ürün’, bir dışavurum ya da icra (performans)” (Özbay, 2013, s. 188) olduğu düşünülmektedir.

Türkiye’de erkeklik çalışmaları, erkeklik çalışmalarının disiplinlerarası bir alana taşınarak, edebiyat, medya, kültür çalışmaları gibi alanları içermeye başladığı üçüncü dalga erkeklik çalışmalarının içinde, yani 90’ların başında yankı bulabilmiştir (Barutçu, 2013, s. 13).

Ancak erkekliğin feminizm alanında sorunsallaştırılması çok sancılı bir süreçtir. Gerçekten erkekler patriyarkanın kendilerine sağladıkları konforu ellerinin tersiyle itip eşitlik temelinde bir duruş sergileyebilecekler midir? Yoksa erkeklerin yalnızca feminizm yanlısı olabilecekleri kanısı daha mı rasyonel bir durumdur? Kentli, orta sınıf, eğitilmiş, profesyonel meslek sahibi ve hatta çoğu solcu ya da liberal görüşlü erkek, kendilerini eşitlik ve özgürlük düşüncelerinin savunucuları ilan etmelerine rağmen, erkek egemenliğini hiç temel bir toplumsal eşitsizlik sorunu olarak görmeyebiliyorlar. Aslında bu kesim erkeklerin içinde çok önemli eleştirel bir sorgulama da yok değildi. Ama erkek egemenliğine karşı yükselen sesler daha yoksul çevrelerde büyümüş, Kürt veya Alevi olarak dışlanma ve baskı yaşamış, gerçekten eril şiddetin nesnesi olmuş ve bu çelişkiler içinde kendi yolunu aramaya çalışan erkekler arasından yükseliyordu (Sancar, 2011, s. 11). Buradan yola çıkarak eşitsiz ekonomik dağılım veya etnik ötekileştirmelere maruz kalmak üzerinden hak arayan sol hareketlerin aynı eşitlik talebini cinsiyetler arası eşitsizlikleri giderme konusunda da hayata geçirip/geçiremedikleri tartışılması gereken bir konudur.

Çalışmanın örneklemini oluşturan BDP veya genel olarak Kürt Hareketinin mensupları olan erkek aktörler bir yandan siyaset yaparken bir yandan da gündelik yaşamda cinsiyet eşitliğini ön plana çıkaran bir söylemi gündelik yaşam pratiklerinde dolaşıma sokma iddiasındadırlar. Dolayısıyla cinsiyet eşitliği vaadi olan 'yeni kadınlık' ve 'yeni erkeklik' tanımları ve açılımları vardır. "Kadınlık ve erkekliğin günlük hayattaki biçimleri değiştirilmeden hiç kimse, hiçbir cemaat, hiçbir milli hareket militarize edilemez" (Enloe, 2011, s. 219).

Kürt hareketi de kendi tarihini yazarken bir cinsiyet politikası teorize ederek gündelik yaşam pratiğinin nasıl olması gereğine vurgu yapmıştır. BDP'nin cinsiyet söylemi siyasal olarak partinin varoluşuyla değil, 1980 sonrası PKK'nin cinsiyet söylemi ile beslenmektedir. Abdullah Öcalan birçok metinde 'yeni kadınlık' ve 'yeni erkekliğin' nasıl olması gerektiğini tartışmakta<sup>2</sup> ve kimlik siyasetiyle beraber günlük yaşamı da kurmaktadır. "Mademki önemli bir devrim sürecine giriliyor ve bu konuda gerçekten sorunların köklü çözümüyle karşı karşıya

bulunuluyor, o halde en azından soruna teorik bir yaklaşımın geliştirilmesi ve eğer kişiler kendilerine güveniyorsa bunun günlük pratik ilişkilere de yansıtılması kesinlikle gerekli olan bir yaklaşımdır” (Öcalan, 1993, s. 13). Kimlik mücadelesi yürütürken kadınlık ve erkekliğin değişmesi gerektiğine değinerek PKK'deki kadınları özgürleşmeye, erkekleri değişime çağırılmaktadır. Erkekliğin dönüşümünün de kadın özgürlüğüyle gerçekleşebileceği teorisini de şu şekilde kurar: Kadının özgürlüğe yaklaşımı güçlü olmalıdır. Erkeğin kendini eşit ve özgür ilişkiye hazır hale getirmesi gerekir. Ayrıca kadınsız devrimin gelişemeyeceğini, kadın özgürlüğü sağlanmadan toplumun ve tabii ki erkeğin de özgürleşemeyeceğinin (1993, s. 106) gereğine vurgu yaparak kadınları özgürleşmeye çağırırken, erkeklerin de yaratılıştan geldiğini sandıkları, gelenek, görenek, ahlak ve hatta dini öğretilerle pekişen özellikleriyle savaşmaları (1993, s. 40) gerektiği yönünde erkekleri erkeklerini öldürmeye çağırılmaktadır. Diğer milliyetçi, siyasal, ulus kurtuluş hareketleri gibi kimlik mücadelesini yürütürken kadınları mobilize etmek için bir formülasyon geliştirmiştir. İdeoloji, işe geleneksel Kürt ailesi olmak üzere, kadınlar üzerinde hegemonya kuran ve kadınları denetleyen kurumları eleştirmekle başlamıştır. Kürt kadınların maruz kaldığı baskı hem cinsel hem de etnik olduğundan dolayı harekete katılımlarının kolaylaştığı söylenebilir. 1993 yılları itibarıyla siyasal zeminde kimlik mücadelesi yürüten DEP (Demokrasi Partisi) döneminde kayıpları ve acıları üzerinden siyasal yapıya eklenen, gösteri ve mitinglerde beyaz tülbenekli ‘ana’lar görünür olmuşlardır. Her Cumartesi günü, İstanbul’da Galatasaray Lisesi önünde toplanan kadınlar, “Cumartesi Anneleri” ya da “kayıp anneleri” adıyla kamusal bir imaj yarattılar. Anne imajı, 1999 yılında silahların susmasının ardından “barış anneleri” grubunun oluşumunda işlev görmüştür. Bu kadınlar başta çocukları olmak üzere aile fertlerinin gözaltına alınması, tutuklanması, dağa gitmesi ya da öldürülmesi sonucu daha da politikleşmişlerdir” (Çağlayan, 2010, s. 168-169). Politize olan anneler hem erkek siyasetçiler açısından siyasal rekabet anlamında bir tehdit oluşturmamış hem de topluluğun motivasyonunu da arttırmıştı. Kürt kadınlara yüklenen/Kürt kadınların üstlendiği “ana”, “yurtsever



anne” rolünden beklenen, bütün bu yaşanan olumsuzlukları ve kayıpları nesilden nesile aktararak ulusal bilincin sürdürülmesi ve yeniden üretilmesini sağlamalarıdır. “Bu bağlamda ulusal hareketin erkek liderleri kadınlara, modernleşen bir ulusun ikonları ve “anavatanın kutsanmış anneleri” olarak “kurallara bağlı” ve “namuslu” bir rol biçmişlerdi” (Mojab, 2005, s. 102). Ancak bu yaklaşım kadınların parti içinde çalışıp bilinçlenmesi, yapı içerisindeki cinsiyet eşitsizliklerinin farkına varmasıyla siyasal alanda yeni bir kadın kimliğinin oluşmasına zemin hazırlamıştır. “Ana” kimliği aynı ideoloji içerisinde sempatisini korumakla beraber yeni genç kadın aktörler ortaya çıkmıştır.

Hareketin söylemi siyasal alanda kadınların aktif katılımı ve zamanın ruhuna da uyarak form değiştirmektedir. Kurtarılacak kadın veya özgürleştirilmeye muhtaç kadın çoktan geride kalmış ve söylem ‘özgürleştirecek kadın’a doğru evrilmiştir. Yani ulusu da kendisi ile beraber özgürleştirecek kadın imgesi daha görünür olmuştur. Kadın, bu söylem ve pratikler doğrultusunda gösteri ve mitinglerde varlığını hissettirmiş, siyasal zeminde ve hareketin dağ kadrolarında görevler alarak kamusal alanda görünürlülük kazanmıştır. 2000’lerin başında siyasal alanda daha genç bir kadın kitlesi var olmuştur. Ancak diğer ulusal ve milliyetçi hareketlerde olduğu gibi ulusal davaya hizmet etmek adına kendi ikincil konumlarını sorgulamamalıdır (Çağlayan, 2010). Bu noktada kadından beklenen, ilk etapta ulusal talepler ışığında vereceği bir uğraştır.

Kadınlar kendi deneyimleri ve bu deneyimlerini sorunsallaştırmaları/deneyimlerin sorunsallaştırılması yolu ile kamusal alanda ‘özne’ olarak konumlanmışlardır. Buldukları siyasal yapılanma içerisinde eril siyasete gösterdikleri direniş sayesinde aktif rol almaya başlamışlardır. Michael Foucault (2005) öznel deneyim biçimlerinin sorunsallaştırmalar yoluyla oluşturulduklarını, geliştirildiklerini ve dönüştürüldüklerini öne sürüyor. Yine öznenin inşasını şu şekilde tanımlar: Bireyi kategorize ederek, bireyselliğiyle belirleyerek, kimliğine bağlayarak, ona hem kendisinin hem de başkalarının onda tanımak zorunda olduğu bir hakikat yarası dayatarak doğrudan gündelik yaşama müdahale eder. Bu, bireyleri özne yapan bir iktidar biçimidir. Kürt

kadının içinde bulunduğu mücadele politik özneler inşa etmiştir. Artık kadınlar, “milli kurgulara ve militarist süreçlere, sadece erkek askerlerin anaları ya da onurlarının sembolü olarak dâhil olmuyorlar” (Çağlayan, 2013, s. 29).

2002 genel seçimlerinde kota uygulamaları DEHAP tarafından uygulanmıştır ve diğer seçimlere oranla birçok açıdan farklılık olduğu aday listelerinden anlaşılmıştır. 2002 DEHAP listelerindeki kadın adayların sayısı yüzü aşmıştır. Bunların yarısı ilk üç sırada aday gösterilmişti. Aralarında Adana, Ağrı, Batman, Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, İstanbul (3. Bölge), Siirt, Şanlıurfa, Van gibi oy potansiyelinin yüksek olduğu iller de bulunmak üzere 25 ilde kadınlar ilk sırada adaydı (Çağlayan, 2010, s. 144). Genel seçimleri takip eden yerel seçimlerde de DEHAP’ın listesinde birçok belediye başkan adayı kadınlardan oluşmaktaydı.

Kürt siyasal hareketinde kadın politikacı görünürlüğü DEHAP ile ivme kazanmış, daha sonra kurulan ve cinsiyet eşitliğine duyarlı siyaset iddiası olan partilerde artmıştır.

### **BDP’de Cinsiyete Duyarlı Söylem ve Pratikler**

**1** 2 Haziran 2011 seçimlerinde, seçim barajı uygulamasından dolayı, bağımsız olarak seçime girmiş, seçim sonucunda 29 milletvekili BDP çatısı altında toplanmıştır. 29 milletvekili içerisinde, kadın vekil sayısı hukuki engellerden dolayı parti üyesi olamayan Leyla Zana da dâhil olmak üzere 10’dur. BDP’nin kadın vekil profili alışılmışın dışında, “ne liderin yakın çevresinden gelen ve bu nedenle güvenilir bulunan kadın kategorisinde ne de yüksek eğitim düzeyi, mesleki statü, sınıfsal konumu vb. özellikler açısından uygun bir vitrin oluşturması beklenen ‘seçkin’ kadın kategorisine uyuyor” (Çağlayan, 2013, s. 142). Profilleri eğitilmiş/eğitimsiz, genç/orta yaşlı, meslek sahibi/ücretli bir işte çalışmayan olarak çeşitlilik göstermektedir.

BDP tarafından 2014 yerel seçimlerinde yüzde kırk kadın kotası uygulanmış ve Türkiye’de ilk defa eşbaşkanlık sisteminin uygulaması

görülmüştür. 'Kota sistemi, siyasette kadınlara eşit temsil hakkını sağlamaya yönelik bir pozitif ayrımcılık sistemidir. Anayasa ve seçim yasalarınca ulusal ya da bölgesel düzeyde öngörülen kadın kotaları olabildiği gibi, partilerin aday gösterdikleri kadın sayısı ve adayların sıralanma biçimlerine ilişkin ilkelerin benimsenmesi de bir kota şekli olabilir (Aydemir, 2011, s. 34).<sup>3</sup> Kota uygulaması hakkındaki temel tartışma, bu uygulamanın milletvekillerinin niteliğini düşürüp düşürmeyeceği sorusu etrafında dönmektedir (Aydemir, 2011, s. 36).<sup>4</sup> Daha açık bir şekilde kadınların sadece kadın olmalarından dolayı aday gösterilmemesi gerektiği, siyasal bilgi ve donanımına sahip olmaları durumunda siyaset içinde var olmaları gerektiği yönünde tartışmalar ve görüşler mevcuttur. Ancak bu yöndeki tartışmaların cinsiyet körü tartışmalar olduğunu belirtmek gerekmektedir. Kadınların birçok alanda olduğu gibi siyasetten de dışlandıkları, siyasal alanda ancak var olarak bu deneyimleri edinebilecekleri ve her şekilde siyasal alanda var olmaları gerekliliğine vurgu yapılmalıdır.

BDP ve daha sonra aktif siyaset yürüten HDP (Halkların Demokrasi Partisi) başkanlık pozisyonlarının tamamında başkanlardan birinin kadın bir diğersinin ise erkek olduğu bir eşbaşkanlık sistemi ile seçimlere girmiştir. Eşbaşkanlık sistemi uygulaması, eril olarak kurgulanan siyaset içerisinde, kadın eşbaşkanın sadece *vitrinde* kalma ve pasifize edilme riskini de barındırmaktaydı. Ancak siyasal pratiklerden anlaşılacağı üzere parti içerisindeki her pozisyonda siyaset yürüten kadın eşbaşkanlar ön planda olmuşlar, partinin yerel ve ulusal siyasetine yön verici olarak aktif siyaset yapmışlardır. Ayrıca 'eşbaşkanlık' uygulamasının sadece genel başkanlık düzeyinde değil, siyasetin tüm kademelerinde de uygulanması ve yüzde 50 kadın kotasının zorunlu hale getirilmesi için kanun teklifi verilmiştir<sup>5</sup>. Örneğin 2014 yerel seçimlerinde, kadın adayların genellikle liste başı olmaması veya partilerin kesin kazanacağı illerde aday gösterilmemeleri alışkanlığının kırıldığı görülmektedir. Diyarbakır Büyükşehir Belediyesi, BDP'nin kazanacağına kesin bakılan bir il olmasına rağmen kadın bir aday gösterilmiş ve aday gösterilen Gültan Kışanak belediye başkanlığını kazanmıştır. Bu doğrultuda yerel seçimlerde, BDP'nin eşbaşkanları ile

Büyükşehir kadın belediye başkan sayısı 5, il, ilçe ve belde belediyelerde kadın belediye başkan sayısı 105 olmuştur. Diğer partilerin kadın belediye başkan sayıları ile bir kıyaslama yapılacak olursa;

Belediye başkanlıklarının partilere göre dağılımı:

- BDP- 23 belediye başkanı (resmi başkan) (+54 eşbaşkan)
- CHP- 7 belediye başkanı
- AK Parti - 6 belediye başkanı
- DP- 1 belediye başkanı<sup>6</sup>

BDP'nin, cinsiyet politikası açısından 1980'ler sonrası Kürt hareketinin cinsiyet politikasıyla beslenmekle beraber 2000'lerde kurulmuş bir parti olarak, küresel feminist hareketlerin etkisiyle, hareketin içerisindeki kadınların katkısı ve dönüşümü ve dolayısıyla erkeklerin de uğradığı dönüşümle cinsiyet politikası da evrilmiştir. 1980'ler PKK ideolojisinde, kadını özgürleşmeye, erkekliliği dönüştürmeye davet eden söylem 2000'lerle yaşamın her alanında cinsiyet eşitliğine davet eden bir söyleme dönüşmüştür. Yaşamın her alanında cinsiyet eşitliği olması gereği söylemi ve pozitif ayrımcılıklar parti tüzüğünde belirtilmiştir. BDP tüzüğü, işleyişi ve yönetim anlayışında parti, "insanların özgürleşmesini cinsler arası eşitlikte gören; bu temelde özgür, demokratik-ekolojik toplumu hedefleyen demokratik, özgürlükçü eşitlikçi sol bir kitle partisi" (BDP madde 2) olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Parti bünyesinde akademide verilecek eğitimlerin de şoven, militarist, milliyetçi ve toplumsal cinsiyetçi öğelerden arındırılacağı (BDP 70-72) belirtilmektedir. "Aile kurumunda toplumsal cinsiyetçi rollerin aşılmasını ve gelenekselleşmiş aile yapısının demokratikleşmesini ertelenemez bir sorun" (BDP 85) olarak ele alır. 'Erkeklik' ve 'kadınlık' rolleri aile içinden başlayarak öğrenilmekte, aile toplumsal cinsiyet rollerini kuran, besleyen ve sonraki kuşaklara aktaran, arzunun ve kadın bedeninin kontrol edilmeye çalışıldığı bir kurumdur. 1980'lerde yapılan aile kurumu eleştirisinin BDP'de de sürdüğü ve cinsiyet politikasının bir parçası olduğu anlaşılmaktadır. Tüzüğün 5. maddesindeki "Kadının cinsler arası eşitlik ilkesiyle, Medeni Kanun'dan kaynaklanan haklarını gözetmek amacıyla, birden fazla evlilik

yapanların üyelikleri düşürülür” ifadesi ile geleneksel aile örüntüsü olan birden fazla evliliğin onaylanmadığı bir politika yürütülmektedir.

Parti tüzük ve yönetim anlayışının yanında partinin siyasetçilerinin haberlere konu olan açıklamaları, sosyal medya paylaşımları ve TBMM açıklamaları da partinin cinsiyet söylemini anlamamız noktasında ipuçları vermektedir. 2014 Cumhurbaşkanlığı seçim propagandasında BDP genel başkanı Selahattin Demirtaş yeni yaşam çağrısında LGBTİ bireylere yönelik düşüncelerini ortaya koyarak<sup>7</sup> cinsiyetçi öğelerden arındırılmış bir politika sürdüreceklerine değinmiştir. Yine TBMM’de LGBTİ bireylerin hakları için araştırma önergesi verilmiştir.<sup>8</sup> Kürt Hareketinin LGBTİ hakları ile ilgili özgürlükçü söylemleri BDP siyaseti itibariyle görünür olmuştur. Yine Cumhurbaşkanlığı seçim adaylığı sürecinde KADER ile buluşan ve kadınların sorularını yanıtlayan Selahattin Demirtaş kürtaj konusunda sürdürülen tartışmalarla ilgili “kadın bedeni üzerinde kimsenin tasarruf hakkı yok. Devletin bunu tartışması bile utanç verici. Bu kadının birey olarak vereceği bir karardır. Ne kocanın ne de Başbakan’ın elindedir”<sup>9</sup> yönünde açıklamalarla iktidarın bedenler üzerindeki kontrol ve denetiminin olmasına eleştirel bir yaklaşım getirmiştir. Kürt hareketinin kadın bedenine yapılan müdahaleler doğrultusunda kadının kendi bedeni üzerinde karar hakkına sahip olduğu yönündeki söylemler 2000’ler itibariyle görünür olmaktadır. Kuşkusuz kadın politikacıların ve parti tabanının politik ve feminist örgütlerle deneyimleri, siyasal alanın da söylemine yön vermektedir. Ayrıca Kürt Siyasi Hareketi’nin, HDP’den itibaren yürüttüğü siyasetin daha geniş kitlelerce sempati bulması feminist oluşumlarla daha çok etkileşim kurmasına katkı sağlamıştır.

Bu bağlamda, kadın temsili konusunda cinsiyet eşitsizliğinin karşısında tutum sergileyen BDP’nin, gerek kota uygulaması, gerek eşbaşkanlık sistemi gerekse de kadın belediye başkanı ve milletvekili sayısı ve aday sayısı bakımından cinsiyet eşitliğine duyarlı bir siyaset izlediği söylenebilir.

## Gerilimler: Geleneksellikten ‘Erkeklığı Öldür(eme)meye’

**H**areketin erkek aktörlerince BDP’nin kadın politikasının bir değerlendirmesi yapılırken, BDP’nin kadın özgürlüğü ideolojisinin BDP ile başlamadığı, referans noktasının PKK ve lideri Abdullah Öcalan olduğu anlaşılıyor. Görüşülen siyasetçilerden Deniz<sup>10</sup>, kadın özgürlüğü ideolojisinin çıkış noktasını ve bu konudaki fikirlerini şu şekilde anlatıyor:

Yani aslında bu politikanın mimarı PKK lideri Abdullah Öcalan’dır. PKK’nin şöyle bir tarzı var: yani diyalektiği şöyle algılıyor. Çelişkiler nerde derinleşmişse devrimci çıkış da orda olabilir... Tabii bütün bu çelişkinin ve sömürünün katmerleşerek geliştiği kimlik de kadın kimliğidir. Yani bu kimliğin kendisi aynı zamanda devrimci bir nitelik taşıyor. Çıkış buradan geliyor(Deniz, 37 yaşında, üniversite mezunu, bekâr, parti meclisi üyesi).

Tam da bu noktada Kürt halkının ezilmişliği ile kadının ezilmişliği üzerinden bir özdeşim kurularak kadın özgürlüğü ideolojisinin çelişkilerin birleştiği noktadan meydana geldiği anlaşılmalıdır. Bizim partide kadın politikası yeni bir olay değil, ta 1990'lara dayanıyor. Yani illegal alanda başlayan bir söylem (Mehmet, 56 yaşında, evli, kamu kuruluşundan emekli, eşi ücretli bir işte çalışmıyor, eşi siyasetçi, belediye başkan yardımcısı).

“Eşi üzerindeki baskıları protesto amaçlı sokağa çıktı (kadın). Zamanla onun bir kimlik mücadelesi olduğunu gördü. Kimlik mücadelesine katıldıktan sonra kadın meselesi ile tanıştı” (Umut, 44 yaşında, üniversite mezunu, evli, eşi çalışıyor, belediye başkanı).

Bu bağlamda BDP’nin kadınlık veya kadın özgürlüğü söyleminin miladının PKK ideolojisi olduğunu söylemek gerekmektedir. Sonrasında Kürt hareketinin siyasal tabanını oluşturan partiler de kadın özgürlüğü ideolojisini geliştirerek teorize etmişlerdir. Başlangıç teorisi olarak

kadını *layık olduğu yere* getirmek olarak teorize edilen kadın ideolojisi, Tanrıça İřtar ve anaerkil dönem atıfları ile mitolojik referanslar bulundurmaktadır. Ulusal hareketlerin tümünde yeni bir tarih kurma aşamasında veya hareket teorize edilirken mitolojik atıflar<sup>11</sup>çok önemlidir. “Bu da geçmişe dair ‘şanlı’ bir motivasyon ve yeni kuşaklar için hem tarihsel hem de güncel bir ‘gurur’ kaynağı olacaktır. Böylelikle toplumun ve bireyin geçmiş, şimdiki ve gelecek zamanları bir ve tek zamanda çıkışabilmektedir” (Mermertaş, 2011, s. 25). Ancak mitolojik atıflar kullanılarak tasarlanan kadın özgürlüğü projesi hareketin ilk kadınlık söylemlerinden biridir. Zamanla bu söylem daha feminist bir perspektife oturtulmuş olmalıdır ki hareketin bugününde erkekler kadınlar adına artık konuşamamakta, kadınlar kendileriyle ilgili kararlar almaktadırlar. BDP’de kadın temsilinin diğer partilere oranla yüksek oluşu erkek siyasetçilerin sadakat ile bağılı oldukları ideolojinin gereğı bir övünç kaynağı olurken bazı siyasetçilerce kota uygulamasının yükseltilmesine karşı bir duruş görülmektedir:

Ama bizim partide Kürt kadınları diğer birçok kadından daha aktif ve özgür. Şimdi %50 kota istiyorlar, ben şahsen istemiyorum ama siyasal olarak kamusala çıkamayan kadınların da çıkması için iyi olur diye düşünüyorum” (Mehmet, 56 yaşında, evli, kamu kuruluşundan emekli, eşi ücretli bir işte çalışmıyor, eşi siyasetçi, belediye başkan yardımcısı).

Kadınların hareket içinde siyaset yürütmesinin hareketin üyelerince ne kadar normalize edildiğini Ali şu şekilde dile getirmektedir:

Özellikle bizim siyaset yaptığımız hareket içinde kadın yer edinmiş ve bizim için kadınların siyasette olması çok normal bir şey. Mesela kadınlar kitleye ulaşma konusunda çok avantajlı ve parti çalışmalarına çok yardımcı oluyorlar bu anlamda. Çalışma için bir evin kapısını çalmak gerekebiliyor onun için kadınlar evlere daha rahat gidip çalışma yürütebiliyorlar (Ali, 57 yaşında, emekli öğretmen,

evli, eşi ücretli bir işte çalışmıyor, eşi siyasetçi, belediye meclis üyesi).

Bir yandan da kadınlarla çalışmanın verimliliği kadınsılığa atfedilen şefkat, eşitlikçi olmak gibi özelliklerle anlatılmakta, duygusal zekâ kadına atfedilirken, kamusal alanın hareketliliği erkekliğe atfedilmektedir. Kadın, siyasal partinin özel alana ulaşması noktasında yardımına başvurulmuş, partinin özel alanla ilişkilerini kurmakla görevlendirilmiştir:

Kadınlarla çalışmak daha verimli kanaatindeyim daha önce zekadan söz ettim ilgi alanlarından dolayı bir yanda şefkat, bir yanda egemenlikçi yaklaşım, bir yanda eşitlikçidir bir yanda kendini üstün görme kendini korumadır şimdi erkekte de mevcut siyasi akımımıza baktığımızda erkekte yalpalama daha çoktur, rant peşinde koşma var bu kadında çok düşüktür. Şimdiye kadar denilmemiş bu kadın yönetici bunu elde etmiş (Ali, 57 yaşında, emekli öğretmen, evli, eşi ücretli bir işte çalışmıyor, eşi siyasetçi, belediye meclis üyesi).

Kadının siyasallaşması 'eril alana' yani sokağa çıkışın bir yolu olarak görülmektedir. Elbette ki kadın görünürlülüğünün artmasında Kürtlerin kırdan kente değişen yaşam koşulları yani kentleşme de büyük rol oynamaktadır. Aynı zamanda bu görünürlülük hali erkek iktidarının ortağı olarak iktidar sarsıcı bir mekanizmaya dönüşmektedir. Ana kimliğiyle siyasal alanda var olan kadın kimliği hareketin erkek siyasetçileri açısından tehdit oluşturmazken politik katılım ve siyasal alandaki deneyimleriyle siyasete yön verebilen kadınların politika yapmayı öğrenmeleri ve siyasal alanın dönüşümünü de sağlamaları hareketin içerisindeki cinsiyet düzenini de değişime uğratmıştır: *"Bir anlamda kadının sokağa çıkması siyasete, toplumsal yaşama katılması erkeklerin iktidar alanlarını elinden aldı"* (Ömer, 45 yaşında, lise mezunu, nişanlı, parti meclisi üyesi). Erkek siyasetçiler açısından kadınlarla siyaset yürütmek, kimi zaman olayları değerlendirme noktasında esnek ve demokratik bir bakış açısı getirmeleri yönüyle bir avantaj olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Bu avantaj geleneksel ataerkil örüntülerin



kırılmasında ve erkekliğin dönüşümü noktasında bir avantaj olarak da değerlendirilmektedir:

Biz hep öğreniyoruz onlardan. Mesela tespih sallıyorum. Çok severim ama bakışlar hemen bana bunu yapmamam gerektiğini gösteriyor. Veya kullandığımız vurgular örneğin argo veya sokak kültürü var bizde, ben sokak kültürünü de severim aynı zamanda örneğin anasını satayım diyoruz, durup düşününce neden babasını satayım demiyoruz ki, tepki gösteriyor kadın arkadaşlar. Bu ciddi bir göstergedir. Bunun yanlış olduğuna dair bir şey uyanıyor insanın kafasında. Bu sadece siyasal bir mesele değil aynı zamanda ahlaki de bir mesele. Bu kendinizi terbiye etmenizi sağlıyor(Deniz, 37 yaşında, üniversite mezunu, bekâr, parti meclisi üyesi).

Tam da noktadan hareketle erkek siyasetçiler siyasetin Kürt Siyasi Hareketi için sadece alanlardan, mitinglerden, kayıplardan, bir ulusu özgürleştirmekten ibaret olmayıp kişisel olanı da kapsadığı noktası ile yüzleşmektedir. Toplumsal eşitsizliklerin farkında olup cinsiyet eşitsizliğini dışarıda bırakamayacaklarını ve özgürlük söylemiyle imtihan edildiklerini düşünmektedirler.

Erkek siyasetçiler açısından, kadınların güçlenmesi ve siyasal alanda varlıkları bir yandan ataerkil örüntülerin kırılmasına kapı aralarken bir yandan da erkeklerin kendilerini *erkeklik krizi* içinde bulmalarına neden oluyor:

Erkeğin içindeki egemenlik iktidar alanlarını kaybetmeye dönük bir şeyi var. Daha önce emrettiği, hükmettiği, işte daha önce angarya işleri yaptırdığı, hiçe saydığı kadın bir anda eşiti olunca veya bunu iddia edince en büyük bunalımı erkek yaşadı(gülerek) (Ömer, 45 yaşında, lise mezunu, nişanlı, parti meclisi üyesi).

“Cinsiyet farkları rejimine dayalı eril tahakküm ilişkileri zaman içinde değişiyor; çünkü toplumsal ilişkiler sistemi değişiyor....Bugün egemen erkeklik değerlerinde ve tarzlarında yaşanan değişim, çoğu kez "erkeklik krizi" olarak nitelendiriliyor” (Sancar, 2011, s. 22). Ve erkekler erk sahibi olmaktan kadınlarla imtiyazlar konusunda pazarlıklar noktasına geliyorlar:

Ama hiçbir erkek de ben imtiyazlarımdan vazgeçiyorum demez. Bu biraz direnç ve karşı direnç meselesi. Kadın arkadaşlar bu konularda hiç geri adım atmıyorlar. Asıp kesiyorlar kılıçları sürekli ellerinde (Deniz, 37 yaşında, üniversite mezunu, bekâr, parti meclisi üyesi).

Kadınların siyasal alandaki varlıkları siyasal alanın demokratikleşmesine, eril siyaset dilinin evrilmesine neden olmakla beraber, erkek siyasetçilerde alanı paylaşma, erki yitirme kaygısı uyandırmaktadır. Bir yönüyle kadın siyasetçilerin varlığı erkekler açısından bir kontrol mekanizması oluşturmakta ve geleneksel ataerkil örüntü kodlarının yıkılmasına aracılık yapmaktadır.

### Ev İçi İş Bölümü

**K**amusal/siyasal alanda kadınlara yönelik özgürlük söyleminin yanında kadınları özgürleşmeye erkekleri ise değişmeye çağıran yeni cinsiyet söyleminin, erkek siyasetçilerin özel alanlarında, geleneksel ataerkil örüntüler içerisinde bir dönüşüm yaratıp yaratmadığı önemlidir. Evli olan erkek siyasetçilerin hemen hemen hepsi zaman problemleri olduğunu belirterek ev içi işbölümüne katılmadıklarını belirtmişlerdir:

Ben mesela sabah erken uyanırım kahvaltıyı ben hazırlarım. Aslında evdeki işlere katılmam gerektiğini biliyorum ama yüzde 70'ini yapamıyorum. Çünkü hakikaten zaman çok sıkıntı benim için (Mehmet, 56 yaşında, evli, kamu kuruluşundan emekli, eşi ücretli bir işte çalışmıyor, eşi siyasetçi, belediye başkan yardımcısı).

Benim evde iş yapmak için çok zamanım olmuyor. Ailem ile yaşarken yani bekâr iken anneme yardım ediyordum. Mesela bulaşık yıkardım. Cezaevinde de kaldığım için bizde işler komünal yapılır. Ama şu an siyasetin yoğunluğundan dolayı işlere yetişemiyorum ve zaten gece eve geç gittiğim için ev işlerine yardımım olmuyor(Ali, 57 yaşında, emekli öğretmen, evli, eşi ücretli bir işte çalışmıyor, eşi siyasetçi, belediye meclis üyesi).

Sedat, siyasal yaşamın zamanını alıyor olmasını ifade ederken ev işlerini kadın işi olarak kodlamamaktadır: *“Yani mesela benim eşim dışarıdaki işleri de yapar. Yani evdekileri eşim, dışarıdaki işleri ben yaparım diye ayırmıyoruz. O da fatura ödüyor”* (Sedat, 37 yaşında, ilkokul mezunu, evli, eşi ücretli bir işte çalışmıyor, BDP il başkanı). Çocuk doğurmanın biyolojik olması nedeniyle ‘kadın işi’ olarak tanımlandığı anlaşılmış, teorik de olsa diğer bütün gündelik hayat pratiklerinde ‘kadın işi’, ‘erkek işi’ ayrımına değinilmemiştir: *“Mesela erkekler çocuk doğuramaz. Bunun dışındaki bütün işlerin ve görevlerin erkeğin de yapabileceğine inanıyorum”* (Sedat, 37 yaşında, ilkokul mezunu, evli, eşi ücretli bir işte çalışmıyor, BDP il başkanı).

Görüşülen siyasetçilerin büyük bir çoğunluğunun ev içi iş bölümü konusunda cinsiyetçi bir yaklaşımlarının olmadığı, özellikle siyasetçilerin genç oluşları ve eşin çalışması durumunda ev içi işbölümüne katılma yoğunluğunun fazla olduğu söylenebilir:

Evliyken ev içi işbölümüne katılıyordum. Uzun yıllar bekâr yaşayanlarda komün hayat doğal bir şey haline geliyor. Kendimi bu anlamda hep masaya yatırmaya çalıştım. Benimle yaşayanlar nasıl algılar bilmiyorum ama ben kendimi bu şekilde görüyorum (Deniz, 37 yaşında, üniversite mezunu, bekâr, parti meclisi üyesi).

Ayrıca, siyasetçilerin bir kısmı, işbölümüne katılamamalarını yaşamlarını paylaştıkları kadınların tutumlarına bağlamaktadırlar. Deniz bu durumu şöyle açıklamaktadır:

Pratikte ev işlerini kadının işi olarak görmüyorum. En zorlandığım kişi annem, her şeyi üstleniyor, ev işini kendi işi gibi görüyor. Kız kardeşler de öyle ama biraz daha kırılmış. Kız arkadaşlarla daha modern kurgular hâkim olduğu için işbölümü daha rahat yapılabiliyor. Daha çok ilişkiniz birbirini anlamaya ve beslemeye dönük oluyor (Deniz, 37 yaşında, üniversite mezunu, bekâr, parti meclisi üyesi).

Görüşmecilerden çocuk sahibi olanlar, çocuk bakımını genel olarak kadının sorumluluk alanı olarak kodlamışlardır. Görüşmecilerin bir kısmı çocuk bakımını yapamamayı zaman yetersizliklerinden dolayı evde zaman geçirememeye bir kısmı da geleneksel kurgulara bağlamaktadır:

Çocuk bakımında kendimi sorumlu hissediyorum ancak mesela çocuğun altını değiştirmişliğim yoktur. Dediğim gibi bizim partide siyaset yapmak için fazla emek ve zaman harcamanız gerekiyor ve ailenizi ihmal etmiş oluyorsunuz. Yani şu anda çocuklarım küçük ama onları, sen kızsın veya sen erkeksin şunu yapma bunu etme diye büyütmemeye çalışıyorum. Erkek çocuğumda kız çocuğum gibi evde bence her şeyi yapmalıdır (Ali, 57 yaşında, emekli öğretmen, evli, eşi ücretli bir işte çalışmıyor, eşi siyasetçi, belediye meclis üyesi).

12, 10, 5 yaşlarındalar çocuklarım. Bakımları desem. Ben eşim kadar ilgilenebilirim desem yalan olur. Mesela altını temizlememişim. Çok nadiren mesela evde olmadığında eşim. O da çok nadir. Özellikle sonuncu çocukta, diğerlerini hiç yapmadım. Evet, ama zaman geçtikçe yapıyı, örgütü tanıdık, kadına bakış açımız bayağı değişti. Daha önce bende böyle değildim (Hüseyin, 38 yaşında, ilkokul mezunu, evli, eşi çalışıyor, BDP il yöneticisi).

**(Na)mahrem Alanlar**

**G**eleneksel ataerkil ilişkilerin baskın olarak yaşandığı kültürlerde, namus kavramı insanlarca içi doldurularak, buna önem atfedilmektedir. Kürtlerin yoğun olarak yaşadıkları bölgeler, geleneksel ilişkilerin baskın olduğu ve muhafazakâr bir yapının hüküm sürdüğü bölgelerdir. Dolayısıyla namus kadın bedeni üzerinden okunmaktadır. Kadın-erkek ilişkilerini yeniden kuran ve cinsiyetleri yeniden inşa iddiası olan hareketin mensuplarının bu anlamdaki tutumlarının geleneksellikten ne ölçüde uzaklaştığı bu çalışma kapsamında önemsenen bir husustur. Namus kavramını konuşmak hem görüşmecilere zor gelmiş hem de görüşmeciler tarafından zor tanımlanabilecek bir kavram olarak açıklanmıştır. Namusun bazı görüşmeciler için geleneksel öğretiler ve bağlı buldukları ideolojinin öğretileri arasında karar veremedikleri bir yerde olması bu konu üzerine konuşmalarını zorlaştırmıştır:

Bu zor bir soru. Örneğin benim eşim ben tüm gün dışarıdayken veya gece akli bende kalmıyorsa ben de o dışarıdayken başına bi şey mi geldi? diye düşünmemek istiyorum. Onun kadar rahat olmak istiyorum. Benim eşim de kadın hareketinde çalışıyor. Yıllar önce gözaltına alınmıştı. Mesela ordayken ben namusum kirlendi diye düşünmedim. Çünkü orda birçok şey olabiliyor. Nasıl işkencelerin yapıldığını biliyoruz. Bunu onur kırıcı olarak görmedim (Mehmet, 56 yaşında, evli, kamu kuruluşundan emekli, eşi ücretli bir işte çalışmıyor, eşi siyasetçi, belediye başkan yardımcısı.).

Kadın bedenin mahrem olma algısı kırılmış ve Kürt hareketi uğruna, yani kimlik mücadelesi nedeni ile gözaltına alınma, gözaltında kadın bedenine yönelik cinsel işkence ve bunun pornografisi, kadın bedeninin tahayyüllerdeki mahremiyetini ortadan kaldırmıştır. Aynı zamanda vatan, millet, onur gibi değerler de namus olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Kadın bedeni Kürtlerin değerleri ile özdeşleştirilerek bir namus tasviri yapılmaktadır. Ali bu konuyu şöyle ifade etmektedir:

Eskiden dedim ya namus kavramı öyle anlaşılıyor cinsiyetçi bir bakış açısıyla, halen de toplumun önemli bir kesimi hala öyle bakıyor, bunu aşan da azımsanmayacak derecede, insanlar namusu, onurunu, değerini halkını öyle namus olarak değerlendiriyor (Ali, 57 yaşında, emekli öğretmen, evli, eşi ücretli bir işte çalışmıyor, eşi siyasetçi, belediye meclis üyesi).

BDP'nin cinsel yönelimleri de içinde barındıran cinsiyet söylemi çerçevesinde ayrı ayrı siyasetçilerin ötekileştirilenler arasından eşcinselliğe nasıl baktıkları da konuşuldu. Bireysel olarak kimliklerin inşa edilmiş olduğunu düşünen Deniz bu konu ile ilgili fikirlerini şu şekilde ifade etmiştir:

Cinsiyetçi kimlikler doğal kimlikler değil, sosyolojinin oluşturduğu kimlikler. Dünyanın her zamanında ve tarafında eşcinseller oldu. Heteroseksüellerin daha ahlaklı olma gibi bir hali söz konusu değil. Eşcinsellerin uğradığı haksızlıkları savunmak konusunda bir öz eleştiri vermeliyiz. Bunların hepsi eğitim işi ve zaman işi. Kamusal alanı buna hazırlamak lazım. (Umut, 44 yaşında, üniversite mezunu, evli, eşi çalışıyor, belediye başkanı).

Kişisel olarak cinsel yönelimlere karşı bir tepki olmamakla beraber cinsel yönelimler konusunda yaşanan haksızlıklara yeterli tepki geliştirilemediği ve BDP tarafından bu konunun yeterince gündemleştirilmediği söylenebilir. Umut'un ifadelerinden Kürtlerin, ötekileştirildiklerinden dolayı diğer ötekileştirilen grupları anladığı ve diğer ötekileştirilen gruplara karşı ön yargılı olmadıkları anlaşılmaktadır. BDP çatısı altında ve özellikle yeni kurulan HDP'de eşcinsel üyelerin olduğu ve beraber çalışma yürüttüklerini şöyle dile getirmektedir:

Daha esnek bir tutum var, biraz davayı, mücadeleyi bilen, üç beş şey okuyan insanlar homofobik değiller, en azından öyle gözüküyorlar, tepkilenmiyorlar, bence bu da önemli bir şey. Yani dediğim gibi onlar da sonuçta bizim gibi bir

insanlar (Umut, 44 yaşında, üniversite mezunu, evli, eşi çalışıyor, belediye başkanı).

Diğer görüşmecilerin aksine Hasan eşcinsellik konusunda işlevselci bir tutum sergileyerek bu konuyla ilgili görüşlerini şu şekilde ifade etmektedir:

Toplumsal bakış açısıyla sapkınlıktır. Ha doğal olarak ben kadının veya erkeğin eşcinsel olmasına karşıyım. Çünkü fonksiyonları bellidir doğası gereği. Biraz daha şeyi tamamen özgürlükten ziyade fonksiyonel olarak bakmak gerekir çünkü niye, bir eşcinsel çocuk doğurmaz. Bence duygusal anlamda bir sığınmadır. Tercihim değildir. İnsani olarak şey yapmam saygı gösteririm(41 yaşında, üniversite mezunu, bekâr, BDP il yöneticisi).

Sonuç olarak BDP' li siyasetçiler farklı cinsel yönelimler karşısında homofobik bir tutum sergilememekle beraber, Kürt Hareketi içerisinde siyaset yürütmek bu düşüncelerinin oluşmasında fazlasıyla etkili olmuştur. Ancak metropolde yaşıyor olmanın da cinsiyete duyarlı tutumu pekiştirdiği düşünülmüştür.

### Erkeklik Öldü mü?

**K**amusal alanda ve özel alanda teorik olarak baskın bir şekilde kendini hissettiren söylemin kamusal alanda büyük ölçüde hedefine ulaştığı anlaşılmaktadır. Kadın politikacı sayısı, politika yapan kadınların yetki alanları ve kadınsız hiçbir örgütlenmenin olmaması buna en görünür örneklerdir. Ancak özel alanda bu cinsiyet söyleminin görünürlüğünü saptamak hayli zordur. Bu anlamda Kürt hareketinin cinsiyet söylemi doğrultusunda kadınlar gündem güne güçlenmekte ve özgürleşmektedir. Ancak erkeklerin hareketin 'erkekliği öldürme' söyleminden ne kadar etkilendikleri ve dönüşümün yaşanıp yaşanmadığı, gelinen noktada halen muğlaktır: *"Demokratik bir erkeklik diyorsunuz? Buna cevap verirken doğrudan evet demek zor ama hayır*

*demeyeceğim” (Deniz, 37 yaşında, üniversite mezunu, bekâr, parti meclisi üyesi).*

Yani şimdi bir kere yeterli bulmuyorum. Tabii geçmişten çok daha iyi. Benimsediğimiz bir görüş ama bunu engelleyen faktörler çok fazla başta erkekler yani bizler yani, şimdi (Ali, 57 yaşında, emekli öğretmen, evli, eşi ücretli bir işte çalışmıyor, eşi siyasetçi, belediye meclis üyesi).

Yöneticimizdir mesela, büyük umutlar, dava için yola çıkmıştık ama işte ailede böyle bir durum yaşıyordu. Sonuçta kimlik mücadelesine inanmış ama ona göre kimlik mücadelesi için ödenen bedel yerindedir ama kadının yeri de budur ama o dönem kadın mücadelesi ile demokrasi mücadelesinin eşit olduğunu yeterince kavrayamamıştık (Umut, 44 yaşında, üniversite mezunu, evli, eşi çalışıyor, belediye başkanı).

Hala kendimizi adapte etmemişiz, belki hem kendimizi hem gençleri bu konuda eğitmek, yönlendirmek ve o perspektifi vermek lazım (Ömer, 45 yaşında, lise mezunu, nişanlı, parti meclisi üyesi).

İfadelerden, Kürt hareketinin erkekliği öldürme politikasının halen yeterince hayata geçmediği anlaşılmaktadır. Bu politikanın hayata geçmesinin bir yolu erkeklerin erkeklik imtiyazlarından vazgeçmesi koşuluna bağlıdır:

En azından şunu benimsetti. Erkek kimliği, erkeğin hak ettiği bir avantaj değil bunun reddetmesi gereken bir yapı olduğunu benimsedi. Ama bu kadın mücadelesinde bu imtiyazlarının reddedilmesi gerektiğini görüyorsun (Deniz, 37 yaşında, üniversite mezunu, bekâr, parti meclisi üyesi).

Görüşme yapılan erkekler arasında Kürt hareketinde uzun yıllar boyunca siyaset yapmış olanlar ve üst düzey yönetim (milletvekili, belediye başkanı, parti meclis üyesi vb.) kadrolarında siyaset yürütenlerin diğer



siyasetçilere göre kendilerindeki dönüşümü hızlandırdıkları saptanmıştır. Örneğin, bir parti üyesinin dönüşümünün daha çok zaman aldığını veya değişime direnç gösterdiğini Umut'un şu ifadelerinden anlayabiliriz:

Kadın kapıyı çalıp, yemeği, çayı, suyu uzatıyor erkek alıp koyuyor, bir erkek orda ayakta duruyor. Dönem dönem biz misafir olduğumuz evlerde kadın arkadaşların yüzünü göremedik. Birçok yerde arkadaşlarımız çok evliydi. Bir kısmı da kadınların erkekler tarafından kaçırılmasına yani 'eenolmuş?' çibuye jineke kurbanı nizamim kébibe (ne olmuş ki bir kadındır bilmem kime (kaçıran kişiye) kurban olsun'<sup>12</sup> diyorlardı. Kadınlar partiye gelmezdi yönetici bulmazdık, renk olsun diye bir iki isim konurdu ama yüzlerini görmezdik. Ancak aradan geçen 10 yılda çok gelişme kat edildiğini şu yaşam pratiği ile ifade etmektedir: 'İşte bugün misafir olduğumuz evde sizde gördünüz. Oturuyoruz birlikte yemek yiyoruz. Çok önemli bir şey, yirmi yıl önce misafir olduğun evde kadın asla erkek misafir yanında oturup yemek yemezdi. Küçük, basit ama bence büyük bir devrim. Bu aynı zamanda yaşamda diğer alanlarda da kadının ne kadar yol kat ettiğini gösteriyor. Kadınlar artık siyaset konuşuyor, eşlerini eleştiriyorlar (Umut, 44 yaşında, üniversite mezunu, evli, eşi çalışıyor, belediye başkanı).

Erkeklerin ister eğitim durumu ister yaş veya mensup oldukları sosyal sınıfın etkisi ile cinsiyete duyarlı kodları olsa da hareketin içinde çalışmanın bu konudaki duyarlılıklarını arttırdığı söylenmelidir:

Tabii insan politikleştikçe, kadınla erkek arasında aslında fizyolojik bir farklılık olabilir ama düşünsel, beyin, duygu, aktivite olarak çok bir farkın olmadığını farkına vardık. Dolayısıyla hareketi okuyup anladıkça geçmişimden de utandım. Muhtemelen birçok insan, biz ne kadar büyük eksiklik içerisindeymişiz dedik tabii ki harekete katılmanın

çok büyük katkıları oldu. Ben de o dönem, dediğim gibi, kız kardeşlerim evlilik çağları geldi diyen birisi iken (...) ( Umut, 44 yaşında, üniversite mezunu, evli, eşi çalışıyor, belediye başkanı).

Yani tabii ki bende yeni bir insan tipini yarattı, elbette ki yarattı. Yani bakış açısını değiştirdi. Her ne kadar geçmişte kadına karşı hümanist yaklaşımlar olsa bile hareket içerisinde çalışmak onunla birlikte olmak bu çalışmaların içinde yer almak elbette ki hem erkeğe karşı hem de kadına karşı bakış açımızı değiştirdi. Ama kendi adıma söylemek gerekirse gerçekten yaşamda yeniden yerini almak gibi bir arayışım bir tavrım gelişmiştir (Ahmet, 58 yaşında, lise mezunu, emekli, evli, eş ücretli bir işte çalışmıyor, BDP il yöneticisi).

Erkeklerin siyasal yaşamları ile beraber yaşamda yeni bir arayış içine girdikleri, kadın ve erkeğe yüklenmiş toplumsal cinsiyet kodlarının cinsiyete duyarlı bir hale evrildiği anlaşılmıştır. Ancak erkeklerin bu değişimin öznesi olmadıklarını söylemek yanlış olmayacaktır. Meydana gelen değişim kimi zaman her anlamda referans aldıkları hareketin öncüleri ve Abdullah Öcalan'ın çizdiği perspektiflerin hayata geçirilmesiyle – itme gücüyle – gerçekleşmektedir. Kimi zaman ise hareket içerisinde yapılanmasını oluşturan ve etki alanını genişleten kadın siyasetçiler veya kadınların yön vermeleri ile farkındalık gelişimi şeklinde olmaktadır:

Dolayısıyla mücadeledeki rolü erkeği harekete geçirmesi, onu gerçekten kendine gelmesini sağlaması açısından çok önemlidir. Hayatın gerçekliği nedir? Özgürlüğün ne anlama geldiği, kadın en çok ezildiği için erkekten daha fazla özgürlüğe ihtiyacı vardır. Kadının bir mücadelede yer alması, harekete geçirir. Hem kendisi hareketlidir ve harekete geçirir. Çünkü hareket onun çıkarına hizmet eder. Erkeğin de özgürleşmesini sağlar. Erkeği harekete geçirme noktasında önemli bir rolü vardır (Ahmet, 58 yaşında, lise mezunu, emekli, evli, eş ücretli bir işte çalışmıyor, BDP il yöneticisi).

## Sonuç

**B**DP her alanda cinsiyet eşitliğini gözeten bir politika yürüterek, kamusal alanın cinsiyetçi öğelerden arındırılması ve geleneksel ataerkil ilişkilerin sürdürücü ve besleyicisi olarak tanımlanan geleneksel ailenin yıkılması ve bir erkeklik dönüşümünün gerekliliğine vurgu yapan bir siyaset iddiası gütmektedir. En genel anlamda Kürt hareketinin *“kadınları özgürleşmeye, erkekleri ise erkekliği öldürmeye”* çağırın söylemi doğrultusunda hareketin erkek aktörlerinin, kamusal alandaki bu söylemi özel alanlarında nasıl dolaşıma soktukları, gündelik ilişkilerini bu söylem çerçevesinde nasıl yaşadıkları, Kürt hareketindeki cinsiyet ilişkilerini anlama noktasında önemlidir. Bu bağlamda, erkeklerin siyasal serüvenleri ile beraber yaşamda yeni bir arayış içine girdikleri, kadın ve erkeğe yüklenmiş toplumsal cinsiyet kodlarının cinsiyete duyarlı bir hale evirildiği anlaşılmıştır. Kürt hareketinin, geleneksel cinsiyet ilişkilerini hareketin erkeklerine sorgulatır hale getirdiği, kamusal alanda siyasetçi erkeklerce cinsiyetçi kodların kırılmaya uğradığı, Kürt hareketinin söyleminin özel alanda tartışılabilirliğinin arttığı ve gündelik yaşamların içerisine sızmaya başladığı söylenebilir. Cinsiyet eşitliği noktasında erkekler tam bir dönüşüm sağlayamasalar da ataerkilliğe, kendi erkeklik değerlerine eleştirel bakış açısı kazanmışlardır. Cinsiyet rollerine bakış açılarını hareketin söyleminin yanında erkeklerin siyaset içindeki pozisyonları – görevleri – eğitim durumları, kentlileşmeleri, eşlerinin tutumları ve eşin ücret karşılığı bir işte çalışıp çalışmaması da büyük oranda belirlemektedir. Bu bağlamda, Kürt hareketi içerisinde özellikle 1990’larla birlikte kadınlar hem içerisinde buldukları ve yürütücüsü oldukları politik alanı hem de özel alan ilişkileri içerisindeki iktidarı sarsmış ve rolleri yerinden etmiştir. Kadınların siyasal alandaki varlıkları alanın demokratikleşmesine, eril siyaset dilinin evrilmesine neden olmuştur. Paralel şekilde erkek siyasetçilerde (görüşmeler boyunca söyledikleri üzere), hem siyasal hem de özel alanı paylaşma, erki yitirme kaygısı uyandırdıkları anlaşılmıştır. Bir yönüyle kadın siyasetçilerin varlığı erkekler açısından bir kontrol mekanizması oluşturmakta ve

geleneksel ataerkil kodların sarsılmasına ve hatta yıkılmasına aracılık yapmaktadır. Erkeklerin ister eğitim durumu ister yaş veya mensup oldukları sosyal sınıfın etkisi ile cinsiyete duyarlı kodları olsa da bütün bu değişkenler bir yana Kürt hareketinin cinsiyet mefhumu üzerine olan genel politikaları içinde bulunmanın/çalışmanın cinsiyet eşitliği konusunda duyarlılıklarını arttırdığı söylenmelidir. Erkeklerin siyasal yaşamları ile beraber yeni bir arayış içine girdikleri, kadın ve erkeğe yüklenmiş toplumsal cinsiyet kodlarının cinsiyete duyarlı bir hale evrildiği anlaşılmıştır. Ama kamusal alanda cinsiyetlerin - yeniden - belirlenişi ve kırılmaya maruz kalan ataerkil örüntüler özel alanda aynı paralellikte ilerlememektedir. Cinsiyet politikasının özel alanda harekete geçmesini etkileyen farklı değişkenler mevcuttur. Erkekler hem kamusal hem de özel alandaki bu değişimin tek öznesi değil ama bu onlara rağmen gelişen bir süreç de değildir. Yani erkekler bir itme gücüyle de olsa, kısmen bu değişimin gönüllü katılımcısı durumundadır. Meydana gelen değişim, kimi zaman her anlamda referans aldıkları hareketin öncüleri ve özellikle Abdullah Öcalan'ın çizdiği perspektiflerin hayata geçirilmesiyle ya da bunun tazyiki ile gerçekleşmektedir. Kimi zaman ise hareket içerisinde kurumsallaşan ve etki alanını genişleten kadın siyasetçiler veya siyasal hareket içerisindeki erkeklerin yaşamlarındaki kadınların yön vermeleri ile bahsi geçen değişim olabilmektedir.

Sonuç olarak diğer ulusal davalarda ve milliyetçi hareketlerde olduğu gibi Kürt hareketi de kimlik mücadelesini kurup tarihini yazarken cinsiyetleri yeniden kurmayı hedeflemiş, kadın ve erkeği harekete geçirmek için çeşitli vaatlerde bulunmuştur. Kürt hareketinin söylemi süreç içerisinde kendisini revize ederek yeni cinsiyet söylemini kurmakta, kimlik mücadelesini sürdürürken gündelik hayatları da düzenlemeyi amaçlamıştır. Harekete eklenen cinsiyetler yeni cinsiyet özellikleri edinmekte. Bu bağlamda siyasallaşma güçlenmeyi ve kamusal alanda görünür olmayı beraberinde getirdiğinden kadınların çıkarına hizmet etmektedir. Ancak ulusal davaların erkekleri genellikle erkek egemen cinsiyet kodlarına yaslanarak erkeklik değerlerinin avantajından vazgeçmezken, kimi zaman da dâhil olunan davanın cinsiyet söylemi doğrultusunda kendisinde değişim yaratmak zorunda

kalmakta bu deęişim kimi zaman doęal akışında gerçekleşse de ulusal hareketlerin söyleminin içerisinde etkileşimin olmaması kaçınılmazdır. Sadakatle baęlı oldukları hareketin söylemi böylelikle yeni bir erkeklik kurmaktadır. Dolayısıyla milliyetçi süreçler cinsiyeti yeniden belirlemektedir.

### Sonnot:

<sup>1</sup> Deniz Kandiyoti, *Cariyeler, Bacılar, Yurttaşlar: Kimlikler ve Toplumsal Dönüşümler*, (Çev.) A. Bora ve dięerleri, Metis Yayınları, İstanbul, (1997).

<sup>2</sup> Abdullah Öcalan'ın yeni kadınlık ve yeni erkeklik söylemleri gerek derlenen röportajları gerek, gerek eğitimlerde yapılan deęerlendirmelerin derlenmesi gerekse de kendi yazdığı kitaplarda uzun uzun yer almaktadır. Bu konuyla ilgili daha ayrıntılı bilgi için; Mahir Sayın, *Erkeęi Öldürmek*, İstanbul: Zelal Yayınları, (1998), Abdullah Öcalan, *Nasıl Yaşamalı 1*, İstanbul: Mem Yayınları, (2000), Selahattin Erdem, *Kadın ve Aile Sorunu*, İstanbul: Melsa Yayınları, (1992), Abdullah Öcalan, *Kürdistan' da Kadın ve Aile*, Weşanen Serxwbûn, (1993) kitapları incelenebilir.

<sup>3</sup>[https://books.googleusercontent.com/books/content?req=AKW5Qaf9sfr6vuva2ygeNyxLjRxYF7pSEXtSYluJdTskPIGEBIUB1eCPsIS2m6SJAxqEhXRKvGzZnq8YC8AspVNR7fr0vTvMwBwk98JhmVMDVnqsNUDUCq4a4WO5Yqg4m07Ub\\_iKX2iw9bqYLtX3tcTDzL72r9N1mld9mueozQk\\_X32JnF8jDe5IvVqXQm32SNK\\_cBN9KS01MRFUuOvVxPmq9oWhwS3tSeiymDkt2LALT9BesdhBISioym5RFC1PrUl17FxSw5v9ee0GW3mIEIM4Cv5L8ceV-WUX7sATUSWIV3oUmhfqE](https://books.googleusercontent.com/books/content?req=AKW5Qaf9sfr6vuva2ygeNyxLjRxYF7pSEXtSYluJdTskPIGEBIUB1eCPsIS2m6SJAxqEhXRKvGzZnq8YC8AspVNR7fr0vTvMwBwk98JhmVMDVnqsNUDUCq4a4WO5Yqg4m07Ub_iKX2iw9bqYLtX3tcTDzL72r9N1mld9mueozQk_X32JnF8jDe5IvVqXQm32SNK_cBN9KS01MRFUuOvVxPmq9oWhwS3tSeiymDkt2LALT9BesdhBISioym5RFC1PrUl17FxSw5v9ee0GW3mIEIM4Cv5L8ceV-WUX7sATUSWIV3oUmhfqE) (Erişim Tarihi:05.08.2017).

<sup>4</sup>[https://books.googleusercontent.com/books/content?req=AKW5Qaf9sfr6vuva2ygeNyxLjRxYF7pSEXtSYluJdTskPIGEBIUB1eCPsIS2m6SJAxqEhXRKvGzZnq8YC8AspVNR7fr0vTvMwBwk98JhmVMDVnqsNUDUCq4a4WO5Yqg4m07Ub\\_iKX2iw9bqYLtX3tcTDzL72r9N1mld9mueozQk\\_X32JnF8jDe5IvVqXQm32SNK\\_cBN9KS01MRFUuOvVxPmq9oWhwS3tSeiymDkt2LALT9BesdhBISioym5RFC1PrUl17FxSw5v9ee0GW3mIEIM4Cv5L8ceV-WUX7sATUSWIV3oUmhfqE](https://books.googleusercontent.com/books/content?req=AKW5Qaf9sfr6vuva2ygeNyxLjRxYF7pSEXtSYluJdTskPIGEBIUB1eCPsIS2m6SJAxqEhXRKvGzZnq8YC8AspVNR7fr0vTvMwBwk98JhmVMDVnqsNUDUCq4a4WO5Yqg4m07Ub_iKX2iw9bqYLtX3tcTDzL72r9N1mld9mueozQk_X32JnF8jDe5IvVqXQm32SNK_cBN9KS01MRFUuOvVxPmq9oWhwS3tSeiymDkt2LALT9BesdhBISioym5RFC1PrUl17FxSw5v9ee0GW3mIEIM4Cv5L8ceV-WUX7sATUSWIV3oUmhfqE) (Erişim Tarihi:05.08.2017).

<sup>5</sup><http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/al-jazeera-ozel/bdpde-esbaskanlik-nasil-uygulanacak>(Erişimtarihi: 30.08.2014).

<sup>6</sup> <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=26138818&tarih=2014-04-02>(Erişim tarihi: 22.10.2014).

<sup>7</sup> <http://kaosgl.org/sayfa.php?id=17249> (Erişim tarihi: 02.11.2014).

<sup>8</sup>[http://www.ertugrulkurkcu.org/tbmm-de-ertugrul-kurkcu/turkiye-heteroseksuellerin-escinsellerin-hakkini-savundugu-zaman-baska-bir-ulke-olacak/#.U\\_izja9rMm8](http://www.ertugrulkurkcu.org/tbmm-de-ertugrul-kurkcu/turkiye-heteroseksuellerin-escinsellerin-hakkini-savundugu-zaman-baska-bir-ulke-olacak/#.U_izja9rMm8) (Erişim tarihi: 02.10.2014).

<sup>9</sup> <http://bianet.org/bianet/toplum/157435-demirtas-evet-lgbti-bireyler-icin-risk-aliyoruz?biasource=rss> (Erişim Tarihi:31.08.2018)

<sup>10</sup> Çalışma kapsamında görüşülen siyasetçilerin gerçek isimleri yazılmamıştır. Bu husus hem siyasetçilerin kendi talepleri hem de düşüncelerini kolaylıkla dile getirmeleri için tarafımda alınan bir önlemdir.

<sup>11</sup> Daha geniş bilgi için bkz. Eric Hobsbawm-Terence Ranger (1983), *Geleneğin İcadı*, Agora Yayıncılık ve Eric Hobsbawm, *Milletler ve Milliyetçilik: Program, Mit, Gerçeklik*, Çev. Osman Akınhay, Ayrıntı Yay., İstanbul.

<sup>12</sup> Kürtçe'den Türkçe'ye çeviri tarafımdan yapılmıştır.

### Görüşme Yapılan Katılımcılar

Sedat, 37 yaşında, BDP il başkanı, Batmanlı, ilkokul mezunu. Evli ve 2 çocuk babası, eşi çalışmıyor, 15 yıllık siyasi geçmişi var. Siyasi nedenlerden dolayı 10 yıl cezaevi öyküsü var.

Deniz, 37 yaşında, parti meclis üyesi, Erzurumlu, üniversite mezunu, bekâr, başından bir evlilik geçmiş, 19 yıllık siyasi geçmişi var.

Mehmet, 56 yaşında, belediye başkan yardımcısı, Batmanlı. Ön lisans mezunu, kamu kurumundan emekli, evli ve 6 çocuğu var. Eşi çalışmıyor, BDP' de siyasetçi, 12 Eylül olaylarından bu yana siyasi geçmişi var. Siyasi nedenlerden dolayı cezaevi öyküsü var.

Umut, 44 yaşında, belediye başkanı, Karşı, üniversite mezunu, evli ve iki çocuk babası, eşi çalışıyor, 30 yıllık siyasi geçmişi var, siyasi nedenlerden dolayı 2 yıl cezaevinde kalmış.

Hüseyin, 38 yaşında, BDP il yöneticisi, Diyarbakırlı, ilkokul mezunu, evli, 3 çocuğu var, eşi çalışıyor, 10 yıllık siyasi geçmişi var.

Ömer, 45 yaşında, parti meclisi üyesi, Diyarbakırlı, lise mezunu, nişanlı, 20 yıllık bir siyasi geçmişi var. Siyasi nedenlerden dolayı toplam 5 yıl cezaevinde kalmış.

Ali, 57 yaşında, belediye meclis üyesi, Batmanlı, ön lisans mezunu, emekli öğretmen, evli ve 5 çocuk babası, eşi ücretli bir işte çalışmamakla beraber siyasetçi, yaklaşık 30 yıldır Kürt siyaseti içerisinde siyaset yapıyor, siyasi nedenlerle 2 yıllık cezaevi öyküsü var.

Ahmet, 58 yaşında, BDP il yöneticisi, Şırnaklı, lise mezunu, evli ve 3 çocuk babası, eşi çalışmıyor, emekli, yaklaşık 30 yıldır Kürt siyaseti içerisinde siyaset yapıyor, siyasi nedenlerle 5 yıllık cezaevi öyküsü var.

Hasan, 41 yaşında, BDP il başkanı, Diyarbakırlı, üniversite mezunu, bekâr, 21 yıllık siyasi geçmişi var, siyasi nedenlerle 4 yıllık cezaevi öyküsü var.

Burhan, 55 yaşında, BDP il yöneticisi, Şırnaklı, ilkokul mezunu, evli ve 7 çocuk babası, eşi çalışmıyor, ticaret ile uğraşıyor, 30 yıldır Kürt siyaseti içerisinde siyaset yapıyor.

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## **BOOK REVIEWS**

## **Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, and Queer Effect**

**Mel Y. Chen**

Duke University Press, 2012, 312 pp.

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**M**el Y. Chen is Associate Professor of Gender & Women's Studies at U.C. Berkeley and Director of the Center for the Study of Sexual Culture. Chen's research areas include queer and gender theory, critical race theory and Asian American studies, disability studies, and critical linguistics. *Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, and Queer Affect* (2012) articulates a vigorous new materialist study of the concept of "animacy," and offers a compelling look at the multifaceted ways how animacy is defined as "an acknowledgment of a quality of agency, awareness, mobility, and liveness". Chen's aim is to "reconsider the precise conditions of the application of life and death, and the working ontologies (2012, p.1). By focusing on contemporary biopolitics such as Achille Mbembe's necropolitics and Giorgio Agamben's bare life, the book traverses modern disciplinary categories and makes a great fit for Duke University Press's *Perverse Modernities* series edited by Judith Halberstam and Lisa Lowe.

The main argument in Chen's book revolves around recent debates on sexuality, race, environment, and affect to reimagine and reformulate the matter that is once perceived as insensate, immobile, deathly or otherwise wrong. The book makes a gripping read and opens up thought-provoking questions about the ways in which the matter animates cultural life and works linguistically in important and complex ways. Chen, by using animacy as a central construct, seeks to upset the binary of life and nonlife by offering a different way of relationality and intersubjectivity that are predicated on sex, race, and class.

The book is arranged into three parts, with two chapters each: “Words”, “Animals” and “Metals”. These individual parts investigate a feature of animacy with a particular focus. In “Words,” the focus is on language and figural dehumanization; in “Animals,” the reader tracks a feature of animacy based on queer animals and animality; in “Metals,” toxicity becomes the main area of inquiry. Each chapter seeks to construe a transdisciplinary method aligned with Chen’s background in cognitive linguistics that refers to queer of color, feminist, and disability scholarship. In the “Introduction,” Chen discusses the multifaceted construals of life and death, underscoring contemporary biopolitics. In doing so, Chen revisits the concept of animacy, uncovering implicit mediations of human and inhuman, particularly in the transnationally conceived United States. In Chen’s analysis, the idea of animacy appears as “racialized and sexualized means of conceptual and affective” mediation between human and inhuman, animate and inanimate through different registers in language, rhetoric, and imagery. This kind of animate crossings and changing disciplinary intimacies are aptly concerned with questions of race, sexuality, and disability in each part.

In the first chapter of “Words”, “Language and Mattering Humans,” Chen investigates what linguists call an “animacy hierarchy” by rethinking language as animated through embodied condensation of social, cultural, and political life. In this chapter, Chen examines an exceptional form of linguistic usage to urge us to comprehend different gradations of animacy and objectification. By utilizing the concept of linguistic insult and its iterative power as representational injury, the author turns to questions of objectification that have been long discussed in critical race, feminist, and disability theory. Chen gives the example of “macaca” that was used by the U.S. Senator George Allan, a Republican from Virginia, at a rally for his candidacy for reelection to the Senate in 2006. The word macaca, as Chen mentions, is hinged on the complex historicity of racialized animality, illuminating such dehumanizing insults that allude to the nonhuman animal. In the second chapter named “Queer Animation”, Chen asks as follows: “If language helps us to coerce certain figures into nonbeing, or to demote on animacy hierarchy, then

what are the modes of revival, return, or rejoinder?"(2012, p.58). Here, Chen investigates the ways in which humans reclaim distressed agencies as a move toward political agency. By analyzing queer's multiple references and senses, Chen articulates on the idea that there are two lexicalized forms: a "re-animated queer verb," and a "de-animated queer noun" that unleash their own reclaimed animations.

In the second part, *Animals*, Chen delves into the problematics of presumed superiority of humans and politics of exclusion by questioning liberal humanism's fictions such as "treated me like a dog". This chapter revolves around the ways in which animality creeps into textures of humanness. In the third chapter "Queer Animality," Chen addresses racialized animacy and points to vibrancies of the queer figure, albeit paradoxically. The author uses performativity to gesture towards a theoretical kinship between queerness and animality. In doing so, Chen revisits the English philosopher J.L. Austin and his work "a marriage with a monkey" asking whether this is a response to heteronormative and righteous marriage. Chen also mentions that Shoshana Felman marks the monkey example as a "monstrous marriage," and "evidence of the black humor" of Austin's text, underwriting the function of "triviality of the witty example". Chen, then, questions the stakes of this kind of humor that the marriage provokes for its readers. Concerning animality, Chen also focuses on the late nineteenth and early twentieth century in terms of increased Asian immigration in the United States, illuminating how Chinese are promulgated as rats in visual media and advertisements. According to Chen, decentering the ontological cohesion of "the human" and blurring the hierarchy of human-animal-vegetable-mineral are some of the interventions that queer animacies offer. In chapter four "Animals, Sex, and Transsubstantiation," Chen begins with biopolitical questions of animal and human neutering and asks how gender and family are queered to address the challenges to the normativity of sex. Even though this chapter seems like a massive convoluted stretch, it invites an interesting queer analysis in animal neutering and castration, and hence rightly extends biopolitical thinking.

Animacy, for Chen, becomes a property of insensate particles and triggers anxiety about permeable borders, whether of skin or country. Thus, the final part “Metals,” revolves around the Chinese lead toys panic in the United States in 2007 and its representation in mainstream media. This part traces physical travel of lead as an industrial by-product, while referring to its representation of national security concerns and interests. In the fifth chapter “Lead’s Racial Matters,” Chen aptly traces lead’s *mythic origins*, and *mythic targets*, illuminating the fact that black children’s exposure to lead are ignored. In the sixth chapter “Following Mercurial Affect”, Chen shifts the book’s main perspective from a theoretical investigation of animacy to the biopolitical impact of environmental toxins on human bodies in terms of present-day emergent illnesses. According to Chen, the body’s fragility is constantly threatened by animacy that takes mobile and molecular form of mercury. In this chapter, Chen traces Roberto Esposito’s paradigm of community, immunity, and biopolitics. By tracing mercurial affect through immunity and biopolitics, Chen examines emergent illnesses in the context of environmental illnesses that reshape intimacies and forms of sociality as queer and disordered proximities. The last part, “Afterword: The Spill and the Sea”, deftly summarizes the affective politics surrounding both animate and inanimate things. Chen brings together the Oil Spill in the Gulf of Mexico (April 2010) and “the human-wanna-be fish,” protagonist of the animated Hayao Miyazaki film *Ponyo* (2008) in order to discuss unexpected affectivity and unruly agencies that surround and poison us.

Chen convincingly illuminates how scholars and activists might respond to hierarchies, racialized animacies, and environmental risks by recognizing the material agency of our own bodies entangled in the world. While *Animacies* invites readers to rethink their own corporeal permeability, the ways we consume and of course are consumed by others, it makes an intersectional mode of reading to trouble the human exceptionalism. *Animacies* urges us to understand our “vexed and often painful complicity” in the order of things and underlines “deconstructive consequences of contemporary biopolitics” in terms of an “ethics of care and sensitivity accompanied by political revision” (2012, p. 237). This

understanding renders an admirable hope and compelling analytical lens to bring to the fore possible queer intimacies that shake the humanist hierarchical ladder. However, the book's dispersion in terms of its analytical focus, at times, leaves some critical areas under-elaborated, and thus confuses the reader. Particularly, biopolitical theory Chen draws upon suffers from vague theoretical abstractedness. Even though Chen includes Mbembe's necropolitics and Agamben's bare life in terms of deconstruction of life and death, and mentions Esposito's immunity, the discussion on biopolitics needs substantive elaboration to escape heavy rhetorical moves throughout the book. The words such as animacy, animality, queer, and toxic are discussed compellingly, yet, at times, lack clarity and precision. That said, *Animacies* is an ambitious intellectual work that offers brilliant moments of slippage in terms of queering human subjects, objects, and affect.

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## **Masculinities under Neoliberalism**

**Andrea Cornwall, Frank G. Karioris and Nancy Lindisfarne**

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**M***asculinities under Neoliberalism*, edited by Andrea Cornwall, Frank G. Karioris and Nancy Lindisfarne, is a collection of ethnographic studies seeking to examine emergent masculinities performed under neoliberal rationality. The book is a follow-up to Cornwall and Lindisfarne's earlier edited book, *Dislocating Masculinity* (1994), a seminal work that has advanced our understanding of hegemonic and subordinate masculinities. This book, therefore, builds on the conception of multiple masculinities that are formed across complex dynamics of power and difference. It expands upon an understanding of gender fluidity by means of focusing on neoliberal contexts. In this respect, this is a groundbreaking collection that makes an indispensable contribution to poststructuralist perspectives in masculinity studies.

The book is comprised of seventeen chapters. The introduction authored by Andrea Cornwall and the second chapter authored by Nancy Lindisfarne and Jonathan Neale offer precursory analyses of two major concepts: neoliberalism and masculinity. Remaining fifteen chapters present thought-provoking ethnographic accounts of transforming masculine enactments in specific socio-economic contexts. I believe that the merit of this book lies in its far-reaching scope. The studies presented in this collection come from varying cultural and economic contexts such as Russia, China, South India, Morocco, the United Arab Emirates, Brazil, Sierra Leone, Angola, Zimbabwe, Gambia, Britain, Jamaica, New Zealand and the USA. Besides, the contributors investigate

masculinities dealing with diverse practices and relations such as family relations, sex tourism, embodiment, transnational mobility, street cultures, intergenerational relations, religiosity, faith-based organizations, football cultures, hunting and intimacy.

Andrea Cornwall, in her introductory chapter, frames neoliberalism by drawing on Foucauldian terms –as an art of government that cultivates the norms of entrepreneurialism, competition and self-responsibilization, and produces certain subjectivities abiding by this normativity. Viewing through this lens, this book seeks to answer the question of how neoliberal mode of self-making is manifested or contested in masculinities. In a similar vein, Nancy Lindisfarne and Jonathan Neale identify three main axes of the gendered nature of neoliberalism: (i) individualization of one’s success or failure to conform to masculine norms, (ii) increasing salience of gender differences, and (iii) new or reinforced symbolic/material demarcations between the elite and the ordinary.

Framing gendered character of neoliberalism from this vantage point, a number of studies focus on economic uncertainties, which recent socio-economic changes have brought along, and the way that they remake masculine identities. Charlie Walker’s examination of working class men in contemporary Russia, for instance, reveals how men engaged in manual labor face with new forms of inequalities as a result of the collapse of Soviet system and de-industrialization. He illustrates the age-based differentiation in men’s experiences of impoverishment, devalorization of manual work and precarity. Penny Vera-Sanso illustrates the difficulties of men to sustain the provider role along with increasing costs of living, and constraining and informal work opportunities. She suggests that these difficulties redefine the gender and age-based hierarchies within the households. Luisa Enria examines the construction of *tough* masculinity through street cultures, which is portrayed by policy-makers as a threat to post-war Sierra Leone’s economic and political stability.



The redefinition of idealized masculinities through the rise of entrepreneurial subjectivities is the overriding attention of several authors. Ross Wignall's study on gendered discourses of self-making, for instance, dissects how faith-based organizations (namely Young Men's Christian Association – YMCA) feature and promote certain models of masculinity. She gives a potent account of 'neoliberal masculinities' by suggesting that YMCA seeks to align masculine aggression with business models of leadership. Likewise, Mairtin Mac an Ghaill and Chris Haywood shed light on the discursive frameworks idealizing entrepreneurialism while simultaneously emphasizing the Britishness and reinforcing the depictions of Muslim men through the terms of extremism and radicalization. Their study brings forth the narratives of young Muslim men negotiating these discursive constructions. John Spall's research illuminates the ascent of masculinities valorizing monetary wealth, consumerism and global lifestyles in post-war Angola. Bearing in mind this transformation, he illustrates the intergenerational conflicts between the male veterans of civil war and their sons. Rachel O'Neill explores London's emergent pickup industry and the ways that it cultivates neoliberal regimes of intimacy. She illustrates the intricate ways of governing men's bodies and practices to enact 'successful' masculinity while interacting with others in this pickup industry.

Other chapters draw on the local cultural contexts and deal with the (re)making of masculinities in neoliberal uncertainties. Xiaodong Lin, for instance, scrutinizes the cultural effects of China's socio-economic transformation from planned to market economy. In this transformation, he sees the robustness of traditional familial norms in male migrant workers' gender identities. Diane Jeater's study elaborates on novel forms of religiosity that come along market rationality in Zimbabwe and revitalize traditional gender norms. The shifting regimes of religiosity, she contends, are a callback for masculine norms re-approving of polygyny, virility, and sexual violence as markers of men's wealth and authority.

Another theme some authors deal with is transnational mobilities. Joe Hayns' study examining Moroccan men's relations with European

tourists in the tourist destinations of Marrakech sets an example of this dimension. Considering these interactions as a neo-colonial institution of globalized world, he views that Moroccan men constitute a subordinate masculinity due to not conforming to gender and sexual norms. Jane Bristol-Rhys and Caroline Osella provide an analysis of masculine hierarchies in the United Arab Emirates' multi-ethnic context. They illustrate the complex dynamics of these hierarchies situating men according to their ethnicities and embodiment. Adriana Piscitelli's research examines the Brazilian masculine body as a social construct through sexualized and racialized gaze. Conducting a comparative ethnographic research in Brazil and Spain, she, then, scrutinizes how Brazilian *capoeiristas* diversely experience and perform this embodiment.

Among these accounts, some authors set forth the possibilities of alternative constructions resisting dominant discourses and practices. In his study on football cultures in Jamaica, William Tantam explains the football field as an arena in which middle and lower-class men perform contrasting images of masculinities. He then regards that field as a performative domain of lower class men where they recuperate their masculinities suffering from precarious employment and symbolic violence. Frank G. Kariotis provides an analysis of campus life in a US university, which is intricately characterized by symbolic and material hierarchies. Within this context, he finds a sense of friendship that informs students' masculinities and its creative capacities to alter neoliberal self-making. Carmen McLeod examines the practice of hunting and its centrality to rural masculinity in New Zealand. Although hunting's association with hypermasculine performances, she suggests, neoliberal discourses transform it into its more egalitarian variants.

Although it is a notable collection intricately dealing with gendered nature of neoliberalism, there are some drawbacks that require some attention here. I believe that some studies would benefit from a more detailed contextualization. In particular, Jane Bristol-Rhys and Caroline Osella's chapter on the construction of masculine stereotypes in Emirati society needs a further elaboration on country-

specific characteristics of transnational mobility. Likewise, William Tantam's chapter on football cultures in Jamaica fleetingly and superficially touches upon the economic marginality which lower class men suffer from. As it stands, they portray static cultural images of masculinity. Thus, they hardly conform to the historicity of gender identities, as it is conceptually framed in theoretical chapters. Apart from these, Carmen McLeod's chapter on men's hunting in New Zealand barely provides an account of neoliberalism. It is not clear how the author comes to conclude that neoliberalism is gendered. Therefore, this chapter is vaguely linked to the general theme of this collection.

Overall, this collection broadens our horizons, revealing diverse ways that neoliberalism unmakes and remakes masculinities in different contexts. This book could be read as a caution to avoid omnivalent conceptions of masculinity and neoliberalism. Chapters unanimously call for considering intricacies of gendered lives getting tortuously twisted in neoliberal times. In this sense, it is a resourceful book for those interested in gendering of contemporary capitalism.

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Masculinities primarily offers interdisciplinary and pioneering research in the field of gender and masculinity, necessarily outreaching into arts, literature, history, sociology, philosophy, communications, linguistics, and medicine. The editor(s) welcome scholarly and critical contributions, including articles, book and film reviews, reviews of the published articles as well as Announcements of forthcoming events, conference reports, and information on other matters of interest to gender studies and/or masculinity studies. The submissions are accepted after a double blind peer review process of evaluation and main criteria of admission are originality, theoretical and methodological sophistication, scholarly significance, and clarity. The editors reserve the right to accept or reject submissions for publication. Any changes to the text submitted will be clarified with the author before publication.

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